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ABSTRACT 
Thomas, Daniel. M.A. International and Comparative Politics Graduate Program, School 
of Public and International Affairs, Wright State University, 2019. The Use of Force: 
Hard Offensive Counterterrorism.  
 
 
 
 In the following research, I investigate whether hard offensive counterterrorism 
results in the failure or success of a counterterrorism strategy. In the second chapter, the 
academic literature of counterterrorism strategies is examined. Next, a hypothesis is put 
forth that if a hard offensive counterterrorism strategy is utilized, indicators such as high 
troop levels, more civilian casualties, more negative public opinion, and an increased rate 
of terrorism, will point to a failed counterterrorism strategy. Then, I put forth a 
methodology to test the hypothesis while introducing troop level databases, various 
public opinion polling sources, and terrorist attack databases to investigate the given 
variables. In the third chapter, a case study of the Iraq War is utilized, in which the initial 
invasion from 2003-2006 and the Surge/Withdrawal eras from 2007-2011 are examined. 
Both time periods are compared to see if hard offensive counterterrorism used in 2003-
2006 resulted in a less effective counterterrorism campaign than the softer 
counterinsurgency strategies from 2007-2011. Data from the Brookings Iraq Index, Iraq 
Body Count, and Global Terrorism Database are then analyzed to investigate the 
variables of casualties, public opinion, and rate of terrorism during each era in Iraq. In the 
fourth chapter, the war in Afghanistan is presented as a case study. I then evaluate 
whether hard offensive counterterrorism used from 2001-2008 resulted in less terrorism 
than the counterinsurgency strategies of Surge and withdrawal used from 2009-2016. 
Data from the Congressional Research Service, UNAMA, Physicians for Social 
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Responsibility, the BBC, the Asia Foundation, and the Global Terrorism Database are 
then utilized to assess each variable. Finally, I present my findings and conclude that 
evaluating a strategy primarily using hard offensive counterterrorism strategies is rather 
complex and then present ideas for future research in counterterrorism strategy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Terrorism has been around for a long time, yet until recently, terrorism was not a 
major area of policy concern in most countries. Since September 11, 2001, however, 
terrorism is a threat that many states now take seriously. The United States and other 
nations have elevated counterterrorism efforts to the highest consideration in policy 
circles. The main strategy of the United States immediately following 9/11 was to fight a 
so called “War on Terror”. In this strategy, President George W. Bush utilized rhetoric 
marked by an “either with us or against us” mantra. The new global counterterrorism 
effort focused on bringing groups responsible for terrorist attacks to justice and 
preventing the next attack.1 Since declaring war on terrorism, the United States embarked 
on serious military campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite all this conflict, it is 
unclear whether this strategy has succeeded in reducing terrorism against the 
United States.  
 I introduce a new categorization of counterterrorism strategies to help define what 
hard offensive counterterrorism is. Hard offensive terrorism is military force utilized in 
effort to pre-empt terrorist attacks from occurring. Other counterterrorism strategies 
confront terrorism through means that are more cooperative with populations susceptible 
to terrorist activity or focus strictly on the prevention of terrorism. In some cases, 
counterterrorism strategies can be hybrids of the different categories of counterterrorism, 
                                                     
1 Margaret Purdy, “Countering Terrorism: The Missing Pillar,” International Journal 60, no. 1 (Winter, 
2004/2005), 4-5. 
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such as counterinsurgency. An important question to answer is how do we measure the 
success of a hard offensive counterterrorism strategy? 
 A methodology is presented to structure an evaluation of whether hard 
counterterrorism results in the success or failure of a given counterterrorism campaign. If 
the given hypothesis that hard offensive terrorism results in counterterrorism failure, then 
indicators such as troop levels, civilian casualties, public opinion, and the rate of 
terrorism should indicate that is the case. Two case studies in counterterrorism strategies 
are utilized. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan feature three different eras of 
counterterrorism strategies. In the first phase of both wars, hard offensive 
counterterrorism in the form of a “traditional war” strategy was utilized. In the second 
phase of the wars, a “Surge’ featuring counterinsurgency tactics was the primary strategy 
used. In the third phase of each war, a withdrawal of troops was implemented, while 
tactics from the Surge were still used. In each phase, the type of counterterrorism used 
will point to indicators determining whether its implementation helped the U.S. to 
succeed or fail in each given era. 
 In the chapter covering the Iraq War, I start by examining the history and politics 
of the “traditional war period” in Iraq from 2003-2006. In this section, qualitative 
evidence points to a failing counterterrorism strategy that resulted in a dangerous and 
chaotic Iraq. In the following data analysis section, I find that the hard offensive 
counterterrorism tactic used, combined with increased troops, high civilian casualties, 
and negative public opinion helped to increase the number of terrorist attacks in Iraq from 
2003-2006, therefore making the initial invasion period of Iraq a failure in countering 
terrorism. 
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 In another subsection, the history and politics of the “Surge” and withdrawal 
periods in Iraq from 2007-2011 are investigated. Evidence from the Surge period shows 
that the counterinsurgency strategy of the Surge helped to dramatically improve the 
security conditions from the chaotic pre-Surge period. In the subsequent data analysis, I 
find that Surge counterinsurgency tactics, when combined with increased troop levels 
actually helped to decrease civilian casualties, increase positive public opinion, and 
decrease the rate of terrorism when the Surge was at full strength. Therefore, the Surge in 
Iraq was a success. After the withdrawal was implemented, however, public opinion and 
the rate of terrorism returned to pre-Surge levels. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from 
Iraq was therefore a failure, which lends evidence that too few troops can also have an 
adverse effect on the success or failure of a counterterrorism strategy. 
 For the chapter on the war in Afghanistan, I first look at the history and politics of 
the pre-Surge period from 2001-2009. During the pre-Surge era, Afghanistan witnessed 
an increase in violence and instability similar to that in Iraq. Upon examining the data 
trends, hard offensive counterterrorism once again involved increasingly high levels of 
troops, high civilian casualties, low public opinion, and resulted in a high rate of 
terrorism, and contributed to the failure of the 2001-2009 counterterrorism strategy. 
 In the next section, the history and politics of the 2009-2016 Surge and 
Withdrawal eras in Afghanistan are reviewed. Based on qualitative evidence, the Surge 
resulted in a very brief improvement to conditions within Afghanistan, but the imminent 
withdrawal helped to reverse counterterrorism gains. In the data section, the primary 
counterinsurgency strategy, when paired with increased troop levels, briefly exhibited 
reductions in civilian casualties, improved public opinion, and a lower rate of terrorism. 
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However, because the COIN strategy coexisted with increasingly hard offensive 
counterterrorism tactics, such as leadership decapitation, and was only full strength for a 
brief period, improvements were less noticeable than in Iraq. The following withdrawal 
period saw increases in casualties, lowered public opinion, and higher terrorism, helping 
lead to counterterrorism failure in Afghanistan. 
 In the final chapter, I conclude that hard offensive counterterrorism can result in 
an overall failed counterterrorism strategy. In contrast, a softer method of 
counterterrorism, such as counterinsurgency, can help to lower terrorism rates. However, 
too few troops in a counterinsurgency strategy can also lead to failures in 
counterterrorism. In addition, I argue that the success or failure of counterterrorism also 
depends on context, and several other factors other than the indicators tested likely played 
a complex role in the success or failure of a given counterterrorism strategy. I then 
conclude this study in counterterrorism by discussing possible future areas of research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
Academic research is largely inconclusive on the effectiveness of particular 
counterterrorism strategies. For example, some political scientists support evidence that 
there is an over reliance on military strategy to fight terrorism.2 They warn that trying to 
solely eradicate terrorism in the short term rather than attempting to manage it long term 
has significant implications that can negatively impact counterterrorism success.3 In this 
academic research, several causal mechanisms have been examined, including causal 
mechanisms such as alienation and collateral damage. However, these explanations have 
been largely inconclusive. 
Because of this ambiguity, it is important to review the literature of offensive 
counterterrorism and how it may have the capacity to backfire. In the literature review, 
three prevailing trends are examined. These include research on the definitions of 
counterterrorism, the various strategies of counterterrorism, and the mechanisms of 
counterterrorist backlash. Additionally, a methodology is proposed to measure whether 
certain counterterrorism strategies do in fact have a negative impact on counterterrorism 
efforts. 
First, it is important to understand the open-ended nature of counterterrorism. As 
Jason Rinehart states, counterterrorism is a vague concept to define and there is no 
universally accepted method of counterterrorism.4 The lack of a single monolithic use of 
counterterrorism is highlighted by the fact that “every conflict involving terrorism has its 
                                                     
2 Purdy, “Countering Terrorism,” 5. 
3 Purdy, 16. 
4 Jason Rinehart, “Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,” Perspectives on Terrorism 4, no. 5 (2010), 
32. 
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own unique characteristics” that alters the way it is fought.5 In one definition, the US 
army defines counterterrorism as “operations that include the offensive measures taken to 
prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism,” which could include a vast variety of 
tactics.6 
Ronald Crelinsten further emphasizes the definitional flexibility of 
counterterrorism by exploring two sides of what he sees as a contested strategic 
argument. On one side, “the criminal justice model” emphasizes the rule of law and 
views terrorism as a crime.7 On the other side, the “war model” views terrorism as a new 
form of warfare.8 Because of the broad theorization common in the literature, 
counterterrorism contains a plethora of different strategies that can be utilized. 
There are four specific types of strategies common in the counterterror literature. 
First, Nacos distinguishes between hard and soft counterterror strategies. Hard strategies 
can be defined as “command power that can be used to induce others to change their 
positions,” and often emphasize the use of military force.9 These strategies include tactics 
such as military invasion, drone strikes, and special operations raids. Second, Nacos 
discusses soft strategies, which are designed to co-opt people rather than coerce them.10 
Soft power contains strategies such as economic aid, community policing, and 
diplomacy, often focusing on long term terrorism mitigation. 
There is also a distinction between offensive and defensive counterterrorism. 
Sandler defines offensive terrorism as strategies “which seek to limit or destroy terrorist 
                                                     
5 Rinehart, “Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,” 32. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ronald Crelinsten, Counterterrorism, (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009), 13. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Brigitte L. Nacos, Terrorism and Counterterrorism, (New York: Routledge, 2016), 257. 
10 Ibid. 
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resources.”11 Offensive strategies are used primarily to pre-empt terrorist attacks. For 
example, a government might choose to utilize a special operations mission to destroy 
critical terrorist infrastructure. In contrast, defensive minded strategies are designed to 
harden the security of terrorist targets and are often reactive measures to an attempted 
terrorist attack.12 For example, Sandler cites that airport security began to screen 
passenger’s shoes in response to the failed shoe bomber mission.13  
In regard to counterterrorist strategy, a problem exists in categorizing specific 
types of strategy. There is no general list of strategies, so individual scholars often 
explain their own arbitrary lists. For example, Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorcheva 
list strategies such as deterrence, “persuasion, … economic aid and democratization, 
appeasement, and military force.”14 This variation across authors makes it difficult to 
compare strategies. I propose a new classification combining the insights of Nacos and 
Sandler, including four different broad categories of counterterror strategy shown in 
Figure 1. 
The hard offensive portion of the chart includes tactics that are military in nature 
and attempt to destroy terrorist resources either to pre-empt or to retaliate against terrorist 
attacks. Hard defensive strategies are intended to increase protection for the targets of 
terrorism, but still include the use of force. In a soft offensive strategy, pre-empting 
terrorist activity is the goal, but the strategies elicit cooperation from populations 
susceptible to terrorist ideology. Lastly, soft defensive strategies are non-violent reactions 
                                                     
11 Todd Sandler, “Introduction: New Frontiers of Terrorism Research: An Introduction,” Journal of Peace 
Research 48, no. 3 (May 2011), 281. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done,” International 
Security 30, no. 3 (2005), 89. 
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intended to mitigate the damage of successful terrorist attacks. Counterterrorism tactics 
are not limited to those listed above, but the strategic categories provide a framework for 
understanding counterterrorism efforts. 
Many political scientists try to weigh which types of counterterror strategies are 
the most and least effective. Several political science studies focus on hard offensive 
terrorism strategies, which are theorized to cause significant harm to counterterrorism 
efforts. An in depth look at several hard offensive strategies is necessary to understand 
why they can backfire. 
 
Figure 1. Counterterrorism Strategies 
Defensive Offensive 
 
 
Target hardening, border 
controls, airport security, 
criminal justice. 
Military invasion, drone 
strikes, special operations, 
deterrence. 
Hard 
Emergency preparedness, 
public health precautions, 
incident response. 
 
Community policing, 
propaganda, foreign aid, 
diplomacy, long term 
strategies. 
Soft 
 
First, drone strikes and special operations can often be loosely defined under the 
same umbrella of leadership decapitation tactics. The main theory behind leadership 
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decapitation is that the targeted killing of leaders in a given terrorist organization often 
causes the organization to collapse.15 Some political scientists, such as Patrick Johnston 
and Bryan Price theorize that leadership decapitation does in fact succeed in crippling 
terrorist organizations. After examining “207 terrorist groups from 1970 to 2008,” Price 
concludes that killing terrorist leaders “significantly increases the mortality rate of 
terrorist groups.”16 Similarly, Johnston utilizes a statistical analysis that suggests that 
terrorism campaigns are more likely to end after leadership decapitation.17  
However, not all academics agree with these studies. Jenna Jordan takes a more 
nuanced approach, stating that leadership decapitation is only effective in a quarter of 
successful assassinations. Jordan explores evidence that several factors, such as 
leadership styles, organizational cohesion, and communal support, can often change the 
outcome of leadership decapitation.18 For example, Jordan finds that leadership 
decapitation used against al-Qaeda affiliated groups is unlikely to succeed because of 
their highly bureaucratic structure and popular support in their homelands.19 Jordan also 
finds that leadership assassination attempts carry unintended consequences, such as 
recruiting surges and retaliatory strikes, not to mention accidental civilian casualties.20 
Second, traditional war campaigns are also popular hard offensive terrorism 
tactics. A traditional war strategy generally entails the classic military strategy of 
                                                     
15 Jenna Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation 
Strikes,” International Security 38, no. 4 (2014), 9. 
16 Bryan C. Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to 
Counterterrorism,” 
International Security 36, no. 4 (2012): 25. 
17 Patrick B. Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in 
Counterinsurgency Campaigns,” International Security 36 no.4 (2012), 62. 
18 Jordan, 21. 
19 Jordan, 25. 
20 Jordan, 35. 
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defeating the enemy on the battlefield, the strategy initially used in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan in the “War on Terrorism”. Crelinsten refers to traditional war as the “war 
model” of counterterrorism. In this strategy, terrorists are considered enemy combatants 
and engagement is restricted to the rules of war and international law.21 As is customary 
with traditional war between states, the war model utilizes “maximal force,” which is 
“designed to overpower the enemy.”22 Success in a war model strategy “tends to be 
defined in terms of victory or defeat.”23 Therefore, counterterrorism efforts have to 
continue as long as the terrorist threat is viable, which can often lead to protracted or 
“never-ending war.”24 
Third, political scientists such as Trager and Zagorcheva also theorize that 
counterterrorism strategies can operate similar to state deterrence. According to Stephen 
Quackenbush, deterrence theory states that “in order to deter attacks, a state must 
persuade a potential attacker that it has effective military capability,” it can impose heavy 
costs, and that their threats will be carried out when attacked.25 Like states deterring 
states, terrorist organizations can be “deterred from actions that harm targeted states” by 
the use or threat of force.26 Kevin Chilton and Greg Weaver support this theory of 
counterterror deterrence, calling for customized strategies “tailor made” for the unique 
threat that terrorist organizations pose.27  
                                                     
21 Crelinsten, Counterterrorism, 48. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Crelinsten, 75. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Stephen L. Quackenbush, “Deterrence Theory: Where do we Stand?” Review of International Studies 37, 
no. 2 (2011): 742. 
26 Trager and Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism,” 88. 
27 Gen. Kevin Chilton and Greg Weaver, “Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,” Strategic 
Studies Quarterly (2009), 34. 
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Other political scientists like Robert Pape have criticized the effectiveness of 
deterrence, stating that terrorists are irrational (therefore undeterred by cost-benefit 
calculations), are so highly motivated they don’t fear death, and lack a return address for 
states to retaliate against.28 In response, Trager and Zagorcheva argue that terrorist groups 
do in fact often have rationally ordered goals, have less motivated individuals that 
support them, and can be tied down to specific geographic locations.29 For example, 
lower level support for terrorists such as financiers, religious figures, or lower level “foot 
soldiers” can be easily dissuaded using deterrence by punishment or deterrence by 
denial.30 In doing so, even the most highly motivated terrorist can be undone by this loss 
of support.31 This line of thinking is also supported by Chilton and Weaver, who believe 
these support components of terrorist networks are incredibly susceptible to influence by 
counterterrorist efforts.32 
However, more substantial doubts can be leveled at deterrence through 
quantitative means. In one study, counterterrorist retaliation by Israel often resulted in no 
significant deviation from the quarterly rate of terrorist attacks.33 From this observation, 
the authors posit that “terrorists have rational expectations about the retaliation they 
receive,” meaning they are rarely surprised by counterterror retaliatory strikes.34 In fact, 
the only reprisal that produced any kind of change was the Israeli reprisal in response to 
the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre, one of the first notable terrorist attacks in the 
                                                     
28 Trager and Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism,” 87. 
29 Trager and Zagorcheva, 89. 
30 Trager and Zagorcheva, 96. 
31 Trager and Zagorcheva, 98. 
32 Chilton and Weaver, “Waging Deterrence,” 37-38. 
33 Bryan Brophy-Baermann and John A. C. Conybeare, “Retaliating Against Terrorism: Rational 
Expectations and the Optimality of Rules versus Discretion,” American Journal of Political Science 38, no. 
1 (1994), 197. 
34 Ibid. 
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twentieth century.35 The lack of the element of surprise puts heavy doubt on whether 
deterrence (specifically retaliatory strikes) is a tenable long term strategy for disrupting 
terrorism.36 
Are there ways that the use of hard offensive strategies can become 
counterproductive? Pape believes that when hard offensive counterterrorism is utilized 
and becomes a protracted occupation, suicide terrorism increases. Defined, occupation is 
the “exertion of political control over territory by an outside power,” which could create 
resentment in local populations.37 As evidence, Pape refers to the rate of suicide terrorism 
in Iraq. Before the U.S. occupation, there were no recorded incidents of suicide 
bombing.38 By 2003, the first suicide attacks began shortly after the U.S. invasion and 
increased over “the course of the next few years.”39 What, if any causal mechanisms can 
explain this phenomenon?  
Three potentially significant causal mechanisms can explain harmful effects of 
hard offensive counterterrorism. First, occupation is looked to by political scientists as a 
possible source of backlash to hard offensive counterterrorism. Pape is one proponent of 
citing occupation as a harmful effect. Pap, as mentioned previously, defines occupation 
as “the exertion of political control over a territory by an outside group” and believes that 
a local community chafes at a foreign military when force is used to prevent a change in 
government “that would otherwise occur” if foreign troops left.40 In turn, occupation 
                                                     
35 Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare, “Retaliating Against Terrorism,” 196. 
36 Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare, 209. 
37 Pape, Robert A. and James K. Feldman. Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism & 
How to Stop it, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), 20-21. 
38 Pape and Feldman, Cutting the Fuse, 30. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Pape and Feldman, 20-21. 
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pushes members of the community to “extreme sacrifices” to resist foreign influence, 
such as engaging in suicide terrorism.41 
Second, political scientists examine the role of collateral damage. Luke Condra 
and Jacob Shapiro define collateral damage as “what happens when civilians are caught 
in the crossfire.”42 More simply put, collateral damage is the unavoidable, but 
unintentional damage (such as injury or death) to civilians who are uninvolved in 
combat.43 Causally, Condra and Shapiro studied the war in Iraq and determined that the 
more civilian killings that were attributed to the United States resulted in an increase in 
insurgent violence.44 Conversely, the more civilians killed by insurgents resulted in less 
support for insurgent groups.45 
Thirdly, the literature examines alienation as a detrimental effect. Studying the 
Uyghur population in China, Christopher Cunningham believes that the alienation of the 
Uyghur minority in Xinjiang province by China has led to an increase in terrorist 
activity.46 According to Cunningham, alienation can be defined as resentment or anger in 
a community when they are discriminated against or are prevented from expressing their 
culture and religion.47 Alienation is defined in various ways across the literature, but 
alienation is a solid potential factor of harmful counterterrorism. 
                                                     
41 Pape and Feldman, Cutting the Fuse, 20. 
42 Luke N. Condra and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Who Takes the Blame? The Strategic Effects of Collateral 
Damage,” American Journal of Political Science 56, no. 1 (2012), 167. 
43 Colin H. Kahl, “In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs? Norms, Civilian Casualties, and U.S. Conduct in 
Iraq.” International Security 32, No. 1 (2007): 10. 
44 Condra and Shapiro, 175. 
45 Condra and Shapiro, 167. 
46 Christopher P. Cunningham, “Counterterrorism in Xinjiang: The ETIM, China, and the Uyghurs,” 
International Journal on World Peace 29, no. 3 (2012), 20. 
47 Cunningham, 19. 
 
 
14 
 
In comparison to hard offensive terrorism, does using a softer counterterrorism 
method yield better results in countering terrorism? For instance, what if 
counterinsurgency, or COIN, used during the Surges in Iraq and Afghanistan worked 
better than traditional war strategy? Unlike other counterterrorism strategies, COIN 
doesn’t fit neatly into any of the categorizations of counterterrorism in Figure 1. Because 
of this, I would argue that COIN is a hybrid counterterrorism strategy borrowing tactics 
from multiple categories. Counterinsurgency is defined as a strategy that “recognizes a 
military solution to a conflict is not feasible, only a combined military, political, and 
civilian solution is possible.”48 Because of its reliance on winning hearts and minds of the 
populace, COIN borrows many ideas from soft counterterrorism, in addition to tactics 
borrowed from hard offensive counterterrorism. Therefore, perhaps a COIN strategy 
results in less blowback than utilizing a true hard offensive counterterrorism strategy. 
To further explore COIN, Rinehart separates two competing types of 
counterinsurgency campaigns, classical and modern. Classical counterinsurgency (the 
model for the Surge in Iraq and Afghanistan) is “confined within the borders of a single 
state” and focuses on training local forces, developing quality local governance, and 
blocking opponents form receiving outside support.49 On the other hand, modern 
counterinsurgency takes on a more global meaning. Global COIN is similar to classical 
COIN, but the scale is much larger, like the international fight against various al-Qaeda 
franchises.50 
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The drawback to COIN being utilized as a counterterrorism tactic is that it might 
not actually be a counterterrorism tactic at all. According to Michael Boyle, 
counterterrorism and COIN “aren’t necessarily compatible or mutually reinforcing,” 
meaning that using both interchangeably might be counterproductive.51 Clearly 
distinguishing between COIN and counterterrorism in Afghanistan, Boyle states that “a 
CT mission would focus exclusively on al-Qaeda, offering little or no support to the 
Karzai government.”52 Conversely, a COIN mission would entail “a comprehensive 
commitment to defeating the Taliban and rebuilding the Afghan state while destroying al-
Qaeda operatives there.”53 The problem with fusing the two approaches is that the United 
States runs the risk of generating offsetting costs such as popular backlash, a legitimacy 
gap, and diminished leverage.54 The legitimacy gap is a very real risk in Afghanistan: the 
Afghan government needs to be seen as the legitimate state, but this is difficult when they 
must allow for unpopular strikes against the enemy.55 Balancing both strategies could 
mean that the Afghan government will be less willing to cooperate with U.S. forces in the 
future. 
In the next section, I propose a methodology to measure and compare the 
effectiveness of hard offensive terrorism and counterinsurgency strategies against each 
other, and see which strategy resulted in counterterrorism backlash and failure. First, 
several conceptual issues are resolved. Second, a hypothesis is presented to predict what 
findings are expected from the comparison between the two counterterrorism strategies. 
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Third, independent and dependent variables are identified, and several data sources are 
introduced. 
Methodology 
In order to accurately measure the backlash of counterterrorism, several 
conceptual issues must be resolved. First, a working definition of terrorism is needed. For 
the purpose of this research, a useful definition might be the one provided by Kydd and 
Walter. According to the authors, terrorism is “the use of violence against civilians by 
non-state actors to attain political goals.”56 Kydd and Walter’s definition restricts the 
ideas of terrorism away from terrorist military targets as well as the use of terrorism by 
states. By avoiding these two categorizations, Kydd and Walter help to simplify terrorism 
into a less controversial definition by limiting points of academic contention. In order to 
limit the scope of the methodology even further, future research should be limited to a 
specific region of terrorism. To better measure occupation, alienation, or collateral 
damage, a possible area of terrorism to look at is terrorism occurring in the Middle East 
region. By limiting the research in such a way, measurements on the dependent variable 
can be neatly kept in a single population group. 
I hypothesize that if a highly aggressive hard offensive counterterrorist strategy is 
utilized then it is likely the overall counterterrorism campaign will fail. To measure the 
hypothesis, counterterrorism strategies will be considered the independent variable. Two 
levels of dependent variables are critical to the study. First, the direct impact of 
counterterrorist strategies should reveal increased levels of occupation, alienation, and 
collateral damage. Occupation will be measured by the number of troops stationed in the 
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country, specifically of foreign origin, as recorded by troop level database. Alienation can 
be measured through political surveys that record negative public opinion (such as anger, 
rage, humiliation, etc.) in a given country. Collateral damage can be measured by the 
number of civilian casualties reported. At the second level of dependent variable, there 
should be a correlated rise in terrorist attacks in tandem with an increase of occupation, 
alienation, and collateral damage, which then helps evaluate whether a counterterrorism 
campaign was effective or not. 
The invasions, counterinsurgency campaigns (or Surge), and withdrawals in both 
Iraq and Afghanistan by the United States are optimal cases and help to build a most 
similar systems comparison. This comparison allows for control over the independent 
variable, as well as the first level of the dependent variables. By doing so, I can examine 
how the “traditional war” stage of American occupation, COIN Surge, and withdrawal all 
correlate with the rate of terrorist activity, examining the success or failure of the 
counterterrorism campaign. 
To measure the independent variable of hard offensive counterterrorism, I will 
provide qualitative evidence of how tactics differed between the preliminary invasion and 
the Surge that followed. Along with a plethora of other sources, Peter Mansoor as well as 
Peter Hahn have extensive historical and military backgrounds on the Iraq War in each of 
their published books which will be incredibly helpful.  
For the dependent variables, several sources of data will be used. For measuring 
occupation, I will look at the number of troops used during each military campaign. U.S. 
and NATO records, such as the Boots on the Ground reports provided to Congress, can 
provide this information. To measure alienation, public opinion polls from the country in 
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question will be used, from media outlets such as the BBC and Gallup, as well specific 
polling sources such as the Brookings Institute Iraq Index and the Asia Foundation. 
Measuring collateral damage will involve data sets that provide an estimate of the 
number of civilian deaths in a period of time. A good source of this information is the 
Brookings Iraq and Afghanistan Indexes, Physicians for Social Responsibility, and the 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan which provide various data on a 
variety of statistics such as civilian deaths. 
Finally, measuring the rate of terrorism requires an effective dataset. One 
particularly useful dataset is the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) compiled by Gary 
LaFree and Laura Dugan. The GTD compiles data on all known terrorist incidents, and 
classifies terrorist attacks with an adjustable filter on the definitional boundaries of 
terrorism. The GTD is highly customizable and provides information helpful to a variety 
of different quantitative research methods. For example, data can be filtered by country to 
country, or isolated by specific terrorist methods. Another strength of the GTD is that it is 
tailored to avoid the political biases of states, built upon a privately compiled database 
originally used by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Agency.57 Designed by Pinkerton, 
the database was 56 utilized to help corporations gain information on potential areas they 
might decide to do business, and less tailored to a state’s agenda. Corporate biases remain 
to be discovered, but removing state bias lends credibility to the data set. 
In the subsequent two chapters, the case studies of both U.S. wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan are presented. The chapters are split into four sections. Two sections will 
focus specifically on the history and politics of the war in question, divided into Pre-
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Surge and Surge/ withdrawal eras. Two additional sections will investigate the variables 
of troop levels, civilian casualties, and public opinion with each of their respective data 
trends, divided again between the Pre-Surge and Surge/ withdrawal eras.  
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CHAPTER 3 
The Iraq War: How Effective was U.S. Counterterrorism in the Invasion, Surge, 
and Withdrawal?  
 The 2003 Iraq War is a useful case study to investigate the hypothesis of whether 
hard offensive counterterrorism tactics lead to counterterrorism failure. In the early stages 
of the war, the United States pursued a traditional military strategy, which can be defined 
as a strategy in which a military invasion and occupation of a foreign territory occurs. 
The traditional military strategy can be classified as a hard offensive counterterrorism 
tactic when the invasion is designed to counter a terrorism threat, which was one of the 
primary reason for toppling the government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Ultimately, this 
traditional strategy gave rise to a nascent insurgency involving increasingly violent 
sectarian and terrorist attacks. American policy makers soon realized their initial strategy 
had made matters worse and were forced to go back to the drawing board. Facing 
mounting public pressure, President Bush ignored calls to withdraw U.S. from the Iraqi 
Civil War and implemented a counterinsurgency strategy in what is now called the 
“Surge.”  
The following analysis looks at which counterterrorism strategy was ultimately 
the most effective in Iraq. First, the politics and strategy of the initial stage of the Iraq 
War from 2003 to 2006 is examined. Second, variables such as troop levels, civilian 
casualties, and public opinion are scrutinized to see if the tactics of 2003-2006 resulted in 
an increase in terrorism. Next, the politics and strategy of the 2007-2011 “Surge” and 
withdrawal phases of the war are presented. Lastly, Surge and withdrawal troop levels, 
casualties, and public opinion data are evaluated to record the differences between all 
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three Iraq eras with regards to the hypothesis that hard offensive counterterrorism results 
in a failed counterterrorism campaign. 
History and Politics of Iraq 2003-2006 
Prior to the invasion of Iraq by U.S. and Coalition forces in March 2003, the Bush 
administration had led the United States public to believe that standing up to Iraqi 
dictator Saddam Hussein was crucial to the “War on Terror”. As Colin Powell told the 
United Nations, the U.S. believed that a “sinister nexus between Iraq and al-Qaeda” 
existed.58 Powell claimed to have evidence of Iraq possessing weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD’s) and the capability to use them. In response to the purported threat 
of Iraqi WMD’s, President Bush delivered an ultimatum to Hussein. On March 17, 2003, 
Bush demanded that Hussein relinquish power within 48 hours or risk a U.S. invasion of 
Iraq.59 Believing that the United States “lacked resolve and was afraid to risk an 
invasion,” Hussein refused to step down.60 This refusal led to the immediate deployment 
of U.S. troops to Iraq and kicked off a war that would continue until 2011. 
In 2003, the United States prepared to wage war, stressing “rapid, decisive 
operations and quick victories by high-tech warfighting forces.”61 Proponents of the Iraq 
War had been preparing since the end of the First Gulf War. However, they had planned 
little for the occupation after the initial invasion, and expected a quick occupation and a 
transfer of power to “Iraqis within 90 days.”62 This short term mentality largely ignored 
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findings by U.S. agencies such as the Department of Defense, Department of State, and 
the Central Intelligence Agency.63 For example, the Department of State’s “Future of 
Iraq” initiative recommended that the military needed to protect critical infrastructure 
such as “water and electricity” and plan for “lawlessness perpetrated by criminals” in the 
immediate aftermath of the invasion.64  
By ignoring recommendations from government agencies, the Bush 
administration set itself up for failure. Proponents of new pre-emptive strategy for the 
global “War on Terror,” such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz dominated planning for Iraq. The two men at the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and specifically its subsidiary the Office of 
Special Plans (OSP), rushed the war planning to avoid prolonged discussions of post war 
complications, which they saw as a ploy to “weaken the case for a preemptive strike.”65  
While no illegal wrongdoing occurred, as some believe, both OSP and the OSD at 
large promoted misguided assumptions about Iraq.66 OSP planners focused largely on 
post-invasion governance of Iraq, and decided that it would take too long for the Iraqi 
interim government to vet out Ba’athists from government.67 Instead, OSP argued that the 
interim government should mainly consist of returning Iraqi expatriates. OSP’s 
suggestion contradicted guidance from the Department of State and CIA, who warned 
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that a government of externals in Iraq would lack important domestic legitimacy.68 In 
addition, OSD had inaccurately likened Iraq to the occupation of Germany and Japan 
after the Second World War.69 As Pete Mansoor illustrates, these earlier occupations 
were much better planned than Iraq. General George Marshall had begun planning in 
earnest for the occupation of Germany and Japan “one month after the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor,” and that “the foundation of a military government in Germany had been 
laid 18 months prior”.70  
In contrast to General Marshall, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
authorized the creation of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 
(ORHA). Under Lieutenant General Jay Garner, ORHA began planning for the 
occupation of Iraq on January 20, 2003, “two months before the beginning of the 
invasion.”71 The result of this rushed occupation planning was an ORHA organization 
that “was disjointed, fragmented, chaotic, and riven with bureaucratic rivalries.”72 For 
example, because of a policy feud between Powell’s State Department and Rumsfeld’s 
Department of Defense, staffers familiar with the “Future of Iraq” plan were forced out of 
the ORHA.73 
Under direction from Rumsfeld, the U.S. government assumed that the 
overwhelming superiority of the U.S. military would quickly topple the Hussein regime. 
Iraqis would “view American troops as liberators and would cooperate quickly to take 
charge of their own destiny”.74 Instead, the poorly planned occupation did exactly what 
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the “Future of Iraq” publication warned about. The U.S. war effort created a “chaotic 
occupation that failed to deliver enough security, jobs, and essential services” to Iraqis, 
resulting in a violent insurgency prone to destabilizing sectarian violence and terrorist 
attacks.75  
After the initial invasion, despite previous warnings and even Garner’s own 
misgivings about “winning the peace,” the Bush Administration continued to ignore 
advice about the occupation.76 Donald Rumsfeld insisted on restricting the number of 
troops in Iraq and promoted a one month ORHA timetable to exhibit enough progress to 
warrant a rapid troop demobilization.77 Additionally, because of a lack of preparation for 
“language and cultural gaps” and ORHA general organizational inefficiencies, U.S. 
troops found themselves in a quickly deteriorating window of opportunity for the 
“creation of a new Iraq.”78 
Soon enough, General Garner’s lack of progress and compliance with the 
Pentagon’s wishes brought an end to the ORHA. Garner followed orders and called for 
Iraqi elections within 90 days, but this imperiled the Bush Administration’ hand-picked 
Iraqi politicians’ preparation for elections.79 Additionally, Garner had planned to enlist 
the help of 100,000 of Saddam’s former army to gain their security expertise and train a 
new Iraqi force.80 Rumsfeld bristled at retaining the Baath party soldiers loyal to Saddam, 
and quickly began searching for Garner’s replacement.  
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However, problems in Iraq would quickly snowball from frustrating 
unpreparedness to a much more dangerous political situation. With the quick demise of 
the ORHA, Ambassador Paul L. Bremer was brought in to head the new Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) tasked with overseeing the Iraq occupation. The CPA got 
off to a bad start. Bremer, with little experience in the Middle East and no understanding 
of Arabic, had trouble managing the CPA.81 For instance, Bremer largely ignored Iraqi 
tribal politics, as the tribes were seen as “part of Iraq’s past and had no place in its 
present or future”.82 Ignoring the tribes exemplifies how misguided the CPA was, as 
engaging with tribal leaders would soon be an important step to combating the 
insurgency in 2006.83 
Additionally, Bremer failed to develop a working relationship with U.S. military 
officers in Iraq. In his introduction, Bremer told military leaders that “you all work for 
me.”84 Eventually, relations broke down to the point where Bremer and the head U.S. 
military general in Iraq, General Sanchez, refused to speak to each other.85 All was not 
well with Bremer’s relationships in Washington either. President Bush had appointed 
Bremer to work directly underneath Donald Rumsfeld and was subject to Rumsfeld’s 
decisions.86 Bremer twice asked for additional troops to send to Iraq but was ultimately 
denied due to Rumsfeld’s strongly held belief that more troops would not help stabilize 
Iraq.87  
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Citing Bremer’s “control freak” personality, Mansoor writes that Bremer also 
lacked cooperation with other U.S. agencies, especially USAID.88 Even though the 
reconstruction of Iraq was the largest international aid package since the Marshall plan, 
Bremer shut out agencies like USAID and kept reconstruction plans firmly under CPA 
control. Under the “ad hoc” CPA organization, monetary waste and mismanagement 
began to build, and the pace of reconstruction slowed to a crawl.89 
However, these were not the worst issues with the CPA. Heavily influenced by 
OSP planning, Bremer made three major decisions that would greatly contribute to the 
failures of the occupation prior to 2007.90 First, Bremer announced CPA Order Number 
1, dismantling Hussein’s Baath party and “barring senior and midlevel officials form 
holding positions in government agencies,” hospitals, and universities.91 Banning 
midlevel officials largely crippled the Iraqi technocracy, which had kept the Iraqi 
infrastructure running, and replaced them with new untrained “political hacks.”92 Bremer 
effectively left thousands of Sunnis barred from participating in a new Iraq, leaving them 
with “no political future … and deprived of their honor.”93  
Second, CPA Order Number 2 disbanded the Iraqi military, preventing a 
predominantly Sunni soldiery from gainful employment. Sacked Iraqi soldiers returned 
home with a vast cache of weapons which would be used against U.S. and coalition 
forces. Both of these orders alienated the Sunni elite, increasing sectarian tension and 
creating “the military basis for the insurgency.”94 
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Third, Bremer went forward with his plan for the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), 
an Iraqi interim government that would oversee the Iraqi elections in 2005.95 The 25-
member IGC became a predominantly Shiite dominated body, excluding the Sunni elite, 
which had been unaccustomed to limited political power since Iraq had been governed by 
the Ottoman Empire.96 Out of the 25 members, 13 of the members were Shiite. In 
contrast, the Sunnis had only 5 members elected due to their boycott of the January 2005 
election, which left the Sunnis as a political minority along with the Kurd, Christian, and 
Turkoman delegates.97 Even when Sunnis appeared to vote in droves in the subsequent 
December election, Sunnis remained in the minority.98 
In addition to Sunni discontent, inter-Shi’a conflict would derail the IGC and Iraqi 
democracy. Many Shiites were dissatisfied because wealthy Iraqis who hadn’t lived in 
Iraq for years would now be making decisions for locals. The IGC brought to power 
Ahmed Chalabi, an Iraqi exile who had been trying to gain U.S. support to overthrow 
Saddam since the 1990’s.99 Despite Chalabi’s enormous influence on U.S. policy and 
OSD pre-war planning, Chalabi’s role within the IGC was ill-advised.100 Both the CIA 
and State Department “were deeply skeptical about Chalabi’s leadership credentials” and 
concerned about his exile group’s financial mismanagement.101 However, the Department 
of Defense saw this as just more CIA and State attacks on their department, largely 
ignoring their concerns.102  
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In Iraq, Chalabi was not as powerful as his OSD allies thought. Iraqi exile groups 
such as Chalabi’s were seen as “divided, weak, and irrelevant” by Iraqis, and had to 
compete with several other Shi’a political groups that were already entrenched in Iraq.103 
Religious leaders such as the moderate Ayatollah al-Sistani and radical cleric Muqtada al-
Sadr had notable influence in Iraq. These leaders and their various Shi’a groups disagreed 
over various concerns such as “cooperation with the United States, elections, governance, 
reaching out to Sunnis and Kurds, the constitution, [and] federalism.”104 Often, the 
argument between groups centered on who was the most Iraqi, and who had sold out by 
spending exile in Iran or the West.105 As Shi’a dominance of the Iraqi government 
increased in the January 2005 elections, competition between Shi’a groups began to heat 
up.106 
To his credit, Sistani did try to stay “above the fray” of the inter-Shia conflict, 
promoting a more moderate line of cooperation with the United States and Sunnis, and 
working to “deliver Iraq to the Shi’as” in a Shi’a dominated central government.107 
Sistani viewed the new Iraqi state as the Shi’a state and saw “no reason to resist state-
building.”108 Sistani was also less hostile to Sunnis than other Shi’a factions. For 
example, when Sunni insurgent violence resulted in a deadly stampede at a Shi’a 
religious pilgrimage, Sistani restrained Shi’as from retaliating against Sunnis.109 
Not everyone was as cooperative as Sistani. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq 
(SCIRI), led by Iraqis who spent their exile in Iran, enjoyed close relations with the 
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Iranian government. Despite a “moderate” veneer, SCIRI’s Badr Brigade military wing 
used its political power in the Iraqi Interior Ministry and its Iranian support to retaliate 
against Sunni insurgents.110 Badr militants dominated the Iraqi police forces, forming 
death squads that would eventually be used cleanse entire neighborhoods of their Sunni 
inhabitants.111 In Southern Iraq, SCIRI established itself as the theocratic independent 
government of Basra, but it solved “few social problems” and tolerated “a great deal of 
nepotism and corruption”.112 SCIRI’s Iranian support, sectarian leanings, and “theocracy 
mixed with thuggery” would hinder the U.S. war effort.113 
The United States also struggled to deal with Muqtada al-Sadr. Inheriting his 
religious following from his cleric father, al-Sadr had a very weak claim to religious 
knowledge. Jokingly referred to as “Mullah Atari,” al-Sadr had failed his seminary 
education and was more adept in playing video games than understanding Shi’a 
theology.114 To make up for his lack of religious legitimacy, al-Sadr adopted radical 
politics which were “exacerbated by his unstable personality.”115 Though al-Sadr could 
be manipulated by various other Shi’a leaders, he developed a rebel image which 
promoted a mix of Islam and nationalism, gaining him influence as an open challenger to 
U.S. authority.116 By opposing the U.S., al-Sadr utilized his father’s legacy and gained 
popularity amongst the “poor and uneducated Shi’a youth.” In addition to his opposition 
to the United States, al-Sadr competed with Sistani and SCIRI for political power. Al-
Sadr argued that he alone was suitable for power as an ibn al-balad, or son of the soil, 
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unlike the aforementioned exiles.117 Al-Sadr held tenuous control of the Jaish al-Mahdi 
Shi’a militant group, using the militia to challenge Sistani’s leadership and SCIRI’s 
control of Southern Iraq.118 As evidence of al-Sadr’s political ambition, he even tried 
allying with Sunnis to undercut his Shi’a opponents.119 
The rag-tag coalition of secular leaders allied with the religious al-Da’wa Party 
dominated the Iraqi central government, but they had very little control over SCIRI and 
al-Sadr. Leaders like Chalabi and his successor Iyad Allawi, struggled to rein in the 
sectarian leanings of the Shi’a. Eventually, Chalabi had lost favor with the United States, 
having been “non-compliant with U.S. wishes” in the IGC and denounced “for leaking 
sensitive intelligence information to Iran”.120 The U.S. infatuation with Chalabi quickly 
ended in 2004, but not soon enough to stem the more radical elements of the Iraqi Shiites. 
Eventually, U.S. and coalition forces would be fighting a three-headed insurgency, 
combating partisan forces led by Sunnis, Shi’as, and international terrorist groups looking 
to take took advantage of the chaos. 
Military strategy was also to blame for the disorganized occupation. Military 
leaders stuck to traditional methods, choosing to utilize aggressive raids and cordon and 
search missions to neutralize enemy combatants.121 At the highest levels, no attempts to 
adjust tactics were made in 2003. General Sanchez had made the decision that U.S. 
troops would remain in “Phase III (offensive operations)” through the end of the year.122 
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As Blair Wilcox writes, the overall strategy was conquest rather than insurgency, 
applying overwhelming force to degrade the enemy.123 Heavy firepower and relying on 
poorly trained Iraqi soldiers to bear the brunt of the violence. The result was heavy levels 
of civilian casualties and human rights abuses detrimental to reducing the growing 
violence.124 As the situation deteriorated, U.S. soldiers soon had to focus on 
counteracting growing numbers of suicide attacks, car bombs, and roadside improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) instead of reconstruction and stability efforts.125 
Another major contributor to the growing insurgency was the tactical decision for 
U.S. and coalition forces to retreat back to forward operating bases (FOBs) on the 
outskirts of major cities such as Baghdad and Fallujah.126 The reasoning behind this 
particular tactic was that the U.S. military presence in urban areas was detrimental to 
keeping the peace, like a “virus infecting Iraqi society.”127 However, this had the opposite 
effect of what was intended. By retreating from the city streets, troops were not able to 
protect civilians or the critical city infrastructure from harm.128 Ultimately, this decision 
created more unrest and increased the sectarian tension between Sunnis and Shi’as. 
The battle to control the Iraqi city of Fallujah in 2004 is most representative of 
this phase of the U.S. occupation of Iraq. As U.S. forces continued to pursue “order and 
stability through military action” and withdraw to FOBs, entire cities were left without 
any U.S. presence.129 In Fallujah, lack of security had resulted in four U.S. contractors 
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being murdered, burned, and hung from bridges by disgruntled Sunnis.130 In response, 
2,000 Marines began an assault to re-establish control over Fallujah, an action “portrayed 
as civilian bloodbath by the Arabic media”.131 As a result, under pressure from members 
of the IGC, Bremer and Central Command generals decided to postpone the Fallujah 
operation.132  
Concurrently, U.S. forces also had to contend with the growing Shi’a insurgency 
lead by al-Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi militia. The militia had declared open rebellion and had 
further “established a shadow government to challenge the authority of the CPA” in 
several southern Iraqi cities.133 Two U.S. armored divisions were sent to deal with al-
Sadr, and they were quickly able to overwhelm the opposition with “superior discipline 
and firepower.”134 Despite success on the battlefield, several political settlements 
between the IGC and al-Sadr provided the Jaish al-Mahdi respite, allowing the militia to 
regain strength.135 
On the political side of things, the CPA transferred power to the IGC in June 
2004. Inadequately trained Iraqi troops, already under strain from significant combat 
roles, would now have more responsibility and less oversight from the United States. 
With the power to “recruit, promote, and dismiss military personnel,” Iraqi politicians 
would continue to choose important command positions “on the basis of religious and 
political affiliations.”136 Less oversight meant the Iraqi military increasingly became a 
source of sectarian conflict rather than a solution to it, and ethnic cleansing was 
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becoming more and more common in Shi’a-Sunni mixed neighborhoods.137 To illustrate 
how easy it was for Shi’as to implement sectarian actions, Shi’as dominated the January 
2005 election, electing a body in which only 2 percent of elected officials represented 
Sunnis.138 
Problems continued to plague the Iraq war effort. Rising international pressure on 
the United States began to develop when it was discovered that there was no proof that 
Saddam Hussein’s regime had possessed WMDs.139 There had also been horrific reports 
of prisoner abuse at the U.S. Abu Ghraib prison in the spring of 2004.140 With everything 
that had gone wrong up to this point, it had finally dawned on the United States 
leadership that changes were needed with regards to the political and military strategy of 
the occupation. 
However, change happened very slowly. After realizing that the military couldn’t 
deploy to each Iraqi city and level them to the ground, the Bush administration had 
decided to shake things up.141 The Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) that had been 
managing the Iraqi war from 2003 to 2004 was soon morphed into Multi-National Force-
Iraq (MNF-I) under the direction of General George Casey. Casey steadily began to build 
the foundation for future counterinsurgency operations.142 Casey’s “fresh thinking” in the 
MNF-I introduced two counterterrorist experts to develop a new operational strategy, and 
most importantly, ordered the creation of an academy for soldiers to learn counter-
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insurgency operations.143 These changes were slow developing steps, but they would 
eventually pay big dividends in 2007. 
Another reason for the Casey’s slow start was the political end game the Bush 
administration was pursuing. Instead of investing for the long run, Bush and the 
Department of Defense prepared an exit strategy. Concerned with the American public’s 
distaste for long military ventures, the emphasis was placed on reintroducing Sunnis to 
the Iraqi political fold, neutralizing insurgents and terrorists, training Iraqi security forces, 
and getting U.S. troops out of Iraq as soon as possible. Many of these political objectives 
were being rushed, and they had a counterproductive effect. For instance, the “premature 
commitment of Iraqi forces” within 12 months led to increased violence because the 
troops were “too few, too apathetic, too ill-trained and poorly equipped, and in some 
cases too sectarian.”144 
The political calculations handicapped the MNF-I game plan, but several other 
military weaknesses were also apparent. Tactically, not much had changed between 
CJTF-7 and the MNF-I. U.S. and coalition forces still remained in large FOB’s outside 
the cities, and traditional military assaults were still a regular occurrence.145 For example, 
the long delayed Fallujah offensive was initiated, resulting in the deaths of 2,000 Sunni 
and al-Qaeda insurgents and virtually leveling the city to the ground.146 With General 
Casey promising to pass the baton to Iraqi forces by the end of 2005, MNF-I did not look 
feasible.147 
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At the combat level, individual military commanders and units were gradually 
adjusting to counterinsurgency tactics. Leaders such as Colonel Stephen Davis and 
Colonel H.R. McMaster provided early case studies of how the counterinsurgency should 
be fought. Both leaders saw value in co-opting the local population and bringing the fight 
to the city cores in “clear, hold, and build” strategies.148 Despite individual success, 
inconsistent military-wide strategy and a lack of proper intelligence collection doomed 
the MNF-I to failure.149  
By 2006, things were looking grim. Because of the inconsistent distribution of 
units who adopted counterinsurgency to those that maintained classic war tactics, 
sectarian violence continued to increase.150 Sunni al-Qaeda elements led by Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi began to participate in cleansing mixed areas of Shi’as, similar to what Shi’as 
had been doing to Sunnis.151 In particular, al-Zarqawi began to target Shi’a holy sites. 
Most notoriously, al-Qaeda members planted explosives at the al-Askari shrine in 
Samarra in 2006, destroying the golden dome.152 One Shi’a leader stated that “this is as 
9/11 in the United States.”153 Not long after the bombing, Shi’a reprisals began an Iraqi 
civil war.154 The U.S. would be forced to consider a more unified counterinsurgency 
effort if they wished to achieve their objectives in Iraq. 
The situation in Iraq from 2003 to 2006 illustrates the environment in which U.S. 
counterterrorism took place. The chaos of the occupation was complicated by both U.S. 
planning and tactical mishaps, as well as the sectarian nature of Shi’a and Sunni politics. 
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In the next section, the history of the early U.S. occupation is utilized to explore variables 
such as troop levels, civilian casualties, and Iraqi public opinion and their effects on 
counterterrorism success within Iraq. 
Iraq War Data Trends 2003-2006 
 Based on the political and military developments from 2003 to 2006, the 
prevailing counterterrorism strategy utilized was invasion and occupation. U.S. and 
coalition forces did not fully embrace a counterinsurgency strategy until 2007, even 
though some counterinsurgency strategies emerged as early as 2005. Therefore, if the 
hypothesis that the use of hard offensive counterterrorism results in counterterrorism 
failure, the “Pre-Surge” period should feature variables that signify that relationship. 
First, troop levels from the Brookings Institution Iraq Index are examined to see if they 
increased or decreased. Second, casualty records from the Iraq Body Count will 
investigate the relation between civilian casualties and troop levels. Third, various public 
opinion polls from 2003-2006 compiled by Brookings will look at whether troop levels 
and civilian casualties affected Iraqi public opinion. Lastly, all previously mentioned 
variables will be compared to the number of terrorist attacks in Iraq registered by the 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to test whether or not the hypothesis that hard 
offensive counterterror strategies lead to failure in counterterrorism is valid. 
Troop Levels 2003-2006 
 Overall, troop levels stayed largely below 180,000 troops stationed in Iraq from 
2003-2006. As mentioned before, the Bush administration largely ignored pressure to 
drastically increase troop levels, even though leaders in Iraq requested higher amounts of 
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soldiers.155 As noted in Figure 1, troop levels only met or exceeded 180,000 for three 
whole months after the initial invasion. In 2003, troop levels steadily declined from the 
initial invasion as the Department of Defense anticipated a quick hand-off from U.S. and 
coalition forces to Iraqi forces. Once sectarian opposition increased in 2004, troop levels 
began to rise with major battles such as the first battle of Fallujah taking place. The battle 
for Fallujah in March of 2004 was prompted by the deaths of U.S. contractors in the city, 
so it is plausible that more troops were sent when major combat operations were required 
during this period. The military had realized that they didn’t have enough troops to 
handle taking Fallujah, sending “five Marine brigades and a U.S. army armored brigade” 
when they invaded a second time in November of 2004.156   
Political motives could also be in play. In February 2004, the number of total 
soldiers increased from 139,000 to 162,000 by that April, in conjunction with Iraq 
approving a new constitution. Numbers would mostly stagnate until the first troop peak in 
February 2005. After February, troops were lowered following a successful election in 
January 2005. The second increase also occurred near the December 2005, meaning that 
these troop level increases were likely a means to provide stability during crucial political 
developments in Iraq. By 2004, Bush had brought establishing democracy in Iraq to the 
forefront of U.S. policy objectives.157 This emphasis on democracy in part helped Bush to 
get re-elected in November 2004.158 With this in mind, troop increases helped to 
safeguard the Iraqi elections and head off the Bush administration’s political opponents 
back home.  Did these troop increases have a positive or negative effect on casualties, 
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public opinion, or the rate of terrorism? Or is it too few troops that lead to 
counterterrorism failure as some scholars suggest? 
 
Figure 2. Number of U.S. and Coalition Troops Present in Iraq from 2003-2006159 
 
Civilian Casualties 2003-2006 
Iraqi civilian casualties gradually increased during the 2003-2006 period, as 
shown in Figure 2. Spikes did occur, and casualty spikes were correlated with periods of 
major events such as military operations. In April 2004, a spike in casualties occurred 
around the same time as the first battle of Fallujah, decried by the media and IGC as a 
“civilian bloodbath.”160 The same could be said in November 2005, as the second battle 
of Fallujah took place. Mansoor claims that Fallujah was likely abandoned by civilians at 
this point, but there was likely many civilians still in harm’s way.161 The Iraq Body Count 
                                                     
159 Michael E. O’Hanlon and Ian Livingston, January 31, 2011, “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of 
Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,” The Brookings Institution, Accessed 3/7/19, 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/index20120131.pdf, 18. 
160 Mansoor, Surge, 14-15. 
161 Mansoor, 21. 
100000
110000
120000
130000
140000
150000
160000
170000
180000
190000
2
0
0
3
 M
ay
Ju
n
e
Ju
ly
A
u
gu
st
Se
p
te
m
b
er
O
ct
o
b
e
r
N
o
ve
m
b
er
D
ec
e
m
b
er
2
0
0
4
 J
an
u
ar
y
Fe
b
ru
ar
y
M
ar
ch
A
p
ri
l
M
ay
Ju
n
e
Ju
ly
A
u
gu
st
Se
p
te
m
b
er
O
ct
o
b
e
r
N
o
ve
m
b
er
D
ec
e
m
b
er
2
0
0
5
 J
an
u
ar
y
Fe
b
ru
ar
y
M
ar
ch
A
p
ri
l
M
ay
Ju
n
e
Ju
ly
A
u
gu
st
Se
p
te
m
b
er
O
ct
o
b
e
r
N
o
ve
m
b
er
D
ec
e
m
b
er
2
0
0
6
 J
an
u
ar
y
Fe
b
ru
ar
y
M
ar
ch
A
p
ri
l
M
ay
Ju
n
e
Ju
ly
A
u
gu
st
Se
p
te
m
b
er
O
ct
o
b
e
r
N
o
ve
m
b
er
D
ec
e
m
b
er
U.S. Troops Total Coalition Troops
 
 
39 
 
tallied the deaths from Fallujah alone at 700, a substantial percentage of the monthly total 
for November 2004.162 These two spikes could be interpreted that higher troop levels, in 
tandem with aggressive military offensives, led to increased civilian casualties.  
A casualty spike in August 2005 might have had a different cause than the 
previous spikes discussed. In this case, the casualty spike predated a troop surge by a 
month, which means additional troops actually might have helped to quell higher 
numbers of casualties. Terrorist attacks, which will be discussed further in a preceding 
section, might have a causal relationship with the August casualty spike.  
As elections were approaching, insurgent and terrorist groups might have had 
motivations to up their attempts to increase instability. Both al-Zarqawi and al-Sadr 
actively resisted Allawi’s government from March 2004 onward, filling in substantial 
“political vacuums left by the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the cities.”163 A large 
number of terrorist attacks occurred in July (and the past several months before), which 
could have led to more casualties being recorded in Iraqi morgues in August. It would 
appear that the following troop increase actually reduced both casualties and terrorist 
attacks. Tactics started to change at the frontlines, as commanders began to shift to 
counterinsurgency operations, popularly known as “clear, hold, and build.”164 
Commanders like Colonels Stephen Davis and H.R. McMaster utilized “clear, hold, 
build,” in areas like al-Anbar and Tal Afar respectively, but the overall U.S. strategy was 
still a mix between counterinsurgency and more aggressive, traditional operations.165 The 
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introduction of clear, hold, and build strategy might have been just enough to contribute 
to a lower rate of casualties. However, the relative stability might have been more 
influenced by the inclusion of Sunnis into the political fold in the elections than troops. 
For instance, the constitution drafting committee was gradually opened for Sunni 
representatives to participate in October.166 
Evidence of a direct relationship between troop levels and civilian casualties can 
plausibly be argued for, but it isn’t entirely conclusive. Increased troop levels, parallel 
with the use of a hard offensive counterterrorist strategy, seemed to result in increased 
civilian casualties. However, other factors could also be in play in the increase, such as 
the many governing mistakes by the CPA and other U.S. administrative organizations, 
and the general political tensions between Sunnis and Shi’as. But in general, when paired 
with aggressive tactics, increases in troop levels did coincide with an increase in civilian 
casualties during the 2003-2006 period. 
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Figure 3. Total Number of Iraqi Civilian Casualties Recorded by the Iraq Body Count 
from 2003-2006167 
 
 
Iraqi Public Opinion 2003-2006 
In Iraqi public opinion, support for the U.S. and coalition’s mission in Iraq started 
optimistically high in 2003, but subsequently declined as many Iraqis began to see the 
foreign troops as occupiers. The high public opinion recorded in Figure 3 would decline 
significantly as Shi’a and Sunni sectarian violence gained strength from 2004 to 2006. In 
2003, Gallup polls ( 1) recorded that 67% of Iraqis believed that Iraq would be better off 
in five years than it was before the U.S. invasion, and 62% believed the hardships they 
endured since the invasion had been worth it. The Gallup poll also found that the majority 
of Iraqis wished to see U.S. troops stay longer, and that a majority believed that attacks 
against U.S. troops were unjustified.  
                                                     
167 “Iraq Body Count Database,” Iraq Body Count, Accessed 3/7/19, 
https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/. 
 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
2
0
0
3
 M
ay
Ju
n
e
Ju
ly
A
u
gu
st
Se
p
te
m
b
er
O
ct
o
b
e
r
N
o
ve
m
b
er
D
ec
e
m
b
er
2
0
0
4
 J
an
u
ar
y
Fe
b
ru
ar
y
M
ar
ch
A
p
ri
l
M
ay
Ju
n
e
Ju
ly
A
u
gu
st
Se
p
te
m
b
er
O
ct
o
b
e
r
N
o
ve
m
b
er
D
ec
e
m
b
er
2
0
0
5
 J
an
u
ar
y
Fe
b
ru
ar
y
M
ar
ch
A
p
ri
l
M
ay
Ju
n
e
Ju
ly
A
u
gu
st
Se
p
te
m
b
er
O
ct
o
b
e
r
N
o
ve
m
b
er
D
ec
e
m
b
er
2
0
0
6
 J
an
u
ar
y
Fe
b
ru
ar
y
M
ar
ch
A
p
ri
l
M
ay
Ju
n
e
Ju
ly
A
u
gu
st
Se
p
te
m
b
er
O
ct
o
b
e
r
N
o
ve
m
b
er
D
ec
e
m
b
er
 
 
42 
 
In 2003, it is therefore likely that Shi’as and Kurds were supportive of the United 
States in Iraq because they were liberated from a repressive Saddam regime. Kurds, for 
instance, had decorated their northern cities with “welcoming signs” for U.S. forces after 
the invasion.168 At this time Shi’as had yet to begin their divisive inter-rivalries, as Sistani 
“argued for truce between various Shi’a factions… [and] focus on confirming their power 
at the polls.” On the other hand, Sunnis had welcomed American troops with graffiti 
promising that they would “remain a thorn in the chest” of the occupiers.169 Sunnis would 
become even more upset with the implementation of “draconian” de-Baathification laws 
by the CPA, which would mark the beginning of a full-fledged “nationalist Sunni 
insurgency”.170 
 
Table 1. Responses in Percent to Iraqi Political Opinion Polling Questions in 2003171 
Question Findings 
Will Iraq be in a better condition five years from 
now than it was before the U.S.-led invasion? 
Better off: 67% 
Worse off: 8% 
Is Iraq better off now than it was before the 
invasion? 
Better off: 33% 
Worse off 47% 
Was ousting Saddam worth the hardships endured 
since the invasion? 
Yes: 62% 
Would you like to see U.S. troops stay longer than 
a few more months? 
Stay longer: 71% 
Not stay longer: 26% 
Are there circumstances in which attacks against 
U.S. troops can be justified? 
No: 64% 
Sometimes justified: 36% 
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 By 2004 however, Iraqi public opinion began to slide among all groups in Iraq. 
By March 2004, 83% of the population polled by the CPA had a negative view of U.S. 
and coalition forces.172 A Gallup poll found that 71% think of foreign troops as occupiers, 
compared to 43% who thought of them as occupiers in 2003.173 As shown in Table 2, The 
CPA also found that 81% wanted U.S. and coalition forces to leave. Iraqis cited various 
reasons for their answer such as viewing coalition forces as occupiers, saying they 
brought too much death and destruction, saying they want Iraqi oil and resources, or 
believing that Iraqis alone could administer Iraq better. 
 
Table 2. Number of Iraqis Answering that Coalition Forces Should Leave Iraq in 2004 
CPA Iraqi Public Opinion Poll174 
Should Coalition Forces leave or stay in Iraq? 
Leave: 866 (out of 1,068 respondents) 
Why should Coalition Forces leave? 
They are occupiers and must leave immediately: 418 
They brought only death and destruction: 142 
Iraqis can administer Iraq better: 102 
They want Iraqi oil and resources: 76 
They are facilitating Zionist domination of Iraq: 51 
They do not respect our religions and cultures: 38 
They abuse Iraqis: 23 
Other/Don’t know/No answer: 16 
 
 Polling broken down amongst the three major sectarian groups are the best 
indicator of the 2004 public opinion slide, as shown in Table 3. Support for the U.S. war 
effort was strongest amongst the Kurds, but even Kurdish public opinion dropped. In 
Kurdish dominant areas, public opinion dropped from 83.8% believing that Iraq was 
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Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq.” The Brookings Institution. Accessed 3/7/19. 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/index20041215.pdf, 41. 
173 O’Hanlon and Albuquerque, 40. 
174 Ibid. 
 
 
44 
 
heading in the right direction in June to 72.2% in October. In the Shi’a dominant south of 
Iraq, polling percentages oscillated with ten percentage points of 50% in 2004. This is 
perhaps in part due to the growing competition between the Shi’a central government and 
the Jaish al-Mahdi and Badr militias. Most dramatically, Sunni areas fell from 33.43% in 
June to 18.3% in October. Sunnis still felt extremely alienated leading into 2005 and had 
committed wholeheartedly to resisting the occupation and Shi’a rule. 
 
Table 3. Percent Answering that Iraq is Heading in the Right Direction in 2004 Regional 
Iraqi Public Opinion Poll175 
Region Do you think Iraq is heading in the right 
direction? 
Kurdish areas: May 27-June 11, 2004: 83.8% 
July 24-August 2, 2004: 71.5% 
Sept. 24-Oct. 4, 2004: 72.2% 
South (Shi’a areas): May 27-June 11, 2004: 44.4% 
July 24-August 2, 2004: 61.4% 
Sept. 24-Oct. 4, 2004: 51.1% 
Sunni areas: May 27-June 11, 2004: 33.4% 
July 24-August 2, 2004: 28.9% 
Sept. 24-Oct. 4, 2004: 14.6% 
  
Some measure of stability and the first successful election propelled 67% of Iraqis 
to believe that Iraq was headed in the right direction in April 2005, as shown in Figure 3. 
The 67% was a high water mark in a period from May 2004 to December 2005, hovering 
around 50% by December 2005. Overall, 65% of Iraqis opposed the presence of 
Coalition forces in Iraq, but support for the war effort continued to be split along 
sectarian lines as noted in a November 2005 poll (Table 4). Sunnis were still wary of U.S. 
and Coalition efforts as 85% opposed the presence Coalition Troops and only 25% of 
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Sunnis believed life was better since the war started. Additionally, Sunni support of the 
established Iraqi government was very low due to the lack of Sunni representation, with 
only 36% approving of the new constitution. For Shiites, a slim majority of 59% opposed 
the coalition, but 59% did believe life was better since the war occurred. And in contrast 
to Sunni disapproval, 85% of Shi’a polled approved of the new constitution. Kurds, the 
most supportive group to the U.S. and coalition effort, had a majority belief that life was 
better (73%) and only 22% opposed Coalition forces.  
 
Figure 4. Timeline of Iraqi Public Opinion Percentages on Which Direction Iraq is 
Headed (2004-2005)176 
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Table 4. Percentage of Yes Answers to 2005 Regional Iraqi Public Opinion Poll 
Questions177 
Question Kurdish Area Shiite Area Sunni Area 
Life is better since 
the war 
73% 59% 25% 
The US was right to 
invade Iraq 
80% 58% 16% 
I feel very safe in 
my neighborhood 
91% 82% 21% 
I approve of the new 
Constitution 
88% 85% 36% 
I oppose Coalition 
Forces 
22% 59% 85% 
 
 In 2006, public opinion of the U.S. military occupation of Iraq and the U.S. in 
general amongst both Sunnis and Shi’as was dangerously low. Shi’as were enraged by 
the al-Qaeda destruction of the al-Askari shrine dome in February of 2006 and had 
greatly increased retaliation against Sunnis, setting off a civil war. Al-Sistani stated that if 
the U.S. and Iraqi government couldn’t control the security situation, the Shi’a faithful 
would.178 For one of the first times, the International Republican Institute polling 
registered that a majority of Iraqis felt Iraq was headed in the wrong direction, as shown 
in Figure 4. 52% of those polled in both March and September felt the country was 
headed down the wrong path. When asked if they supported attacks against U.S.-led 
forces, 47% said yes in January 2006, and then 61% in September 2006. In another first, 
Shi’a approval of attacks on U.S. forces increased from 41% in January to 62% in 
September, joining Sunnis in venting their frustration (Sunnis registered at 88% and 
subsequently 92%).  
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From 2003 to 2006, Iraqi public opinion steadily dropped. As sectarian violence 
skyrocketed, both Shi’as and Sunnis became more disillusioned with the direction of the 
country. During this same drop in public opinion, civilian casualties began to mount. 
Civilian casualty spikes, often correlating with increased troop levels and aggressive 
military tactics, were followed by a general increase in casualties per year. Therefore, it is 
possible that there is a relation between the increase of U.S. troops and civilian casualties 
and a decrease in public opinion during the “Pre-Surge” period. 
 
Figure 5. Timeline of Percentage of Iraqi Respondents on the Direction of Iraq (2004-
2006) 179 
 
Terrorist Attacks in Iraq 2003-2006 
During the 2003-2006 campaign, terrorist incidents in Iraq occurred in very small 
numbers, as shown in Figure 9. For example, several months in 2003 only registered less 
                                                     
179 Michael E. O’Hanlon and Jason H. Campbell, December 21, 2006, “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of 
Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,” The Brookings Institution, Accessed 3/7/19, 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/index20061221.pdf, 35. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Do you think Iraq today is generally headed 
in the right or wrong direction?
Right Direction Wrong Direction
 
 
48 
 
than ten attacks. According to Robert Pape, there had even been no recorded instances of 
suicide terrorism in Iraq before 2003.180 As time elapsed, the number of terrorist attacks 
would steadily increase. Linearly, there is a steady rise in the number of attacks per 
month leading to 2007. This rise seems most related to the deteriorating conditions in 
stability and the rise of insurgent violence that occurred over the four years. The linear 
rise in terrorist attacks correlates to the linear rise in civilian casualties, as both terrorist 
attacks and civilian casualties steadily increased from 2003 to 2006. The rise in terrorist 
attacks also corresponds with a decrease in favorable Iraqi public opinion to the U.S. and 
coalition occupation.  
In addition to the linear increase, several bursts of attacks began to regularly occur 
in early 2005. New record highs of terrorist attacks were recorded for 2005, especially 
after the January 2005 election. The first election involved a Sunni voting boycott, and 
when they did participate in the second election in December, Sunnis were forced to 
come to the realization that they couldn’t compete politically with the Shi’as.181 Instead, 
Sunnis resorted to intimidation and violence to curb Shia power and “sap their 
confidence.”182 Notably, these 2005 spikes also occurred with a significant U.S. and 
coalition troop increase, from 162,000 to 180,000. The period starting in late 2005 shows 
a different trend for troop levels and terrorism. During the late 2005 period, troop levels 
increased while civilian casualties and terrorist attacks decreased. This is in part thanks to 
evolving tactics used by commanders like Colonel H.R. McMaster, but also to more 
Sunni inclusion in the political process in the December 2005 election.  
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Figure 6. Number of Terrorist Attacks in Iraq from 2003-2006183 
 
For the hypothesis that offensive counterterrorism leads counterterrorism failure 
to be proven, troop levels, influenced by high casualties and low public opinion, should 
lead to more terrorism. In the traditional war era, this logic seems to be true, as the 
indicators all point to counterterrorism failure. But again, other factors could be at play, 
such as the enmity of politics between Shi’as and Sunnis in Iraq at the time, or the 
ineptitude of the CPA government in navigating said Iraqi politics. In the next section, 
the politics and tactics of the “Surge” from 2007 onward are examined. The Surge 
featured a unified U.S. effort at counterinsurgency, where U.S. forces attempted to win 
back the Iraqi people by paying closer attention to the “type and amount of force used” 
and the competence and impartiality of those who wield force.184 By way of the 
hypothesis that hard offensive counterterrorism causes a counterterrorism campaign to 
                                                     
183 Global Terrorism Database [gtd_96to13_0718dist], National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2019, retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. 
184 Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency," Department of the Army Headquarters, (December, 2006), 
Accessed 3/12/2019, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=468442, 1-25. 
0
50
100
150
200
250
2
0
0
3
 M
ay
Ju
n
e
Ju
ly
A
u
gu
st
Se
p
te
m
b
er
O
ct
o
b
e
r
N
o
ve
m
b
er
D
ec
e
m
b
er
2
0
0
4
 J
an
u
ar
y
Fe
b
ru
ar
y
M
ar
ch
A
p
ri
l
M
ay
Ju
n
e
Ju
ly
A
u
gu
st
Se
p
te
m
b
er
O
ct
o
b
e
r
N
o
ve
m
b
er
D
ec
e
m
b
er
2
0
0
5
 J
an
u
ar
y
Fe
b
ru
ar
y
M
ar
ch
A
p
ri
l
M
ay
Ju
n
e
Ju
ly
A
u
gu
st
Se
p
te
m
b
er
O
ct
o
b
e
r
N
o
ve
m
b
er
D
ec
e
m
b
er
2
0
0
6
 J
an
u
ar
y
Fe
b
ru
ar
y
M
ar
ch
A
p
ri
l
M
ay
Ju
n
e
Ju
ly
A
u
gu
st
Se
p
te
m
b
er
O
ct
o
b
e
r
N
o
ve
m
b
er
D
ec
e
m
b
er
 
 
50 
 
fail, the Surge should show that less aggressive tactics help counterterrorism efforts to 
succeed. 
Iraq History and Politics 2007-2011: The Surge and Withdrawal 
 By the end of 2006, politicians, soldiers, and the even the general public felt that 
the United States was losing the war in Iraq. Sunni and Shi’a sectarian violence had 
reached critical mass, and the Iraqi political system was largely deadlocked. If changes 
were to be made they needed to happen fast, before things got even worse. Soon enough, 
President Bush saw fit to change the direction of the war in Iraq by pushing a “Surge” 
strategy. This section investigates the political and historical context of the 2007 Surge by 
looking at the mounting U.S. public opposition to the war, Surge planning, President 
Bush’s decision making, implementation of the Surge, the Sunni/Shi’a political break-
through, and President Obama’s drawdown of the war. By examining these topics, it is 
possible to evaluate the Iraq War from 2007 to 2011. It is then possible to look and see if 
hard offensive counterterrorism causes more terrorism, or rather, if the Surge caused less 
terrorism than the aggressive 2003-2006 period. 
 U.S. public opinion towards the war in Iraq plummeted in early 2006, and many 
called for a withdrawal of U.S. troops. By March 2006, the midterm election was fully on 
the minds of the American public. In a Pew poll recorded that month, 43% of those 
polled thought the war was going well, in contrast to 51% who believed the war was not 
going well.185 By November, “an all-time low of 29 percent” of Americans polled 
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supported Bush’s management of the war, and expected Democrats to end the war if they 
were elected to a congressional majority.186  
During midterm campaigning, Democrats had framed the war in Iraq as a failure. 
In contrast to the Bush administration’s rosy outlook, his political opponents criticized 
Iraq’s fall into a civil war.187 Leaders such as Senator Harry Reid argued that the “war in 
Iraq was unwinnable, owing to the country’s ethnic divisions … [and] the 
administration’s failure to adequately plan for the postwar occupation.”188 The 
Democrat’s plan eventually paid off. In the midterm elections, Bush was handed a 
decisive defeat when Democrats took a majority in both the House of Representatives 
and the Senate.189 In a rebuke to Bush’s war policy, newly minted Senate Majority 
Leader Reid and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi wrote to Bush and said that “the 
American people … don’t believe your current Iraq policy will lead to success.”190 They 
also recommended that “rather than deploy additional forces to Iraq,” the President 
should “begin phased redeployment of our forces … shifting the principal mission of our 
forces there from combat to training…”191 
 Several months prior to the President’s disastrous 2006 midterm elections, 
Congress had created the “Iraq Study Group” to study the war and suggest a new strategy 
for Iraq.192 The bipartisan group was run by 10 government officials, including 
Republican James A. Baker and Democrat Lee H. Hamilton, both of which had served 
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distinguished government careers.193 In their examination of the war’s progress, they 
noted that Iraq was not doing very well. The Iraq Study Group soberly wrote that Iraqi 
violence was “increasing in scope and lethality”.194 Groups like Sunni insurgents, Shi’a 
militias, al-Qaeda, and criminals were a challenge to stability, and the Iraqi government 
was “not adequately advancing national reconciliation, providing basic security, or 
delivering essential services.”195 Mirroring recommendations by Congressional leaders, 
the Iraq Study group concluded that the United States should begin a gradual withdrawal 
of U.S. troops, and transfer responsibility to the Iraqi military.196 
 Contrary to the conclusions of politicians, the Iraq Study Group, and the general 
public, a different approach to handling the war was also taking shape in 2006. Military 
discussions on whether to stay the course or create an entirely new approach were under 
way. Research groups in various departments such as the National Security Council, State 
Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had also begun to grapple with the 
“deteriorating situation in Iraq” to find a new way forward.197 Building on 
recommendations from working group members, and even the recommendations of the 
Iraq Study group, a new troop surge strategy began to develop.198 
 The success of this planning began with General Casey’s building blocks that he 
had established after taking over the MNF-I execution of the Iraq War. Frustrated by the 
lack of success in curbing sectarian violence, Casey began to develop a 
counterinsurgency strategy for Iraq.199 By bringing in counterinsurgency advisors, slowly 
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changing tactics, and establishing a new counterinsurgency academy, Casey had helped 
to set the ground work for the future Surge strategy.200  
Casey had also paved the way for his successor, General David Petraeus, to 
assume the mantle of leadership during the Surge period. Petraeus had lead the 
development of counterinsurgency tactics in Iraq since 2003, where those under his 
command had successfully provided stability in Mosul until their untimely replacement 
by another brigade.201 Behind the scenes, Petraeus authored the basis for the Surge’s 
counterinsurgency strategy, the Army and Marines Field Manual 3-24.202 
Counterinsurgency, or COIN, would require U.S. and Coalition forces to enact a strategy 
that would be “a mix of offensive, defense, and stability operations conducted along 
multiple lines of operations.”203 Most importantly, the manual stressed the importance of 
preserving the well-being of the Iraqi population. The field manual states that COIN 
efforts “should focus on supporting the local populace and [host nation] government,” 
and that “political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than 
conventional military operations … in undermining an insurgency.”204  
This counterinsurgency plan understood well some of the essential problems the 
war in Iraq had faced so far, and that had not been addressed by the initial OSD planning 
of the invasion. To secure and support the Iraqi people, the military would need to 
develop skills “most associated with nonmilitary agencies.” This would entail “providing 
all aspects of the basic quality of life,” like meeting basic economic needs, ensuring the 
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provision of essential services, sustaining social and cultural institutions, and providing 
security from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and crime.205 
In response to the strong insurgency that had developed in Iraq, the Field Manual 
also tried to foster a better understanding of the motivations of insurgents. Petraeus wrote 
that insurgents cannot “defeat the United States with conventional operations.”206 Instead, 
insurgents “do not limit themselves to purely military means” and instead “try to exhaust 
U.S. national will … by undermining and outlasting public support.”207 A successful 
COIN operation would need to not only secure the population from insurgent violence, 
but also establish the legitimacy of the Iraqi government. Ultimately, U.S. and coalition 
forces would need to stand down and allow for the government of Iraq to win on its 
own.208 The new surge, would still need to “strengthen local forces” in order to remove 
“foreign armies” such as the U.S., seen as an occupier.209 
Offensive operations would still be critical to the U.S. war effort. Petraeus warned 
that soldiers would need to be ready for a “handshake or a hand grenade” when securing 
the Iraqi people.210 As Mansoor quipped, “there was plenty of killing involved” in the 
new Surge strategy.211 The Field Manual noted that there would be times where it would 
be necessary to eliminate extremists “whose beliefs prevent them from ever reconciling 
with the [Iraqi] government.”212  Additionally, the new COIN strategy would make the 
population secure, but would ultimately leave U.S. and coalition forces less secure.213 No 
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longer would troops “remain in their compounds … [and] lose touch with the [Iraqi] 
people.”214 Aggressive tactics, such as “saturation patrolling, ambushes, and listening 
post operations” would need to be conducted, and would entail sharing more risk with the 
population.215 
However, unlike the general strategy in Iraq from 2003-2006, the Surge would 
require restrictions on the use of force. Petraeus and other contributors realized early on 
that the “United States did not have the leeway … to undertake counterinsurgency … 
focused … on killing the enemy regardless of the collateral damage caused to civilian 
lives and property.”216 The American public and the international media would not 
tolerate “such excesses” any longer.217 The military would need to pay close attention to 
the appropriate level of force, and be sure that those able to wield force were legitimate 
and committed to impartiality.218 Public perceptions of “both police and military units” 
were thus critically important to effective COIN operations. 
In addition to his conceptual work in completing Field Manual 3-24, Petraeus 
enlisted several of his staffers, such as Mansoor and McMaster, to advise the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS) on how to rethink strategy for the Iraq War.219 Aptly nicknamed the 
“Council of Colonels,” the group criticized Rumsfeld and Casey’s conclusion that Iraqis 
had rejected the U.S. occupation, necessitating U.S. and coalition troops withdrawing 
from Iraq’s cities.220 Instead, the JCS discussed various strategies described as ‘Go Big, 
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Go Long, or Go Home”.221 The JCS ultimately stressed the need for more troops and 
implementing a long haul counterinsurgency approach.222 
In parallel with the progressing military COIN planning, President Bush had 
perceptively felt that America was losing the Iraq War.223 Bush had come to his own 
conclusions without having consulted with the JCS or the other COIN recommendations. 
Partly, this was in order to avoid politically radioactive evidence of the Bush 
administration having second thoughts about the war before the 2006 election.224 Instead, 
Bush directed his National security Advisor Steve Hadley to undertake a secret review of 
Iraq policy.225 First, Hadley invited several “outside government” experts to brief the 
President on their views on the Iraq War.226 These experts recommended a shift to 
counterinsurgency methods, stressing increased troops and holding military leaders in 
“Iraq and Tampa accountable.”227 Second, members of Bush’s staff asked Petraeus for his 
advice on what would need to be done.228 Petraeus, of course, recommended a “fully 
resourced counterinsurgency strategy”.229  
Third, after the “rebuke” of Bush in the midterm election, Bush accepted 
Rumsfeld’s resignation as Secretary of Defense.230 The President immediately appointed 
Robert Gates as Rumsfeld’s replacement. Gates had been a member of the Congressional 
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“Iraq Study Group,” but unlike the group’s final assessment, Gates had concluded that a 
“temporary reinforcement of U.S. troops” was necessary.  
Fourth, Bush met with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to see if his vision for 
Iraq was similar to that of the United States. After having been appointed Prime Minister, 
Maliki’s office had been known to prevent the detention of Shi’a hardliners, fill the 
military leadership with Shi’as, and neglect Sunni areas of important resources.231 It was 
unknown if al-Maliki was “just too weak to prevent such actions, or if he was a willing 
participant” in them.232 Maliki relied on the support of al-Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi, which 
constrained his public actions in support of the United States.233 When Bush met in 
private with the Iraqi Prime Minister, al-Maliki promised to commit more forces, allow 
more U.S. presence in Shi’a dominate neighborhoods, rein in Shi’a militias, and begin the 
process of political reconciliation of Shi’as with the other various Iraqi factions.234 
Finally, with the influence of West Point professor Fred Kagan and retired 
General Jack Keane, Bush had decided to choose “victory in Iraq” over an embarrassing 
withdrawal.235 Bush took Kagan and Keane’s advice of committing more resources, 
securing Sunni and Shi’a mixed areas in Baghdad, and training Iraqis without abandoning 
a properly secured Iraqi population.236 As General Casey was still committed to 
“transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces as soon as possible,” Bush’s new 
Secretary of Defense Gates recommended that Petraeus take over command of U.S. 
forces in Iraq. 
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By January 2007, Bush had finalized most of the major decisions regarding the 
transition to the Surge, and all that was left to do was inform the American people of his 
decision. In the face of incredible opposition towards the escalation of the Iraq War, Bush 
doubled down and announced his new strategy for Iraq. Bush admitted personal 
responsibility for the direction the war had gone, and stated his intention to “change 
America’s course in Iraq.”237 Because “failure in Iraq would be disastrous to the United 
States and the region,” a new strategy was needed to succeed.238 In addition to the 15 
brigade combat teams already in Iraq, a surge of 24,000 troops would head to Iraq to 
enact a counterinsurgency mission.239 20,000 of the troops would be sent to Baghdad, 
while 4,000 others would be sent to the restive al-Anbar province.240 Bush would allow 
Petraeus to enact his vision of U.S. troops fighting alongside Iraqis to protect the 
population, build the Iraqi Army and Police Forces, and begin reconstruction of the 
country.241 As Bush concluded his speech, “we can, and we will, prevail.”242 
The President had taken major political risk to enact the new Surge strategy in 
Iraq. Bush had felt that it was necessary to go ahead with the troop increases, stating that 
“the Surge was our best chance, maybe our last chance, to accomplish our objectives in 
Iraq.”243 Bush’s political opponents were quick to oppose the escalation of the war. In the 
public, the Democratic Congress, and even his own Administration, Bush had to 
overcome major opposition to the Surge.244  
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In January 2007, 61% of Americans opposed sending more troops to Iraq, while 
only 36% agreed.245 The public opposition to Bush’s Surge was in part thanks to his 
unpopularity. Even though he went public with the Surge announcement, Bush was 
unable to reframe the war in the eyes of the American people.246 Despite his warnings 
that a withdrawal would increase the threat of “Radical Islamic extremists,” the public’s 
disapproval continued through the Democratic Congress.247 However, despite their 
landslide victory in the 2006 midterm elections, Democrats did not have a veto-proof 
majority in Congress.248 In order to pass a funding cutoff for the war, Democrats would 
also have to gain Republican votes as well. If Bush could keep the Republicans in support 
of his efforts, the Surge could continue unimpeded.249 
In the Bush Administration, many cabinet and military members agreed with 
General Casey that the U.S. should train Iraqi forces and “quickly minimize its presence 
in Iraq” in the existing “Stand Up/Stand Down” policy.250 In order to resist Democratic 
pressure, Bush would need to placate his cabinet and ensure the support of the military. 
For instance, senior political advisor Karl Rove “believed that if any generals were to 
resign in protest of the Surge,” it would have caused rebellion in the Republican ranks 
and cause the formation of a bipartisan antiwar alliance.”251  
In this effort, the President was largely successful at containing dissent. By 
replacing Rumsfeld and Casey with their popular successors Gates and Petraeus, Bush 
was able to gain the approval of his skeptical cabinet members. For example, 
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Condoleezza Rice had expressed her doubt in the new policy, but because Gates was now 
in command of the Department of Defense, she agreed to “fully endorse” the Surge.252 
With the backing of his full Administration, Bush could now attempt to influence the 
fractured opinions of the Republican Party (GOP).  
Several GOP members had been both publically and privately opposed to the 
Surge in 2007, and the Bush Administration needed to address these concerns.  Bush sent 
Rice, Gates, and Petraeus, all popular with the GOP establishment, to plead their case.253 
Rice, Gates, and Petraeus all were good choices because they held far more credibility 
with Congress than the President.254 For instance, Petraeus made use of his 67% approval 
rating amongst Republicans.255 With the help of his subordinates’ full court press on GOP 
members, Bush managed to placate GOP concerns about the Surge. First, the Bush 
Administration publicly suggested that the surge would be a “short-term approach,” even 
though they privately knew this was unlikely.256 Second, they promised Republicans that 
a comprehensive review of the strategy in September 2007.257 By promising these two 
major concessions, Bush was able ensure Republican unity towards the Iraq war. 
With his Republican alliance, Bush could now divide and discredit Democratic 
opposition to the war.258 Republicans like Senator John McCain reframed the Democrat’s 
antiwar sentiment, reiterating Bush’s stance that withdrawal Iraq would harm both U.S. 
troops and national security. McCain helped to defeat a bill that would contain set dates 
for withdrawal by stating that any benchmarks would act as “a date for certain 
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surrender.”259 This type of rhetoric preserved Republican support, as the American public 
was “receptive to the Republican argument that Democrats were precipitously conceding 
defeat.”260 A July poll noted that 55% of the public was willing to wait for Petraeus’ 
report on the Surge in September.261 Ultimately, Democrats were never able to create 
substantial obstacles for the Surge in 2007, and the Surge continued unencumbered. 
Amidst the public discussion of the Surge, General Petraeus quickly enacted 
Surge policy and tactics in January 2007. Despite some initial difficulty in ensuring the 
timely arrival of the Surge brigades, Petraeus was immediately able to begin planning for 
the first Surge operation.262 Codenamed Fardh al-Qanoon (or “enforcing the law” in 
English), the military began targeting Baghdad and its surrounding areas. Fardh al-
Qanoon would immediately reverse the tactics used in Iraq from 2003-2006. As noted 
previously, the objective of the Surge was to provide security to the public. Instead of 
being holed up in FOBs like before, U.S. and coalition troops would operate where Iraqis 
“lived, worked, and slept,” and work more closely with Iraqi soldiers and policemen.263 
By securing the public, they would become more cooperative with Americans, sharing 
intelligence on insurgent activities and helping to rebuild Iraq. The Surge would also 
limit the rules of engagement for soldiers, restricting the unhelpful collateral damage 
towards civilians and their property.264 
The major focus of Fardh al-Qanoon would be to achieve an important objective: 
securing Baghdad. Planners for the operation wanted to “win the Battle of Baghdad” by 
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regaining stability in urban areas and also targeting the so-called Baghdad “belts,” which 
were targeted in Fardh al-Qanoon’s sister operation entitled Phantom Thunder. The belts 
were the outer reaches of Baghdad where sectarian groups had garnered a substantial 
manufacturing and logistical base to attack the capital.265 By choking off the belts, U.S. 
and coalition troops could reduce accelerants, such as “car bombs and suicide bombers,” 
from disrupting Baghdadi security.266 The extent of the belts were massive and the 
operation would take months to unfold, as the full strength of the Surge brigades would 
only be felt by June of 2007. The uncovering of a vast network of bomb making factories, 
command centers, medical stations made it clear that sectarian groups wouldn’t give up 
the area easily.  
Despite an increase in violence, the operation would ultimately prove successful. 
In May and June of 2007, U.S. troops had suffered a high casualty rate of 227 soldiers 
killed.267 However, by December, only 23 soldiers died, a marked improvement.268 By 
operating inside Baghdad, and providing Iraqis with “24/7 [security] coverage, several 
developments would help to reduce violence.269 For instance, as security improved and 
permanent U.S. outposts were established, Iraqis were more comfortable sharing 
information with soldiers because they no longer feared reprisals from insurgent and 
terrorist groups.270  
The new battalion level security stations and company/platoon level outposts also 
helped to restrict the movement of insurgents.271 No longer could militants move about 
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the city unimpeded by U.S. military presence. Iraqi freedom of movement was also 
hampered by the building of controversial “gated communities.”272 Walls were erected 
around Baghdad where insurgent violence was the most prevalent.273 Though harshly 
criticized by insurgent propaganda and the international media, barriers between Shi’a 
and Sunni neighborhoods greatly reduced violence.274 For instance, walls constructed in 
the al-Ghazaliyah neighborhood helped to lower the murder rate in that area by up to 50 
percent.275 Ultimately, the neighborhood walls and various traffic obstacles seriously 
limited both insurgent violence and terrorist attacks such as car bombs and suicide 
bombers.276 
Fardh al-Qanoon also marked the first steps towards increased reconstruction 
efforts across Baghdad. Before the operation, basic services were being neglected in 
many Baghdadi neighborhoods. In several places, trash and raw sewage waste was 
common in the streets.277 In many cases, electricity had to be “rationed, and was only 
available a few hours a day.”278 Insurgent groups could plausibly claim that the Iraqi 
government had “lost complete control” over Baghdad.279 As security improved, 
reconstruction efforts could begin. For example, in September 2007, a “four hundred-
kilovolt electrical line” know as “Tower 57” was finally repaired, after having become a 
personal obsession for Petraeus.280 
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Operation Phantom Thunder was also a successful operation. Though insurgent 
resistance was fierce and deeply entrenched, U.S., coalition, and Iraqi troops were largely 
able to clear the belts. In May 2007, the final Surge brigade had arrived in Iraq and began 
work in driving hostile groups, especially al-Qaeda from the outermost parts of 
Baghdad.281 The clearing of the belts was intensive work, and al-Qaeda was dug in deep. 
In Baqubah, U.S. soldiers were met with a plethora of obstacles, such as “dozens of … 
improvised explosive devices” and even entire rows of houses that were rigged with 
explosives to kill the “Americans soldiers clearing them.”282 Efforts to stabilize the belts 
“were uniformly successful” largely in part thanks to the fact that U.S. and coalition 
forces would “not clear and leave, they would clear and hold.” Fardh al-Qanoon and 
Phantom Thunder would help to put increasingly heavy pressure on insurgent groups, and 
Fardh al-Qanoon’s initial success would lead to a growing number of COIN operations 
throughout Iraq. 
The success of the Surge in 2007 was also due in part to increasing U.S. 
reconciliation with Sunni leaders. In the western al-Anbar province, local Sunnis began 
“turning” against al-Qaeda, in what became known as the Awakening.283 Before 2007, 
Sunni tribes and their sheikhs were alienated by the “end of Sunni political control in 
Baghdad.”284 From 2003 to 2006, tribal leaders in al-Anbar chafed at the De-
Baathification laws, which eliminated the important jobs and “sources of patronage” that 
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sheikhs relied upon for their political power.285 Alienation of the Sunni tribes ultimately 
led many Sunni leaders to join the insurgency or support al-Qaeda.286  
However, the tribes had become increasingly incensed by al-Qaeda’s brutal de 
facto rule in al-Anbar province. In 2005, some Sunni tribes tried to participate in the 
December 2005 elections after the failed boycott of the January elections, and were met 
with al-Qaeda violence. Al-Qaeda ruthlessly undertook a campaign of “murder and 
intimidation” against Sunnis that opposed their will.287  
Al-Qaeda also sought to aggressively impose a “brutal interpretation of Shari’a 
law on a Sunni tribal culture that was largely secular.”288 Egregious actions by al-Qaeda, 
such as the lack of burial of corpses within a 24-hour period, sacrilegious to the Islamic 
faith, rankled the sheikhs.289 Most importantly, al-Qaeda had put an end to the sheikh’s 
smuggling routes, which further reduced their ability to gain patronage.290 Soon enough, 
al-Qaeda would face a Sunni backlash. 
 The Sunni tribes of al-Anbar province had tried unsuccessfully to unseat al-Qaeda 
on several occasions, and their attempts only increased al-Qaeda’s retaliation. In one 
rebellion, infighting had left the Sunni tribes vulnerable, and al-Qaeda took advantage. 
Three fourths of the sheikhs involved in the early rebellion were murdered in what one 
U.S. colonel called the “night of long knives.”291 Increasingly desperate, Sunnis began to 
seek more cooperation with American forces. Sunnis had largely supported the resistance 
to American occupation of Iraq, but al-Qaeda’s violence had thrown them into the arms 
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of their professed enemies. As one Sunni leader put it, “Life became intolerable. So we 
started looking for salvation, no matter who it was.”292 
 By the summer of 2006, Americans renewed interest on securing al-Anbar and its 
major city, Ramadi. General Casey had tasked a brigade under the command of Colonel 
Sean MacFarland with retaking the city but asked MacFarland “to fix Ramadi, but don’t 
do a Fallujah.”293 Instead of pursuing the strategy known derisively as “Drive-by COIN” 
that had been popular before the surge, MacFarland and his troops would pursue 
reconciliation with the Sunni tribes.294 
 At this point, the Sunni Awakening had coalesced under the leadership of a 
young sheikh named Abdul Sattar Abu Risha al-Rishawi.295 Controlling only a minor 
tribe, Sattar had miraculously come to control a renewed Sunni rebellion.296 In 
September, Sattar had managed to assemble a meeting of 50 sheikhs, where they 
promised to “declare war on al-Qaeda” and to “consider American forces friendly, and to 
forbid attacks on them.”297 MacFarland took advantage of this development to engineer 
an offensive to retake Ramadi, a prototype that would be used as an example in the 
following Surge. MacFarland utilized the walls and outposts defensive strategy to secure 
the city, in concert with allowing the Sunni tribes to join local police forces, removing al-
Qaeda from the city.298 With Sattar’s help, Ramadi was back under control of U.S. and 
coalition forces. Al-Anbar was soon able to be put on a path towards reconstruction. The 
U.S. military’s Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) was utilized to 
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provide millions of dollars in contracts for the Sunni tribes to fix critical infrastructure 
and other essential services.299 
As the Surge began to be implemented, the Awakening spread to other parts of 
Iraq. As Mansoor states, “the Surge had acted as the catalyst for the spread of the tribal 
rebellion across much of western and central Iraq.”300 Under the direction of General 
Petraeus, supporting the Awakening and reconciliation with Sunnis “was not optional.”301 
As Awakening franchises became ubiquitous across Iraq, the U.S. began to support local 
armed neighborhood watch groups such as the Ibnaa al-Iraq (or Sons of Iraq).302 Even 
though they had been trying to kill American troops just weeks prior to this development, 
but the U.S. command thought it was well worth the risk based on how violent Iraq had 
become.303 Eventually, the Sons of Iraq became crucial to ensuring Iraqi security, and 
many soon entered into both the U.S. and the Iraqi governments’ payroll.304 Partly a 
strategy to assuage fears of Sunni militias by Shi’a leaders, the Sons of Iraq being paid by 
the government nonetheless gave the Awakening some legitimacy in the eyes of the Shi’a 
leaders. 
Despite notable reconciliation between Shi’as and Sunnis there was still a lot of 
work to be done. Shi’a leaders such as Prime Minister al-Maliki were still deeply 
suspicious of Sunni intentions. Even worse, the central government could barely control 
the Shi’a militias. It was clear that the U.S. would also need to spend considerable effort 
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defeating the Shi’a insurgency. Surprisingly, initiative from the Prime Minister’s office 
would serve as the unlikely catalyst for bringing the Shi’a militias to heel. 
With the emergence of the Surge and the Awakening, Sunni insurgents, as well as 
al-Qaeda, were in disarray. Shi’a militias would now be the main target of U.S. and 
coalition forces. At the end of 2007, groups linked to the Jaish al-Mahdi were continuing 
to attack U.S. forces, and now had deadly new techniques at their disposal.305 In 
November, Shi’a militants attacked a U.S. combat outpost with explosives and ball-
bearings, which wounded 12 soldiers, and damaged or destroyed 24 vehicles.306 The new 
tactics were linked to Iran, which increasingly began to meddle in Iraqi politics.307 
Iran’s main goal was to ensure a “weak and pliable state in Iraq,” which could be 
influenced to help Iran pursue its interest of establishing Iranian hegemony in the Middle 
East.308 During increased sectarianism of 2006, a branch of Iran’s Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard Corps military wing called the Qods force, began to infiltrate sections of the Jaish 
al-Mahdi. Their goal was to “create a client proxy force” beholden to Iran, much like Iran 
had done with Hezbollah in Lebanon.309 In 2006, Qods personnel were active inside Iraq, 
and had been smuggling arms to the Jaish al-Mahdi.310 These arms were increasingly 
deadly, like explosive penetrators that “could destroy an M1A1 tank.”311 
Initially, the main obstacle to combating the Jaish al-Mahdi militia was Prime 
Minister al-Maliki. Al-Maliki’s government was full of sectarian ministers that had 
largely failed to produce any political progress alongside the progress of the Surge. In 
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private, al-Maliki had promised President Bush that he would allow for U.S. operations to 
take place in predominantly Shi’a neighborhoods, which had been previously off 
limits.312 But in practice, al-Maliki’s government was beholden to al-Sadr and the Jaish 
al-Mahdi for political support, which constrained his actions.313 Until Maliki was willing 
to stand up to the Shi’a militias, the Surge would likely fail. 
Soon, an opportunity presented itself for al-Maliki to assert more control over the 
Shi’a militias. With the growing influence of Iran and increasing pressure from the U.S. 
Surge, al-Sadr began to lose control over the Jaish al-Mahdi.314 Since al-Sadr had entered 
government, he was forced to moderate his political aims to align with al-Maliki’s 
government. Sadr’s moderation pushed parts of his militia to “turn their backs on al-
Sadr’s leadership,” and turn to funding themselves by way of “organized crime.”315  
In the spring of 2007, the Jaish al-Mahdi pulled out of al-Maliki’s government, 
increasing al-Maliki’s willingness to retaliate against them316. In addition to their political 
exit, the Jaish al-Mahdi increasingly fought against its rival, the Badr Brigade. The Badr 
Brigade had become increasingly close to the central government and was embedded in 
its security forces. The Jaish al-Mahdi battled for control of Southern Iraq, and had 
undertaken several assassination attempts of government figures, both successful and 
unsuccessful.317  
The final straw for al-Maliki would be the violence in the city of Karbala, where 
Ayatollah Sistani had threatened to cancel the religious celebration of mid-Sha’ban in the 
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city. Likened to the “pope canceling Easter or Christmas Mass,” cancelled celebrations in 
Karbala would likely see the end of al-Maliki’s government.318 The government 
immediately began a “show of force” to assert its control of Karbala that August.319 At 
the head of a large vehicle convoy, al-Maliki personally oversaw the arrests of several 
Sadrist leaders in Karbala.320 The Karbala fiasco provided huge political gains to al-
Maliki’s government. The Shi’a community blamed al-Sadr and the Jaish al-Mahdi for 
the violence in Karbala, and al-Sadr was forced to agree to a cease fire with the Iraqi 
government and U.S. forces in order to save face.321 With al-Maliki’s intervention, a 
temporary improvement in security conditions occurred.322 
Despite the success of the Surge in reducing violence, there was very little in the 
way of political reconciliation taking place.323 Al-Maliki was front and center in the 
political stalemate. Despite the veneer of a balanced ethnic government, al-Maliki was 
extremely suspicious of the Sunnis. Attempts had been made to distribute power amongst 
the various ethnic groups, but the Prime Minister undercut the other groups at every 
possible chance.324 For instance, al-Maliki used his Office of the Commander in Chief to 
bypass Sunni officials and work directly with the predominantly Shi’a military.325  
Additionally, Maliki was wary of the Sons of Iraq, crucial to the Sunni 
Awakening movement. Calling them the “hidden army,” al-Maliki was fearful that the 
Sons of Iraq would work to undermine the government.326 As Mansoor states, the Sons of 
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Iraq were hardly hidden. All Sons of Iraq members had been entered into a biometric 
identification database run by the government and were also paid directly by MNF-I (and 
by extension the Iraqi government).327 
Relations with other political figures were also sour. Al-Maliki and his rival Sunni 
Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi both competed during the improving security to 
advance their own political gains. Hashemi tried to lay claim to the Sons of Iraq, which 
fortified al-Maliki’s “hidden army” claims.328 The United States was relying on an 
increasingly divisive Iraqi government, and huge political developments, such as 
repealing De-Baathification, passing a budget, oil sharing, and signing a Status of Forces 
agreement looked nearly impossible. 
However, several political developments began to take place. At the local 
government level, leaders of the Sunnis in al-Anbar province and Shi’as in Karbala came 
together to discuss ways to increase cooperation between the two religious groups.329 
Both groups managed to come together to sign a reconciliation accord, as well as to 
“address … the issue of displaced Iraqis.”330  
National government political progress quickly heated up as well.331 Despite al-
Maliki’s dysfunctional handling of politics, political progress would be pushed by other 
national leaders. Lack of political progress motivated several Iraqi leaders to propose 
forming a new government, and this vote of no confidence had scared Maliki enough to 
bring him back into political negotiations with Sunnis and Kurds.332 In the Iraqi Council 
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of Representatives, Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashadani began to skillfully engineer political 
compromise. In a matter of a few months, Iraqi lawmakers had passed a “grand bargain,” 
where the 2008 budget, amnesty for Baath members, provincial powers act, and even a 
symbolic redesign of the Iraqi flag had all been approved.333 Despite national 
reconciliation not being achieved, political progress was being made.334 
The political progress in early 2008 led al-Maliki to adopt an almost 
overconfident outlook in Iraq. This overconfidence would lead al-Maliki to pursue further 
control of his Shi’a political base, ultimately leading to another showdown between the 
government and the Iranian backed Jaish al-Mahdi.335 The showdown would occur in the 
southern city of Basra, a bastion of the Jaish al-Mahdi’s power, where al-Maliki pursued 
an action similar to the one in Karbala. The al-Maliki led an assault on Basra which 
would become known as Saulat al-Farsan, or “Charge of the Knights.” 
At the beginning of 2008, the military situation in Basra was dire. As part of the 
coalition forces, the United Kingdom was tasked with keeping the peace in Basra and had 
largely held the city without incident prior to 2007.336 However, while the United States 
began implementing the Surge, the British began to withdraw. By 2007, British troops, 
who were anticipating a withdrawal from Basra due to their own domestic political 
pressure, consolidated their forces to one single base at the Basra airport.337 So, like the 
United States had done elsewhere in Iraq prior to 2007, British troops left the Iraqi army 
and police to patrol Basra, opening the door for increased sectarianism inside the city. 
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Eventually, competition between the Badr Brigade and Jaish al-Mahdi gave way to the 
Jaish al-Mahdi’s sole control over Basra, with al-Sadr claiming personal responsibility 
for “forcing the British out of Iraq.”338 
Since the British pullout, al-Maliki was unable to reassert government control of 
Basra.339 However, with the political “grand bargain” in 2008, al-Maliki was politically 
empowered to do something about the city.340 During the 2008 Shi’a Ashura holiday, the 
Jaish al-Mahdi tried to kidnap al-Maliki’s national security advisor, Dr. Mowaffak al-
Rubaie, giving al-Maliki the perfect opportunity to rally a military response.341 With al-
Maliki “on the warpath against Iranian-backed militants of the Jaish al-Mahdi special 
groups,” the United States began to pay closer attention. 342 U.S. leaders warned al-Maliki 
and his generals that a quick excursion like that in Karbala would not be feasible in 
Basra, due to the “deeply entrenched militias and criminal organizations.”343 It would be 
possible to clear Basra, but only if Iraq had enough time and resources to implement it.344 
Despite U.S. advice, al-Maliki rushed to “clean up Basra.”345 In March, al-Maliki 
informed the U.S. he intended to deploy troops within 24 hours, and would go 
“personally to Basra … with his AK-47, to meet with local leaders to resolve the 
situation.”346 This caught MNF-I unawares, leaving the Iraqi Army to begin the invasion 
by itself. Due to poor intelligence, logistics, and weaponry, al-Maliki’s offensive stalled 
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when it entered the outskirts of the city.347 Al-Maliki was forced to hunker down while 
Jaish al-Mahdi rocket fire thundered overhead, which resulted in the killing of his head of 
security.348 
Concerned that al-Maliki’s defeat in Basra would ultimately endanger al-Maliki’s 
national political control, General Petraeus stepped in to ensure MNF-I could help in any 
way possible.349 U.S. and British forces rapidly deployed to Basra and were able to 
augment the Iraqi army and helped to push back the Jaish al-Mahdi. Despite al-Sadr 
trying to broker a ceasefire, al-Maliki continued the offensive to its conclusion, and 
ensured that the “Jaish al-Mahdi never again contested control of Basra.”350 Al-Maliki’s 
ultimate victory in Basra forced Iran to reconsider who it supported in Iraq. With the 
downfall of the Jaish al-Mahdi in Basra, as well as in other cities, Iran had come to the 
“conclusion that Iranian interest would be better served if Maliki remained in power.”351  
With Iran’s Qods force supporting the legitimate Iraqi government, and successful 
operations by the Iraqi and MNF-I forces across Iraq, the security situation in Iraq 
improved dramatically by July of 2008. The only question remaining was how long the 
Surge would continue to be U.S. policy. With the U.S. presidential elections coming up, 
the future of U.S. forces in Iraq was in question. 
On November 17, 2008, both the U.S. and Iraqi government signed a status of 
forces agreement that would see U.S. and coalition combat troops withdraw from Iraqi 
cities and towns by the end of June 2009, and all troops leave Iraq by 2011.352 The basis 
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of the agreement was that Iraq “had exercised its sovereignty” and that the “tenure of 
U.S. forces on Iraqi soil was finite.”353 The status of forces agreement also stipulated that 
U.S. contractors and military personnel would now be subject to Iraq’s laws.354 Most 
importantly, the three year withdrawal date would also give both the U.S. and Iraq to 
negotiate a longer term agreement for U.S. presence in the country.355 
In reality, the negotiations for continued U.S. presence in Iraq did not materialize. 
The Iraqi government made no significant attempt to keep U.S. troops in Iraq. Nationalist 
sentiment in Iraq had pressured Iraqi politicians to call for the end of the foreign 
occupation.356 Similarly, in the U.S., President Obama took office and initiated a 
campaign promise to withdraw from Iraq.357 The U.S. would honor the previous status of 
forces agreement, continue its withdrawal, and leave Iraq before the December 2011 
deadline.358 U.S. combat forces would leave by 2010, and then the U.S. role would be 
strictly limited to advising Iraqi forces.359  
The ultimate result of both the U.S. and Iraqi efforts to avoid a protracted conflict 
would be the return of sectarianism. Mansoor writes that after the last U.S. troops 
departed, political crisis returned to Iraq. Prime Minister al-Maliki quickly “went after his 
political enemies,” especially Sunni Vice President al-Hashemi, who he accused of 
running a Sunni death squad.360 Additionally, as the U.S. withdrew, al-Qaeda was “given 
a second lease on life”, resurfacing as ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). 361 
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Increasing sectarianism and the emergence of the powerful ISIS group would haunt Iraq 
for years to come.  
Despite the end result, the Surge may have important insight into what kind of 
counterterrorism strategy is the most successful. Was the Surge more effective than the 
previous 2003-2006 period and the subsequent withdrawal? In the next section, the 
tactics and politics of both the Surge and the withdrawal will be taken into consideration 
while evaluating trends such as U.S. and coalition troop levels, Iraqi civilian casualties, 
Iraqi public opinion, and the rate of terrorism. The comparison will help to determine 
whether hard counterterrorism does in fact result in a failed counterterrorism effort. 
Iraq Surge and Withdrawal Data Trends 2007-2011 
 From 2007-2011, a general counterterrorism strategy of counterinsurgency was 
used. In comparison to the traditional war strategy utilized from 2003-2006, 
counterinsurgency utilizes tactics that are less aggressive and more cognizant of collateral 
damage. Therefore, the Surge and withdrawal periods should show trends that indicate 
lower troop levels and civilian casualties, higher public opinion of the United States and 
the Iraq war effort, and lower rates of terrorism, pointing to counterterrorism success. In 
the following section, the hypothesis that hard offensive counterterrorism causes 
counterterrorism failure will be tested against a softer counterterrorism approach in the 
Surge. First, the troop level trends of U.S. and coalition forces is examined. Second, the 
relationship between troop levels and civilian casualties is analyzed. Third, troop levels 
and civilian casualties are investigated to understand their role in Iraqi public opinion 
trends. Fourth, trends in troop levels, civilian casualties, and Iraqi public opinion will be 
looked at to explain trends in the rate of terrorism during the Surge period. Lastly, the 
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implications of all aforementioned trends will be discussed to help determine whether the 
hard counterterrorism of the 2003-2006 period was more or less successful than the 
Surge. 
Troop Levels 2007-2011 
 During 2007-2011, two general trends of troop levels are apparent. First, from 
January 2007 to October 2007, troop levels increased from 146,650 troops to 182,668 
troops as the five additional U.S. Surge brigades were introduced to Iraq (Figure 5). 
Second, From November 2007 to November 2011, a very gradual troop withdrawal from 
182,668 in 2007 to a complete withdrawal of U.S. combat troops occurred in 2011. These 
two trends coincide with military planning during the Surge period.  
The general consensus was that the Surge would be a temporary fix, as domestic 
pressure was mounting to end the war. As Mansoor stated, the Surge “would be our last, 
best shot at salvaging victory.”362 Additionally, Petraeus aimed to make the withdrawal of 
Surge forces official by July of 2008, not long before the U.S. election which would spell 
the end of Bush’s second term in office.363 This way, the Bush administration ensured 
that Iraq’s future would be determined by the new President, Barack Obama. The two 
trends demarcate the change of policy from President Bush to President Obama, where 
Obama enacted a policy of facilitating full withdrawal of American combat troops. This 
break in policy is best signified by when the war was renamed from Operation Iraqi 
Freedom to Operation New Dawn in 2010.364 In the new strategy, Obama would ended 
combat operations in Iraq in 2010, and honoring the agreement to withdraw all forces by 
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2011.365 In the next section, these two trends of troop levels will be examined to 
determine the relationship between troop numbers and civilian casualties. 
 
Figure 7. Total Number of U.S. and Coalition Troop in Iraq from 2007-2011366 
 
Civilian Casualties 2007-2011 
From 2007 to 2011, Iraqi civilian casualties gradually dropped from more than 
3,000 in January 2007 to an average of 500 per month past July of 2008. During the true 
Surge from 2007 to 2008, casualties were still very high due to increasing military 
operations which were needed to wrest control from Iraqi sectarian and terrorist groups. 
General Petraeus and his staff were aware violence would be prevalent during the surge, 
as the U.S. made efforts to better secure the population.367 Parallel to civilian casualties, 
U.S. and coalition troop casualties in the first five months of the Surge were the most of 
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any five month span of the war.368 However, by the summer of 2008, the successful 
military operations gave way to decreases in both Iraqi civilian and U.S. military 
casualties. Casualties didn’t completely disappear, but they had eventually reached 
controllable levels. So, compared to the troop level counts, the trend of civilian casualties 
were extremely similar. Troop level and civilian casualty trends point to a relationship 
where less troops correlated with less civilian casualties. Likely, changes to 
counterinsurgency strategy helped to bring the Iraqi civil war under control, and by the 
end of the Surge, military offensives were less aggressive as well as less needed. 
However, this reduction in casualties as troop levels increased could also be attributed to 
other factors, such as the reintegration of Sunnis via the Awakening.  
However, evidence points to the fact that civilian casualties most likely increased 
after the U.S. withdrawal was complete. By 2014, a huge spike in civilian casualties 
occurred, and civilian casualties were much higher than during the Surge. Likely, this 
spike can be attributed to the U.S. withdrawal, which allowed political upheaval and 
terrorist violence to return to Iraq. 
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Figure 8. Number of Total Iraqi Civilian Casualty in Iraq from 2007-2016369 
 
Iraqi Public Opinion 2007-2011 
 In continuance with the declining Iraqi public opinion of U.S. and Coalition 
forces and the progress of the war from 2003 to 2007, the Surge period started out with 
dismal approval ratings. In February 2007, 78% of those polled opposed the presence of 
U.S. and coalition troops (Table 5). Additionally, 31% of those polled blamed the 
international military presence for the violence occurring in Iraq, more than double the 
percentage of any other entity blamed as seen in Table 6. Split into ethnic groups or 
regions, the same pre-Surge trends continued. Both Shi’as and Sunnis opposed the 
continuing presence of U.S. and Coalition troops, while 85% of Kurds believed the 
security situation in Iraq would become worse with their withdrawal.370 
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Table 5. Percentage of Iraqis Who Support U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq371 
Do You Support the Presence of U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq? 
 Strongly/ Somewhat 
Support 
Strongly/ Somewhat 
Oppose 
September 2007 21% 79% 
Shia 17% 83% 
Sunni 2% 98% 
February 2007 22% 78% 
November 2005 32% 65% 
February 2004 39% 51% 
 
Table 6. Percentage of Responses on Who is Most to Blame for Violence in Iraq 
(February 2007)372  
Who Do You Blame Most for the Violence that is Occurring in the Country? 
 February 2007 August 2007 
U.S. / Coalition Forces 31% 19% 
Iraqi Government 8% 9% 
Sunni Militias/ Leaders 5% 6% 
Shiite Militias 6% 7% 
Al Qaeda/ Foreign Jihads 18% 21% 
Iran 7% 11% 
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Eventually, the success of the Surge in achieving better security across Iraq led to 
slightly better outlook of the war in public opinion. As early as September of 2007, Iraqis 
blamed the U.S. and coalition less (19%) and Al Qaeda and jihadist groups more (21%) 
for the violence in Iraq (Table 6). However, overall approval for U.S. and coalition troops 
would only very slightly improve. In contrast with 78% disapproval of international 
forces in February 2007, 73% disapproval was recorded in February 2008 (Table 7).  
 
Table 7. Percentage of Iraqis Who Support U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq 373 
Do You Support the Presence of U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq? 
 Strongly/ Somewhat 
Support 
Strongly/ Somewhat 
Oppose 
February 2008 26% 73% 
Shia 23% 77% 
Sunni 5% 95% 
September 2007 21% 79% 
Shia 17% 83% 
Sunni 2% 98% 
 
Despite miniscule gains in international forces approval, the growing security 
conditions in Iraq led to better future outlooks of the war’s progress. February 2009 
marked a high water mark for the Surge, with the transition to withdrawal taking effect. 
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Iraqi public opinion reflects the Surge improvements in Iraqi security. 52% of Iraqis 
believed the security situation in Iraq had improved over the past 6 months before 2009 
(Table 8).  Also, 58% of Iraqis believed that things were going well in Iraq, compared to 
35% in February 2007 (Table 9).  
 
Table 8. Percentage of Iraqis Who Believe Iraq is Heading in the Right Direction374 
In the Past Six Months, has the Security Situation in Iraq Become Better, Worse, or 
About the Same? 
 Better About the Same Worse 
February 2009 52% 39% 8% 
February 2008 36% 37% 26% 
August 2007 11% 28% 61% 
 
Table 9. Percentage of Iraqis Who Believe Things in Iraq Are Good Overall375 
How Would You Say Things Are Going in Iraq Overall These Days? 
February 2009  February 2008  
Very Good/ Quite Good 58% Very Good/ Quite Good 43% 
Very Bad/ Quite Bad 41% Very Bad/ Quite Bad 56% 
September 2007  February 2007  
Very Good/ Quite Good 22% Very Good/ Quite Good 35% 
Very Bad/ Quite Bad 78% Very Bad/ Quite Bad 65% 
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 By 2010 however, Surge gains in public support began to decline. As U.S. and 
coalition forces withdrew, public opinion took a drop. Iraqi beliefs that the security 
conditions were improved fell from 74% in October of 2009 to 59% in April 2011 (Table 
10). In addition, 51% of Iraqis had believed the country was headed in the right direction 
in October 2009, whereas only 38% believed so in April 2011 (Table 11). 
 
Table 10. Percentage of Iraqis Who Believe Security Has Gotten Better Over the Last 
Year376 
Has Security Gotten Better or Worse Over the Last Year? 
April 2011  October 2010  
Better 59% Better 65% 
Worse 22% Worse 20% 
June 2010  October 2009  
Better 74% Better 74% 
Worse 23% Worse 16% 
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Table 11. Percentage of Iraqis Who Believe Iraq is Heading in the Right Direction 377 
Is the Country Headed in the Right or Wrong Direction? 
April 2011  October 2010  
Right Direction 38% Right Direction 35% 
Wrong Direction 52% Wrong Direction 57% 
June 2010  October 2009  
Right Direction 41% Right Direction 51% 
Wrong Direction 59% Wrong Direction 43% 
 
 Trends in public opinion reveal that while most Iraqis didn’t support U.S. and 
coalition forces in Iraq, they did support gains in Iraqi security from sectarian and 
terrorist violence. As international forces withdrew, public opinion once again slid. A 
change in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy, coupled with troop 
withdrawals, led to reduced civilian casualties as well as improved public opinion in 
some facets. However, it should be noted that too few troops led to decreased public 
confidence in Iraq at the end of the U.S. presence. 
The Rate of Terrorism from 2007-2011 
 During the surge and subsequent withdrawal of U.S. and coalition troops, three 
trends in the rate of terrorism can be noted. First, the initial two years of the Surge 
resulted in dramatic spikes in terrorism, higher than most months of 2006. In June and 
October of 2007, terrorist attacks reached record numbers, at 223 and 198 recorded 
attacks respectively. Likely, this increase in attacks can be contributed to backlash against 
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U.S. and Sunni Awakening gains by al-Qaeda.378 Second, while record spikes occurred, 
subsequent months leveled out, and spikes were far less common after 2008 as security 
improved. Additionally, after the U.S. withdrawal in 2011, terrorist attacks 
predominantly led by ISIS began to pick up and by 2014, had surpassed even the highest 
levels of attacks recorded during the U.S. occupation. 
 The record setting spikes in terrorism from 2007 to 2008 can be explained by two 
phenomena. First, the changing tactics of U.S. and coalition forces are partly to blame, at 
least at first. By focusing on securing the Iraqi population, the U.S. military had begun to 
interfere with insurgent and terrorist operations. Because COIN tactics impeded the 
movement of various violent groups, they tried to combat the improving security stability 
in Iraq.379 Second, the large terrorism spikes can be interpreted as the high water mark of 
the sectarian Iraqi Civil War. Aggressive tactics during the 2003-2006 period led to 
increasing instability in Iraq, which had made the U.S. enact the Surge to rein in sectarian 
and terrorist violence. In order to curb the violence, U.S. and coalition forces first had to 
increase the security situation in the country. After the implementation of the Surge, 
terrorist attacks did in fact lower, though not as substantially as the U.S. had hoped. 
 Possibly, the short term Surge might not have been long enough to ensure the 
stability of the Iraqi government or the security of Iraq in general. Perhaps, as some 
suggest, the Surge should have been more concerned with the long term security of Iraq, 
rather than a ploy by the U.S. government to save face.380 Surge terrorist attacks 
diminished from 2007 levels, but the withdrawal period witnessed terrorist attack levels 
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that were higher than levels of terrorist attacks seen during the 2003-2006 period. 
Relative stability in attack levels that had been achieved were quickly reversed once U.S. 
troops no longer had a significant presence. By March 2014, the emergence of ISIS as a 
grave threat to Iraq had prompted terrorist attack levels to hit an all-time high of 503 
attacks in a single month. 
 In comparison to troop levels and civilian casualties trends, terrorist attacks levels 
do yield some correlation. Tactics seem to be a relevant factor, like the new Surge focus 
on improving security and moving off of FOB’s, which yielded important dividends. If 
tactics hadn’t changed from 2003-2006 it could be argued that increased troops yield a 
reduction in both civilian casualties and terrorist attacks. As time went on, it is clear that 
less troops in later years opened the door for an increase in casualties and terrorist attacks 
after the U.S. withdrawal. Terrorist attacks would increase linearly into 2014, so perhaps 
a more sustained U.S. and coalition military effort could have helped to further reduction 
of terrorism. So, a change to softer counterterrorism strategies could have plausibly 
resulted in less terrorism. Therefore, the hypothesis that hard offensive counterterrorism 
decreases counterterrorism success is possible, but not entirely proven. Other factors, 
such as increased political cooperation between Shia’s and Sunnis, and the emergence of 
the Awakening during the Surge could also be at play. 
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Figure 9. Total Number of Terrorist Attacks in Iraq in the Surge and Withdrawal Eras 
(2007-2011)381 
 
 
Figure 10. Total Number of Terrorist Attacks in Iraq after the U.S. Withdrawal from 
2011-2017382 
 
Conclusion 
 In attempting to understand the impacts of hard counterterrorism versus other 
counterterrorism tactics, understanding the U.S. war in Iraq is crucial. By looking at both 
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the post invasion period from 2003-2006 and the Surge and withdrawal from 2007-2011, 
it is possible to compare the strategies. In the 2003-2006 period, temporary increases in 
troops, paired with the use of aggressive military tactics, might have led to an increase in 
civilian casualties, Iraqi public discontent with the war, and a rising level of terrorist 
attacks in Iraq. With the Surge and subsequent withdrawal, COIN tactics and a more 
sustained increase in troops initially led to an increase, but then eventually a minor 
decrease, in terrorist attacks. Possibly, if the Surge had maintained adequate troop levels, 
terrorist attacks might have reduced to manageable levels, instead of even an increase in 
instability during the ISIS era. But, other explanations are also possible. Maybe, al-Qaeda 
and insurgent groups decided to bide their time until they knew U.S and international 
forces intended to leave the country. So, the hypothesis that hard offensive 
counterterrorism leads to counterterrorism campaign failure is possible, but not entirely 
conclusive. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Afghanistan: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Strategies from 
2001-2016 
 Since 2001, the United States has waged war in Afghanistan against the al-Qaeda 
organization and its Afghan ally, the Taliban. Generally, this war effort has entailed hard 
offensive counterterrorism strategies to reduce al-Qaeda’s global reach. After the 
September 11 attacks, the Bush administration quickly dislodged the Taliban using heavy 
aerial bombardment and help from an Afghan Northern Alliance ground offensive. Soon 
enough, President Bush handed control over to the interim Afghan government and a UN 
sanctioned international coalition designed to bring stability to Afghanistan, while U.S. 
forces focused on hunting down al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders. However, the 2001-2008 
period resulted in a renewed Taliban insurgency against the Afghan government and 
international forces. Following the success of the Surge in Iraq, Obama sought to salvage 
and win the war in Afghanistan following a similar counterinsurgency strategy from 
2009-2016. Despite considerable efforts, the Surge in Afghanistan failed to bring about 
the end of the war, and U.S. forces are still committed to the country to this day. 
 The following chapter looks to analyze which strategy was the most effective at 
countering terrorism in Afghanistan. First, an in-depth qualitative section looks at the 
history politics, and strategy of the 2001-2008 period of the war under President Bush. 
Second, trends in troop levels, Afghan civilian casualties, Afghan public opinion, and 
terrorist attacks during the first phase of the war are presented. Third, the history, politics, 
and strategy of the Obama Surge and withdrawal eras are examined. Lastly, the 
aforementioned quantitative trends of the Surge and withdrawal are evaluated. 
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Ultimately, this chapter should help to examine the hypothesis that hard offensive 
counterterrorism leads to counterterrorism failure. 
History and Politics of Afghanistan 2001-2008 
 To understand the reasons the United States went to war in Afghanistan, it’s 
important to also understand the history of Afghanistan since the 1980’s. According to 
Tamim Ansary, Afghanistan became embroiled in Islamic-motivated revolutionary 
activity during this period. During the Cold War tensions between the United States and 
the USSR, Afghanistan became a prime target for communist expansion. When the USSR 
invaded Afghanistan, the Muslim world would view Afghanistan as the nexus of a 
burgeoning Islamist movement.383 Thousands of Islamist activists from around the 
Middle East flocked to the country to join fighters known as the Mujahideen to repel the 
Soviet invaders.384 Eventually, after several long and brutal years of war, Arab 
Mujahideen fighters were able to force a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Despite 
the overwhelming superiority of Soviet troops, Afghanistan fighters held their own, 
benefiting from the support of the United States and Pakistan, who wished to curtail 
Soviet interests in Central Asia. Despite achieving their Cold War interests, the U.S. and 
Pakistan ultimately contributed to people and groups who would later wreak havoc 
against them. 
 Fighting alongside the Mujahideen was a young Osama bin Laden. Heir to a 
wealthy Saudi family, bin Laden rejected his family’s “jetsetting” lifestyle and instead 
sought to leave his mark as a pious Islamist fighter in Afghanistan.385 Bin Laden’s role in 
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fighting the Soviets was actually rather modest. Bin Laden was better known for the 
guest house he established across the Pakistani border in Peshawar for fighters who 
would ultimately enter Afghanistan to fight the Soviets.386 The house would eventually 
become known as “the base,” or al-qaeda in Arabic.387 As the victorious Arab fighters of 
the Mujahideen returned home following the Soviet withdrawal, bin Laden would 
repurpose al-Qaeda as the name for his newly created Islamist organization.388 
 Al-Qaeda would start to gain notoriety as bin Laden began to develop a grudge 
against Saudi Arabia and the United States. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and 
began threatening Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War, bin Laden confidently told the 
Saudis that he could defend the country with an Islamist Arab army.389 However, Saudi 
Arabia turned to the United States to defend them from Iraq, allowing U.S. forces to use 
Saudi territory as a base.390 Bin Laden was infuriated that the Saudis refused his help, and 
publicly criticized the Saudi royal family.391 Soon enough, bin Laden was asked to leave 
the country.392 
 Bin Laden ended up moving to Sudan, where he and his al-Qaeda organization 
began to research the possibilities of terrorism in achieving their political goals.393 By 
November 1995, al-Qaeda began testing their methods of terrorism, most notably the 
bombing of a U.S. compound in the Saudi capital, Riyadh.394 The Riyadh attack was 
successful in killing several Americans, prompting the CIA to take notice of bin Laden 
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and al-Qaeda.395 CIA pressure on the Sudanese government forced bin Laden to once 
again relocate, this time to his old stomping grounds in Afghanistan and Pakistan.396 
From the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, bin Laden would grow his organization 
and carry out several more terrorist attacks against the United States.  
 During this time, bin Laden developed relationships with both the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan and the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (or ISI) in 
Pakistan.397 To gain the Taliban’s trust, bin Laden funded Taliban efforts to buy the 
loyalty of various Afghan warlords.398 Once the Taliban had taken control of the Afghan 
capital of Kabul, bin Laden fully embraced the religious sentiment of the Taliban 
movement’s founder, Mullah Omar.399 As reward for his loyalty, the Taliban awarded bin 
Laden control of various properties throughout Afghanistan, such as Tarnak Farms and 
Tora Bora.  
Soon enough, al-Qaeda had built up an impressive infrastructure for future 
terrorist operations. In 1998, despite his dubiously low level of religious authority, bin 
Laden issued a fatwa which declared war against Israel, the United States, and the 
West.400 Al-Qaeda claimed that killing Americans was now religiously acceptable, and 
al-Qaeda promptly planned more attacks against the United States. Soon after the fatwa, 
al-Qaeda operatives successfully carried out attacks against the U.S. embassies in 
Nairobi, Kenya and Dar al Salaam, Tanzania, killing over 200 people and injuring 
thousands.401 
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Parallel to the rise of al-Qaeda, the Taliban emerged out of the chaos of the post-
Soviet Afghan period. The early 1990’s saw several Afghan warlords fight for power in 
two successive civil wars. First, Mujahideen groups collectively fought against the 
Afghan communist government that the USSR left behind. 402 After the collapse of the 
USSR, the Afghan government lost all financial support from the Soviets, and the 
communist regime quickly lost control of Kabul.403 In the second civil war, Mujahideen 
groups fought amongst each other for control of the capital. The civil war period was the 
perfect incubator for the Taliban’s emergence.404 In response to the rampant violence and 
corruption of the warlords, Taliban leader Mullah Omar began to implement an austere 
version of sharia law.405  
Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban would also have a major impact on the future 
U.S. intervention. Pakistan’s ISI had supported the Mujahideen effort to repel the USSR 
through arms                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
smuggling and monetary funds. During the Afghan civil war, the ISI had decided that the 
Taliban was an ideal proxy to promote Pakistani authority in Afghanistan. The ISI-
Taliban marriage was easily facilitated, as Mullah Omar had close ties to the Pakistani 
religious community.406 In exchange for food, money, and weapons, the Taliban would 
help to achieve Pakistan’s two geopolitical goals in Afghanistan.407 First, Pakistan 
believed that a Pakistan friendly regime in Afghanistan would be of strategic help in case 
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of a war with India.408 Second, the Taliban could be used to help train guerilla soldiers for 
use in the contested India-Pakistan Kashmir region.409 By co-opting the Taliban, Pakistan 
believed it could control Afghan foreign policy.410 
However, Pakistan’s support of the Taliban would come back to haunt them. 
Pakistan might have sent the Taliban into Afghanistan, but the Taliban would also begin 
to exert their influence within Pakistan as well411. The Pakistani military elite had failed 
to understand that the appeal of the Taliban would also appeal to millions of their own 
citizens.412 As Ansary states, “the Taliban were not only Islamists, but Pushtoon 
chauvinists” who attracted the support of Pakistani Pushtoon tribes who had a contentious 
relationship with the state of Pakistan.413 The Taliban had also made important allies with 
Pakistani radical religious parties and “smuggling mafias” that operated along the 
Pakistan-Afghan border.414 When the United States demanded the extradition of Osama 
bin Laden, Pakistan could do little to help. Taking visible efforts to combat al-Qaeda 
against the wishes of the Taliban would ultimately destabilize the Pakistani 
government.415 
In the United States, President Clinton ordered several attempts to kill or capture 
bin Laden. Despite having plenty of information on where bin Laden lived and worked, 
CIA plans to target him proved unsuccessful. In plans for a “snatch operation,” the CIA 
wanted to drop a 30-man special operations crew to abduct bin Laden from his Tarnak 
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Farms headquarters.416 However, President Clinton backed out at the last minute.417 In a 
subsequent mission plan, the CIA proposed bombing one of al-Qaeda’s training camps 
while bin Laden was present. Again, Clinton refused the mission, as it could have also 
killed members of the royal family of the United Arab Emirates.418 Finally, Clinton 
approved a 55 million dollar air strike that dropped sixty tomahawk missiles on al-Qaeda 
targets in both Afghanistan and Sudan.419  
The missile strikes were a failure for several reasons. First, the missile strikes 
hadn’t killed any important members of the al-Qaeda leadership, because they had most 
likely been tipped off by Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif.420 Second, Clinton’s 
political opponents denounced the massive strike as a distraction from the Whitewater 
and Monica Lewinsky domestic scandals.421 Lastly, al-Qaeda had benefited from the 
strikes, as many disgruntled Muslims sought recruitment by al-Qaeda.422 Bin Laden’s 
cause against the United States was strengthened, as the world’s only superpower 
validated his image as an Islamist folk hero.423 
During this period following the Clinton approved strikes, bin Laden met with key 
members of a radical al-Qaeda cell in Hamburg, Germany. The German cell presented 
their plans for a bold new terrorist attack that involved hijacking airplanes and using them 
as suicide bombs.424 On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda members flew hijacked planes 
into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Southwestern Pennsylvania, 
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killing thousands of Americans. Nearly a month later, the United States launched the 
invasion of Afghanistan. 
Directly after the attacks, the Bush Administration was motivated by an intense 
domestic pressure to retaliate against the 9/11 perpetrators.425 Congress quickly 
authorized President Bush to retaliate against al-Qaeda. The Joint resolution passed by 
Congress stated that the United States would “use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons” responsible for the attacks.426 In effect, 
the U.S. not only targeted al-Qaeda, but also the Taliban who harboring them. At first, the 
U.S. pressured the Taliban to extradite bin Laden and destroy the al-Qaeda camps in 
Afghanistan.427 However, the Taliban refused both demands. As far as they were 
concerned, the 9/11 attacks wouldn’t affect them because they were so far away. In their 
minds, “what could the Americans do to Kabul?”428 Ultimately, the Taliban’s 
intransigence would cost them. 
Unlike the later war in Iraq, The United States had very few barriers to eliciting 
international support for invading Afghanistan. The 9/11 attacks had garnered the United 
States sympathy from the international community. Great Britain responded quickly to 
aid the United States in its time of need and lent its military support.429 NATO invoked 
Article V of the Washington Treaty, in which an attack on one NATO member equals an 
attack on all members.430 Importantly, countries like China, Russia, India, and Pakistan, 
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did nothing to prevent the United States from invading Afghanistan.431 Ultimately, the 
United States was given the greenlight for Operation Enduring Freedom (or OEF). 
Back in Washington, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was preparing to 
send troops to Afghanistan. Rumsfeld was a proponent of modernizing the U.S. military 
by increasing the use of new technology as well as reducing the size of ground forces.432 
Rumsfeld’s doctrinal views would increasingly influence the course of the coming war in 
Afghanistan, where counterinsurgency tactics were subordinate to massive aerial strikes 
and a multitude of special operations missions. Based on a reluctance to repeat the war in 
Vietnam, the Bush administration de-emphasized counterinsurgency tactics and was 
hesitant to commit to any nation building in Afghanistan.433 The U.S. would maintain that 
Afghanistan would be responsible for its own reconstruction.434 With this anti-nation 
building strategy, the United States began its war in Afghanistan. 
As bombing missions began in October 7, 2001, three main U.S. goals became 
apparent. First, the United States would topple the Taliban government regime in 
Afghanistan.435 Second, efforts would be made to destroy al-Qaeda’s bases.436 Third, 
U.S. forces would kill and capture al-Qaeda affiliated terrorists.437 To this end, superior 
U.S. firepower, in concert with special operations and cooperation with local Afghan 
partners, would combat the Taliban and al-Qaeda presence in Afghanistan. 
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In the first phase of Operation Enduring Freedom, Tomahawk cruise missiles 
rained down over Afghanistan from U.S. and U.K. ships.438 Additionally, allied bombers 
dropped their loads over Taliban and al-Qaeda targets.439 With all this firepower, the U.S. 
decimated enemy infrastructure and quickly ran out of targets.440 The Taliban and al-
Qaeda quickly collapsed in the face of intense bombings. In the second phase of OEF, the 
United States would “entrust the actual fighting to the Northern Alliance,” assist the 
Northern Alliance with air support, and put pressure on Pakistan to cut ties with the 
Taliban.441 
Just months before the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban’s armed opponent in Afghanistan, 
the Northern Alliance, had sent their leaders to Europe to plead for humanitarian aid.442 
Led by warlord Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Northern Alliance plead their case that the 
instability in Afghanistan would come to hurt the West. Massoud warned the European 
Union that the Taliban acted as a front of their foreign occupier, Pakistan.443 Pakistan and 
the Taliban had allowed Afghanistan to become a major terrorist training camp for 
terrorists “whose only aim was to harm the West.”444 If the international community 
didn’t help the Northern alliance, “it would suffer terrible consequences.”445 
Unfortunately, Massoud’s call for aid fell on deaf ears. It wouldn’t be until after 
the 9/11 attacks that the United States and its allies would call aid the Northern Alliance. 
Two days before 9/11, Massoud was assassinated by two terrorists posing as Western 
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journalists.446 Though Massoud was killed, the Northern Alliance would become 
instrumental in the early stages of the U.S. war in Afghanistan. As the United States was 
hesitant to send too many troops to Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance became the 
primary OEF ground force. With immense logistical support and the help of U.S. Special 
Forces, the Northern Alliance launched an offensive to drive the Taliban and al-Qaeda 
from Afghanistan.447  
Additionally, the United States had finally put enough financial and diplomatic 
pressure on Pakistan to cut their support to the Taliban.448 As the Northern Alliance 
closed in on the cities, Pakistan ordered the Taliban to leave their consulate in Karachi.449 
Not long after, Taliban leaders quietly fled the capital Kabul back to their stronghold of 
Kandahar.450 By December 7, 2001, the Taliban were also forced to flee Kandahar for the 
Pakistani border.451 The United States and the Northern Alliance had successfully 
removed the Taliban from power, which helped to temporarily justify Rumsfeld’s plan to 
limit U.S. troops on the ground.452 However, in the Battle of Tora Bora, as well as in 
Operation Anaconda, large numbers of al-Qaeda forces escaped due to coordination 
difficulties between OEF air and ground forces.453 The ultimate legacy of this opening 
offensive was that the United States had achieved many of its Afghan war objectives, but 
had narrowly missed eliminating the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership, a 
legacy that would come back to haunt Afghanistan in the coming years.454 
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The immediate aftermath of the relatively successful invasion of Afghanistan was 
a country without a government. The rapid pace of the Taliban’s disintegration surprised 
the United States, which quickly scrambled to capitalize on the mission’s “catastrophic 
success.”455 In December 2001, as U.S. and Northern Alliance forces besieged al-Qaeda 
at Tora Bora, several Afghan opposition groups met in Bonn, Germany in the hopes of 
forming a government to rule Afghanistan. In essence, the Bonn conference sponsored by 
the United States was a conference of “winners.”456 Leadership representing the Taliban 
were not invited to the conference, and the framework of the future governance of 
Afghanistan would be hammered out by the groups who had sided with the United States.  
The Afghan opposition at Bonn Conference could be divided into four groups. 
First, the Northern Alliance, who had helped to oust the Taliban with U.S. support, 
represented the ethnic minorities of Afghanistan.457 Second, the so-called “Peshawar 
Group” represented the Pushtoon tribal Mujahideen that operated out of Pakistan.458 
Third, the “Cypress group” was composed of various Hazara and Herati ethnic groups 
supported by Iran.459 Lastly, the “Rome group” acted as the representative of various 
Afghan expatriate technocrats spread across Europe and the United States, as well as 
royalist supporters of the former Afghan Shah.460 However, the Bonn Conference 
excluded the Taliban and largely rural Pushtoon tribes of Southern Afghanistan from the 
negotiations, excluding a large portion of the population.461 In effect, the Bonn agreement 
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would contribute to the growing divide between urban and rural portions of the Afghan 
population, a trend that would fuel the return of the Taliban in subsequent years.462 
During the Bonn Conference negotiations, the Afghan opposition groups 
hammered out plans for Afghanistan’s future. With heavy guidance from Western 
powers, a four step plan was introduced.463 First, the Bonn Conference would assemble 
an interim government to rule the country for the first six months.464 Second, a loya jirga, 
adapted from the traditional Afghan tribal assembly, would help to create a two year long 
transitional government which would rule until elections were held.465 Third, Afghans 
would draft a new constitution for the country.466 Fourth, Afghanistan would hold 
presidential and parliamentary elections to help bring in to existence Afghan 
democracy.467 
After formulating the four point plan, the Afghan groups elected to appoint 
Hamid Karzai as head of the interim government. Karzai was a compromise candidate for 
all those involved at the Bonn Conference.468 For the United States, Karzai was the most 
palatable choice, despite his lack of leadership experience, because of his extensive 
connections with American Afghans and the U.S. Republican Party.469 As Ansary notes, 
Karzai also had palpable Afghan tribal credibility. Karzai was a Pushtoon and his father 
was a Popalzai tribal leader in Kandahar, giving him sway amongst the important 
Pushtoon tribal constituency.470 In addition, Karzai’s father had been murdered by the 
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Taliban, which made him a fervent opponent of the ousted group.471 With no major 
enemies or supporters inside Afghanistan, Karzai “had no blood on his hands” in fighting 
either the United States or anyone else, and was considered the most ideal choice for 
power.472  
Parallel to the negotiations between the Afghans, the international community 
also made lofty plans for the future of Afghanistan. As Afghanistan ranked in the very 
bottom of countries in terms of socioeconomic conditions, efforts were made to bring in 
billions of dollars in aid for the country.473 At a donor conference in Tokyo, it was 
estimated that the country needed twenty five billion dollars in international aid.474 In 
actuality, donors only pledged three billion dollars and only half of that trickled into the 
country.475 However, a billion dollars was still a large influx of donor money.476 
The Tokyo Conference also devised a “lead nation” approach to rebuilding 
Afghanistan.477 Instead of a singular effort to manage the funds, individual countries were 
given mandates to what they would be responsible for. For instance, the United States 
would aid the Afghan Army, and the United Kingdom would fund counternarcotic 
efforts.478 Many other countries were involved, such as Japan, Germany, and Italy.479 The 
Tokyo conference would create the backbone of aid efforts in Afghanistan over the 
following years. 
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On the military side of things, the international community was keen on 
increasing their role in Afghanistan, much to the chagrin of the Bush administration. The 
United States had been content with the international community’s role following the 
invasion of Afghanistan. Although NATO invoking Article V was unprecedented, the 
role of NATO was more symbolic than militarily significant.480 This arrangement suited 
the Bush administration just fine, as they had “no desire to involve NATO directly in 
[military operations].”481 With their new broad “War on Terror” counterterrorism 
campaign, the United States didn’t wish to be limited by NATO’s complicated rules and 
procedures.482  
The dominant strategy of the U.S. OEF campaign in Afghanistan was revenge and 
retribution, focused solely on “disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda and [the] 
Taliban.”483 Ultimately, this strategy put more emphasis on the traditional war paradigm 
of defeating the enemy and going home rather than ensuring Afghanistan’s future 
stability. Part of this focus was born out the United States’ strong aversion to “nation 
building,” which their European allies wished to promote in Afghanistan.484 President 
Bush had campaigned on his promise to not engage in nation building, so the U.S. effort 
in Afghanistan would remain “a purely military mission.”485 Even in 2006, Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates concluded that the effort of the United States was “significantly 
hampered by muddled and over-ambitious objectives.”486 Therefore, stability minded 
international troops would play a minor role in the first years of the war. 
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However, an international force sponsored by the United Nations came into 
existence at the Bonn Conference. The International Security Assistance Force (or ISAF) 
composed of 4,500 troops would be sent to Kabul to support the Afghan Interim 
government and election process, as well as to promote “national reconciliation, lasting 
peace, stability and respect for human rights.”487 If ISAF’s goals seem difficult to 
achieve, the United States made it that more difficult. In exchange for allowing ISAF’s 
presence, the United States ensured that ISAF would only operate in Kabul, and that the 
U.S. military would be independent of ISAF jurisdiction.488 Keeping ISAF restricted 
would fulfill the Bush Administration’s wish for marginal international presence and also 
allow the United States focus on its independent “mop up” operation against the remnants 
of al-Qaeda and the Taliban without international interference.489 
Eventually, the United States would become distracted with the war in Iraq by 
2003, so the views towards ISAF and nation building began to change. As issues with 
instability and violence in Iraq began to mount, ISAF’s role would grow exponentially in 
Afghanistan. By August 2003, NATO was given command of all ISAF forces.490 This 
development was advantageous to the Bush administration. First, international 
cooperation helped to “legitimize the need for continuing involvement” by the United 
States in Afghanistan.491 Domestically, the keen interest of NATO and the UN helped to 
prove to Congress as well as the American public that the U.S. military should continue 
to fight in Afghanistan.492 The international interest towards Afghanistan was critical to 
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ensuring the narrative of Afghanistan as a “good war,” especially during a time when the 
American public was deeply divided over the war in Iraq.493  
Second, the Iraq War was a convenient excuse for the Bush administration to pass 
the burden of nation building onto the United States’ allies. Since Bush and his staff 
abhorred the very idea of nation building, it was a convenient way of avoiding discussion 
of nation building altogether. Passing the buck on to international forces allowed U.S. 
forces to focus on their narrow counterterrorism operation, and also divert more resources 
to Iraq. 
As NATO assumed command of ISAF, the United Nations helped to expand their 
mission. The UN Security Council authorized ISAF to expand to areas outside of Kabul 
and establish stability, security and government through “all parts of Afghanistan.”494 
Steadily, ISAF presence would increase through a strategic counterclockwise expansion, 
which featured steady troop increases from North to South from 2004 to 2006.495 By 
2006, 25 ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams (or PRT’s) were functioning in local 
bases across Afghanistan.496 The expansion of ISAF lowered the burden of the United 
States, and also granted its European allies a chance to meet their growing sense of duty 
in Afghanistan. In NATO’s mind, “the interveners now had to an obligation to deliver 
more than a government of warlords” to the Afghan people.497 
Concurrently, Afghanistan began to work towards the four professed goals of the 
Bonn Conference. By June 11, 2002, Afghanistan’s interim government laid in motion 
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the plans to transform the country into a modern democratic nation. In keeping with 
Afghan tradition, the interim government assembled a loya jirga to appoint members of 
the transitional government. To nobody’s surprise, Karzai was elected to head the 
election transition. According to Ansary, this process might have gone “too smoothly.”498 
The highly “stage-managed” process had ensured that America’s choice for government 
had been chosen.499 In effect, the loya jirga was seen by Afghans as an attempt to squeeze 
other political alternatives out of the running. For example, the former king of 
Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, a “countrywide symbol of reconciliation,” wasn’t allowed to 
run.500 
However, the process of democratization continued on. As head of the transitional 
government, Karzai assembled a commission to draft Afghanistan’s new constitution.501 
A loya jirga was again convened, and Afghan leaders hashed out the final structure of 
government. Afghanistan formalized a bicameral legislature, where the lower house is 
elected by citizens, and the upper appointed by a president, who is supposedly restricted 
to two five-year terms.502 Additionally, the constitution states that Afghanistan is an 
Islamic republic, with no laws conflicting with Shari’a law, although there are also 
provisions common in western democracy, such as equality and other modern human 
rights.503 The new Afghan constitution ratified by December, 2003 in the loya jirga, and 
would set in motion the coming elections. 
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By the fall of 2004, Afghanistan held its presidential election, by many measures, 
it was a huge success. Twelve million Afghans had registered to vote, and 75% of those 
registered had made it to the polls.504 The election was largely violence free, and long 
lines at polling stations were prominent across the country. Additionally, many Afghans 
couldn’t read, and candidates utilized pictures to get the word out about their 
candidacy.505 Therefore, Afghan voters more or less voted to “express support for voting 
itself” rather than a specific candidate.506 As Ansary states, “in this light, the election was 
a big success.” As a result of the elections, Karzai once again emerged victorious as the 
uncontested leader of Afghanistan. In the parliamentary election that occurred months 
after, disorder and violence were more pronounced, but the two elections had left many 
Afghans with the impression that “Afghanistan was on the verge of a takeoff”.507 
However, the political and military developments in Afghanistan were 
accompanied by a fair share of problems. The 2001-2008 period of the Afghanistan war 
started off with high hopes, but ultimately the problems far outweighed the progress at 
the end of 2008. The growing split between the U.S. and NATO, aggressive 
counterterrorism strategies, a weak Karzai government, and growing backlash to foreign 
occupation all contributed to a growing lack of stability and security in Afghanistan. 
The divide between U.S. and NATO was largely centered on the extreme 
reluctance of the United States to participate in nation building in Afghanistan. The U.S. 
strategy continued to be focused squarely on aggressive counterterrorism, which clashed 
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with NATO’s focus on stability and reconstruction efforts.508 Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates sums up the U.S. stance quite well, stating that the U.S. goal in Afghanistan 
needed to “be limited to hammering the Taliban and other extremists.”509 The United 
States never questioned “the supposedly unbreakable link between the Taliban and al-
Qaeda.”510  
In contrast with the United States, NATO wished to forge a wide national 
reconciliation between all parties.511 NATO’s diverging view on Afghanistan would help 
to increase internal military tension and contribute to a “fragmentation of effort” during 
the war512. However, the ultimate result of this divide was that the U.S. counterterrorism 
approach won out. Because of the United States’ dominant role in both decision making 
and resources allocated to Afghanistan, the counterterrorism strategy often held higher 
importance than NATO priorities.513 
The results on the ground in Afghanistan from the conflicting interests of NATO 
and the United States was “a complicated and dysfunctional set of command and control 
arrangements that included multiple and separate chains of command.”514 OEF continued 
to be separate from the ISAF mission, most notably the special operations missions that 
reported directly to USCENTCOM in Tampa, Florida.515 ISAF itself had issues, as the 
PRTs that were sent to various local regions of Afghanistan had very little oversight from 
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central NATO command. Individual nations who each had their own PRTs, creating their 
own “national bubbles” that helped to undermine NATO’s “strategic coherence.”516 
The aggressive military strategy pursued by the United States, and in some cases 
ISAF, also contributed to the growing instability in Afghanistan. In what became known 
as the “Afghan Model,” the United States pursued a military strategy that featured a light 
traditional military footprint which relied heavily on special operations, aerial strikes, and 
local Afghan forces.517 In many cases, special operations and aerial strikes replaced 
ground troops in remote Afghan areas.  
In particular, there were a lot of airstrikes which resulted in high collateral 
damage against Afghan civilians. ISAF used an incredible amount of airstrikes during 
this time. In a six month span at the end of 2006, ISAF forces initiated 2,100 airstrikes in 
Afghanistan, which was more strikes than had been carried out from 2001-2004.518 In 
comparison, only 88 strikes were carried out during that same time period in Iraq.519 
General Stanley McChrystal remarked that “over-reliance on firepower and force 
protection … severely damaged ISAF’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people.”520 
 As reparations for civilian casualties, both ISAF and the U.S. maintained a policy 
of reimbursement for civilian deaths.521 However, this further enraged Afghans who now 
believed international forces thought “that compensation for wrongful death was a 
business transaction.” It was also concerning was that “bombs from the air” couldn’t 
replace “boots on the ground,” as Taliban infiltrators began to move into areas outside of 
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the U.S. and international zone of control to take advantage of the lack of military 
presence.522 By 2006, the U.S. and NATO were facing a new threat from a Taliban 
insurgency. 
As ISAF expanded to new regions, the United States also began new combat 
operations, in the south. Military forces were now entering areas of significant Taliban 
support from the local Pushtoon Afghans. After securing the relatively peaceful North, 
ISAF moved into the South and Southeast, and the United States initiated a bloody 2006 
incursion into Helmand Province in Operation Mountain Thrust.523 As the U.S. and ISAF 
force deployed to these areas, a noticeable increase in terrorist attacks and other security 
issues occurred.524 However, there was no real effort to rethink the strategy in 
Afghanistan. For example, there was no concerted effort to implement a 
counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy as late as 2009.525  
Parallel to warfighting in pre-Surge Iraq, the United States operated from large 
forward operating bases (FOBs). Bagram Air Force base was the primary location for 
United States forces. Bagram was a former Soviet airbase just north of Kabul that was no 
being retooled for the U.S. military.526 Most Afghans never saw the inside of the heavily 
secured base, and those that did witnessed “that an entire ready-made American city had 
gone up within Bagram, complete with nightclubs, cinemas, restaurants, and shops (a 
gross exaggeration).”527 With Afghans rarely having access to the base, it was easy for 
rumors to spread about what was going on there. For example, many Afghans had begun 
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to think they were selling mountains of pork, in an affront to Islam.528 Rather than 
working in and around the Afghan population, U.S. forces were rather isolated, 
propagating serious misunderstandings between themselves and the populace. 
ISAF, however, did make some effort to get out amongst the Afghan people. The 
PRTs, the main force of ISAF that operated at the local level, maintained patrols across 
Afghanistan once they had been deployed across the entire country. With their 
nationwide presence, the PRTs sought to stabilize Afghanistan, “extending the influence 
of the central government” and “facilitating ‘reconstruction, security, governance, aid and 
development.’”529 However, as previously mentioned, the PRTs had a counterproductive 
effect.  
Instead of promoting stability, the PRTs not only undermined NATO and U.S. 
from attaining a coherent strategy in Afghanistan, but they also exacerbated tensions 
between international forces and the local Afghans, especially in the Pushtoon dominated 
South.530 First, individual PRTs led by different nations pursued different strategies, and 
the different nations varied on how aggressive the tactics they pursued were.531 Second, 
Afghans often didn’t distinguish between ISAF troops and the more aggressive 
counterterrorism strategies employed by the U.S.532 Lastly, as noted in a survey taken in 
five of Afghanistan’s provinces, Afghans in particularly low security areas viewed troops 
as disrespectful of Afghan “culture, religion, and traditions.”533 Ultimately, the PRTs 
helped to push Afghans back into the arms of the resurgent Taliban. 
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The Afghan central government also contributed to a renewed Taliban presence in 
Afghanistan. The thirty-year political chaos of Afghanistan and its tribal oriented society 
made Afghans suspicious of central authority. But, after the Bonn Conference handed 
power to the Karzai government, Afghans found itself under a heavily centralized 
government’s rule. The new Afghan constitution that passed in 2004 gave Karzai “near 
absolute authority… without any checks and balances to executive power.”534 Karzai’s 
government was a radical change for an Afghanistan that was used to weak central 
government and dominant tribal politics.535 
Despite its centralized power, the new Karzai government lacked a politically 
legitimate mandate for ruling Afghanistan.536 Over time, the government had lost its 
novel luster, and was soon “widely and increasingly seen by many as weak, corrupt, and 
abusive.”537 Corruption was rampant in post invasion Afghanistan. First, Karzai himself 
contributed to the instability of the government by using his power for personal gain. 
Karzai installed many members of his own Popalzai tribe to positions of power. This 
nepotism included his brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, who assumed an important council 
position in Kandahar Province.538 Second, other government officials used their power 
for financial gain. For instance, the minister of mines, Ibrahim Adel, took a $30 million 
bribe in exchange for awarding a government copper rights contract to a Chinese 
company.539 
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The financial aspect of corruption was the most problematic issue for the Afghan 
government. As international money flowed into Afghanistan, powerful Afghans took 
advantage of funds meant for reconstruction of the country. Because this money didn’t 
enter the domestic economy, only Afghans who worked closely with foreign NGOs, 
companies, and governments ever saw it pass through their hands.540 Ultimately, the new 
and elite economy contributed to pervasive “lunch-pail corruption’ that ordinary Afghans 
now had to face on a daily basis.541 For instance, cops who responded to vehicle 
accidents detained anybody they could find at the scene regardless of their involvement 
and force them to pay fines.542 In another case, government bureaucrats would slow down 
their processing of paperwork unless the requestor paid bribes to expedite the process.543 
International development funds also helped to undermine the Karzai government. 
Seventy-seven percent of reconstruction funds used in Afghanistan “bypassed the Afghan 
government entirely,” making the government appear as a useless bystander, instead of a 
competent authority.544 In addition, the often rushed and shoddy workmanship of the 
reconstruction did the government no favors. For example, an American led effort to 
build a paved road between Sar-e-Pul and Shiberghan ran into a few issues.545 First, the 
road didn’t do the local Afghans much good, as they rarely had vehicles and traveled 
mostly by foot with their goods carried by donkeys.546 A paved road was better than the 
previous dirt path, but it didn’t cut travel time by very much. Second, the new raised road 
acted like a dam, water pooled on one side, and there were no culverts to divert the 
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water.547 The local Afghans took it upon themselves to cut drainage ditches along the 
road, which then meant that cars could no longer travel on the road.548 Ultimately, the 
Afghan police got involved and arrested those responsible for defacing the road, creating 
another negative interaction between the Afghan people and the central government.549 
Coinciding with the poor economy and ineffective government, a robust drug 
trade became a lucrative money maker in Afghanistan. Farming was tough in the 
countryside, and farmers preferred to lean on their skills in growing and selling opium. 
The opium crop was far superior to anything else they could grow on their properties, as 
the opium plant can be grown on a small unirrigated plot of land, is relatively drought 
resistant, unperishable, and can be transported easily as heroin.550 Opium farming had 
funded the Taliban before the war, and it would do the same as the Taliban returned from 
exile. 
Of course, the burgeoning drug trade concerned the U.S. and its international 
partners. As the primary lead nation for countering narcotics in Afghanistan, the United 
Kingdom led an extensive eradication effort of the opium crop. Through the policy of 
eradication in Helmand province, the U.K. ultimately cut into the “main source of 
livelihood to thousands of farmers” as well as the “power and profits to officials and 
strongmen” in Afghanistan.551 Eventually, local Afghans provided the Taliban with a 
share of their profits in return for protection against international eradication efforts.552  
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The West was also partly to blame for this drug economy. In a haste to achieve its 
counterterrorism objectives and get out of Afghanistan, the United States relied on the 
Northern Alliance and other warlords to keep control of the country. The United States 
allied with warlords such as Ismail Kahn and Gul Aga Shirzai, who had gained power in 
the 1992 civil war, reintroduced the “venal, predatory, and violent” relationship with the 
warlords that many Afghans despised.553 The Afghans who had suffered under the 
warlords before the arrival of the Taliban, were now back where they started. As a result, 
many Afghans once again embraced the Taliban as way of rejecting warlord control. 
The warlord debacle also cut both ways. As the Taliban group led by Mullah 
Omar regrouped in Pakistan, Mujahideen warlords like Jalaluddin Haqqani and 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar began to operate under the Taliban umbrella.554 In post-invasion 
Afghanistan, the Taliban group began much more diverse, and also under much less 
central control.555 As Pape writes, there were really about three different independent 
subgroups of the Taliban insurgency. First, the religiously motivated group of the Taliban 
under Mullah Omar, which numbered around 10,000 individuals, only accounted for a 
quarter of the entire Taliban movement.556 Second, the southern drug lords of Helmand 
and Kandahar who profited off the opium crop, were motivated by profit and not 
religious motivations.557 Third, the aforementioned warlords, such as Haqqani, were 
opportunists who chose sides whenever it suited them.558 The U.S. and its partners didn’t 
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quite understand these organizational divisions, and instead adopted a narrative of a 
singular and unified Taliban insurgency.559 
Meanwhile, as the Taliban regained control of parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan 
interfered in the missions of the U.S., NATO, and the Afghan government. As the 
Taliban gained strength, the Talibanist movement had directed an insurgency towards the 
government in Islamabad, and Pakistan desperately needed to redirect the Islamist 
momentum back into Afghanistan.560 Therefore, Pakistan sought to prevent an 
autonomous Afghan government from forming in Kabul in order to combat a movement 
they helped to create and subsequently lose control of.561 To achieve this goal, Pakistan 
sent “agents in to [Afghanistan to] commit occasional acts of senseless sabotage.”562 To 
make matters worse, the Pakistan and Afghanistan border became increasingly volatile, 
with each armed border mafia creating their own militias.563 The Taliban now had a 
perfect climate of instability to launch a violent insurgency. 
As a counter to growing Talibanist sentiment, the Afghan government under 
Karzai began to build up its own security through the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 
Afghan National Police (ANP), together known as the Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF). Unfortunately, the rapid deployment of many unqualified men who “were given 
guns and authority” and no clear directives backfired on the government’s security 
efforts.564 Many soldiers and policemen took advantage of their new found authority by 
physically abusing people or collecting exorbitant bribes.565 Problematically, the ANA 
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and ANP were also made up of predominantly Tajik and Uzbek ethnic groups, and 
deployed to the restive Pushtoon tribal areas.566 The lack of Pushtoons further tarnished 
Afghan government authority, and the resulting ethnic conflict was yet another reason 
that Afghanistan struggled to achieve national unity, instead devolving into another 
violent chapter in Afghan history.567 
By 2006, the Taliban began their violent insurgency by targeting schools. Before 
then, the Taliban had avoided violence against schools because of their fear it would 
alienate their Afghan patrons.568 After a successful propaganda campaign against western 
style education, the Taliban launched several attacks against school teachers and 
property.569 Beyond targeting schools, the renewed violence helped to spur increasing 
suicide attacks, assaults, and murders.570 Eventually, the group managed to convince 
everyday Afghan people that attacks against foreigners and foreign aid were good for the 
country: U.S., NATO, NGO, and other international groups were now easy targets for 
Taliban violence. 571 
Combined with the failing war effort and reconstruction of Afghanistan, the 
violence tightened the Taliban’s grip on the country. By 2008, the Taliban had 
established a shadow government directly competing with the legitimate Afghan 
government.572 Despite not actually doing any government administration, the Taliban 
created at least a veneer of a substitute for Karzai’s corrupt government.573 The biggest 
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substitute was a Taliban run judicial system. Any Afghan of even a falsely claimed 
religious scholarly background could now dispense justice as they saw fit in accordance 
with their limited understanding of Shari’a law.574 The Taliban judicial system became 
much more palatable to the indigenous customs of Afghanistan, and easily supplanted 
law established by the central government.575 
As President Obama took office in 2009, it was clear that the war in Afghanistan 
was not going well. The future of Afghanistan would be up to Obama and the United 
States’ international allies to find a new way forward. With the relative success of the 
Surge in Iraq, President Obama decided Afghanistan needed a Surge of its own. Before 
exploring the road to a Surge in Afghanistan, it is important to also examine quantitative 
data on the 2001-2008 period. In the next section, factors such as U.S./NATO troop 
levels, Afghan civilian casualties, and Afghan public opinion are examined to determine 
whether the hard offensive counterterrorism approach in Afghanistan contributed to the 
failure of the U.S. counterterrorism mission. 
Afghan Data Trends 2001-2008 
 The United States’ counterterrorism campaign dominated strategy considerations 
in the first eight years of the war in Afghanistan. Though there were efforts by U.S. 
international partner nations to pursue stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan, the 
period from 2001-2008 can’t be seen as a softer “hearts and minds” counterterrorism 
campaign. In analyzing the data and trends of from 2001-2008, the war under President 
Bush should show indicators that the aggressive counterterrorism approach utilized 
resulted in a failed counterterrorism campaign. First, trends in troop levels for both OEF 
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and ISAF forces are analyzed. Second, Afghan civilian casualty rates and their relation to 
troop level trends are examined. Third, the relationship between Afghan public opinion 
and the previously mentioned troop level and casualty trends are investigated. The rate of 
terrorism is then examined. Finally, troop levels, casualties, public opinion trends, and 
the rate of terrorism will be utilized to determine whether the Bush era Afghanistan 
counterterrorism strategy resulted in counterterrorism failure. 
Troop Levels in Afghanistan 2001-2008 
 During the 2001-2008 period, a steady increase of both OEF and ISAF troop 
levels can be observed (see Figure 9). From January 2002, U.S. forces rose from 4,100 to 
over 35,000 in May 2008. ISAF forces also increased, from 5,000 in February 2002 to 
31,400 in December 2008. Two trends are mainly responsible for the increase in both 
U.S. and ISAF troops. First, the declining security climate and resurgence of the Taliban 
necessitated both military organizations to deepen their involvement in the country. 
Reconstruction efforts, as well as ineffective and corrupt governance ultimately drove 
Afghans back into the arms of the Taliban. With ample Afghan public support, the 
Taliban was emboldened to carry out attacks against U.S., international, and Afghan 
forces. Facing a frustrating insurgency which utilized “murders, assassinations, and 
small-scale hit-and-run tactics,” OEF and ISAF troops needed to increase their numbers 
to rein the deteriorating security situation.576 
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Figure 11. Total Number of U.S. and ISAF Troops Stationed in Afghanistan from 2002-
2008577 
 
 
Second, NATO’s increasing involvement was also influenced by the U.S. shift in 
focus to the Iraq War in 2003. Instead of further involvement in Afghanistan, the U.S. 
allowed NATO to take control of ISAF’s nation building efforts in Afghanistan. Faced 
with a “growing and resilient insurgency” from 2006 to 2009, ISAF troops not only 
heavily increased to improve security, but also to meet their expanding stability and 
reconstruction responsibilities.578 The data also reflects ISAF’s growing importance to 
the war in Afghanistan. In July of 2006, ISAF forces increased by over 10,000 soldiers, 
making their overall total number of troops even with that of U.S. forces conducting 
OEF. If the hypothesis that hard offensive counterterrorism leads to a failed 
counterterrorism campaign is correct, than the increasing troop levels and aggressive 
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tactics in 2001-2008 should point to an increase in civilian casualties, lower afghan 
public opinion, and a higher terrorism rate. 
Afghan Civilian Casualties 2001-2008 
 From 2001 to 2008, Afghan civilian casualties peaked during the initial invasion, 
dipped below 500 casualties a year from 2003 to 2005, and then began to increase in 
2006 as the Taliban began its insurgency. Despite not a single source that kept detailed 
civilian casualty records during the first eight years of the Afghan conflict, the Physicians 
for Social Responsibility group compiled data which combined several casualty counts, 
helping to create a yearly estimate for civilian casualties. In Figure 10, the civilian body 
count estimates both a low range estimate and a high range estimate to account for the 
discrepancies between different casualty datasets. 
 
 Figure 12. Yearly Estimated Number of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan 2001-2008579 
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 Three explanations for the graph trend can be presented. First, the high casualty 
count at the onset of the war is clearly related to the tactics of the invasion. The intense 
bombing campaign against Taliban and al-Qaeda targets decimated their organizations, 
causing both groups to quickly fold.580 In the haste to retaliate in Afghanistan, it can be 
inferred that the bombings hit more than just the individuals that actively participated in 
either al-Qaeda or the Taliban.  
 Second, a lull in violence helped to drastically lower the number of casualties 
between 2003 and 2005. Many Afghans had high hopes for the new government that 
emerged from the Bonn Conference. The influx of foreign investment and democracy led 
many Afghans to believe that things were finally looking up. For instance, when 
President Bush promoted a “Marshall Plan” reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, Ansary 
anecdotally recalls that an Afghan man who looked like he could have been used as a 
Reuter’s stock photo of the Taliban planned to build a cosmetics factory in Kabul.581 This 
man believed he would be successful because Afghan women would once again freely 
roam the street with the Taliban in exile, and his optimistic views for the country were 
shared with millions of other Afghans. However, the lack of violence could also be the 
result of the aforementioned shift by U.S. policy makers to Iraq instead of Afghanistan, 
or the fractured and disorganized nature of militant groups following the highly 
disruptive U.S. invasion. 
 Lastly, like the increased number of OEF and ISAF troops, a notable increase in 
civilian casualties from 2005 to 2008 also occurred. With the Taliban on the rise, they 
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began to target military personnel, schools, and even NGO workers.582 Despite 
employing a “hearts and minds” propaganda campaign towards the Afghan people, their 
guerilla tactics most likely caught innocent Afghans in the cross fire. In the Physicians 
for Social Responsibility report, nearly 20-30% of Taliban attacks were directed at 
civilians.583 The Taliban weren’t the only perpetrators of civilian casualties, however. 
Pro-government forces (OEF, ISAF, ANA, etc.) accounted for a sizable portion of the 
casualties. In particular OEF Special Forces and aerial bombings produced a numerous of 
civilian deaths, which explains why international forces paying Afghan families for 
accidental deaths backfired- too many people were being killed. A recent study found that 
U.S. Special Operations Forces raids and bombings accounted for half of all U.S. caused 
civilian deaths.584 Even more problematic, the spec ops mission collateral damage is 
largely under-reported because many of the operations are kept secret from even the 
regular U.S. military.585 Civilian casualties could even be much higher than what the data 
implies. 
 Despite the flaws in recording civilian casualties and the lack of a single constant 
body count dataset, the available record point to a plausible correlation between 
aggressive tactics, troops, and Afghan civilian casualties. As more troops arrived in 
Afghanistan, the security situation deteriorated immensely, with increased collateral 
damage from both Taliban and OEF/ISAF forces. Once again, however, the relationship 
between tactics, troops, and casualties can also be put into question. Many factors besides 
just tactics and troops could account for high civilian casualties. Maybe increasing 
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casualties had more to do with the resurgence of the Taliban than U.S./ ISAF troop levels 
and tactics alone. In the next section, troop and casualty trends will be compared to trends 
in Afghan public opinion from 2001-2008. 
Afghan Public Opinion 2001-2008 
 Based on available polling information from the 2001-2008 period, it appears that 
Afghan public positive opinion towards the direction of Afghanistan and towards the 
presence of the United States slowly declined as the war approached its eighth year in 
2009. Similar to data on civilian casualties, Afghan public opinion should be observed 
with several important caveats. First, not much significant data polling of Afghan public 
opinion occurred in the early years of the war, and useful public opinion is hard to find 
from 2001 to 2005. Much of this section will rely on polling done by the Asia Foundation 
and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), which took place from 2006 to 2009. 
Though past the 2001-2008 era, 2009 was a transition point between the Bush and 
Obama strategies in Afghanistan. 2009 public opinion was therefore similar to the end of 
the Bush era and is important to also include 2009 in the examination of 2001-2008. 
Second, polling in Afghanistan is dangerous work. In many instances, polling 
authorities were prevented from collecting data because of the unstable security situation 
in Afghanistan. As the Taliban gained strength, they became more willing to target both 
military and civilian international personnel. The Asia Foundation and the BBC both 
reasonably tried to collect polling information across all regions of the country, but safety 
of the poll workers often dictated how many Afghans could be polled. For example, when 
UN staff went to survey Afghans in the Paktika province near Pakistan in 2007, they 
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couldn’t get into many districts because of the increasing levels of violence and 
insurgency.586  
The BBC polls from 2004 to 2009 includes the opinions of about 1,500 people 
from Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.587 Their data, especially in Helmand Province, was 
limited by the violence and instability.588 For the Asia Foundation, they polled a total of 
6,263 Afghans in 2007, but some areas had a higher percentage of Afghans polled.589 
People in Kabul accounted for 19% of the data, and the Northern provinces accounted for 
29%.590 In comparison, the Hazarajat and South Western Regions accounted for 7% and 
9% respectively.591 These oversamples in more secure areas likely skews poll findings to 
favor pro-U.S. and ISAF views. To their credit, however, the Asia Foundation did try to 
compensate for their oversamples in regions like Kabul by weighting their data to be 
more representative of the Afghan population as recorded by the Afghan Central 
Statistics Office.592 Despite polling flaws, the Afghan public opinion that was recorded 
helps to provide helpful insights into whether hard offensive counterterrorism lead to 
more terrorism from 2001-2008. 
As previously noted, Afghan public opinion towards the U.S. and the direction of 
Afghanistan gradually decreased from 2001-2008, as noted by both the BBC and the Asia 
Foundation polling. Both polls asked Afghans whether they though Afghanistan was 
headed in the right direction or the wrong direction. For the BBC, their poll noted a high 
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of 77% of Afghans felt that the country was headed in the right direction in 2005 (Table 
12). By 2009, only 40% believed the country was in a good direction, compared to 38% 
who believed Afghanistan was going in the wrong direction. However, the BBC did not 
carry out the survey during 2008. 
 
Table 12. Percent of Afghans Answering whether Afghanistan is headed in the Right 
Direction or Wrong Direction by Year (BBC)593 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 
Right Direction 64% 77% 55% 54% 40% 
Wrong 
Direction 
11% 6% 22% 24% 38% 
Mixed 8% 11% 17% 15% 14% 
No opinion 16% 6% 5% 7% 9% 
 
The Asia Foundation noted a similar decline in favorable opinion about where 
Afghanistan was headed. In their survey, those who had responded that Afghanistan was 
headed in the right direction never reached above 50%, and declined from 44% to 38% 
from 2006 to 2008 (Table 13). In comparison, public opinion that Afghanistan was 
headed in the wrong direction climbed from 21% in 2006 to 32% in 2008. As the Taliban 
returned, it appears negative perceptions about Afghanistan’s future were growing. 
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Table 13. Percent of Afghans Answering whether Afghanistan is headed in the Right 
Direction or Wrong Direction by Year (Asia Foundation)594 
 2006 2007 2008 
Right Direction 44% 42% 38% 
Wrong Direction 21% 24% 32% 
Don’t Know 4% 7% 6% 
 
 Afghans also had several reasons for why they thought Afghanistan was headed in 
the right or wrong direction. In the Asia Foundation’s 2006 survey, the top three reasons 
cited by right direction respondents for their responses were good security, reconstruction 
efforts, and peace (Table 14). From 2006 to 2008, right direction respondents fluctuated 
between these three main reasonings. Oppositely, wrong direction respondent reasonings 
were largely diverse in 2006 (Table 15). Several issues, such as a bad economy, bad 
government, and no reconstruction were cited. However, by 2008, rising insecurity 
concerned 50% of wrong direction respondents, which increased from 6% in 2006. 
General corruption and corruption by officials concerned 28%.  
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Table 14. Percent of Afghans Citing a Specific Reason for their “Right Direction” Survey 
Answer (Asia Foundation)595 
 2006 2007 2008 
Good Security 31% 34% 39% 
Reconstruction 21% 39% 32% 
Peace 29% 16% 21% 
Schools for Girls 16% 19% 19% 
Freedom/ Free Speech 11% 3% 9% 
Good Government 9% 9% 9% 
 
Table 15. Percent of Afghans Citing a Specific Reason for their “Wrong Direction” 
Survey Answer (The Asia Foundation)596 
 2006 2007 2008 
Insecurity 6% 48% 50% 
Corruption 0% 13% 19% 
Administrative 
Corruption 
2% 15% 9% 
Bad Economy 27% 12% 17% 
Unemployment 22% 15% 15% 
Bad Government 22% 15% 12% 
High Prices 0% 1% 10% 
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 The 2009 BBC survey also seem to confirm the Asia Foundation’s 2008 findings. 
Like the Asia Foundation, Afghans surveyed by the BBC echoed similar reasons for their 
right or wrong direction responses. On the right direction side, Afghans cited 
reconstruction, good security, and peace as their top three answers, almost exactly the 
same as the Asia Foundation survey responses (Table 16). For the wrong direction 
respondents, violence, corruption, and the economy were the top three responses, not 
much different from the Asia Foundation poll (Table 17). Clearly, Afghan public opinion 
is a function of increasing Taliban violence and lack of ability of U.S. and ISAF forces to 
protect the population, but also the increasing issues with corruption and a weak 
economy. 
 
Table 16. Percent of Afghans Citing a Specific Reason for their “Right Direction” Survey 
Answer in 2009 (BBC)597 
Reconstruction 43% Freedom/ Free Speech 7% 
Good Security 38% Economic Revival 5% 
Peace 14% International Assistance 5% 
Girls’ Schools 12% Disarmament 5% 
Good Government 12% Free movement 4% 
Democracy 8% 
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Table 17. Percent of Afghans Citing a Specific Reason for their “Wrong Direction” 
Survey Answer in 2009 (BBC)598 
Security/Warlords/Violence 52% Western Influence Too Great/ 
Dangers to Islam 
8% 
Corruption 26% Education/Schools/Literacy 3% 
Economy/Poverty/Jobs 25% Reconstruction Problems 2% 
Weak Government 16% Neighboring Countries Cause 
Problems 
1% 
Taliban 8% 
 
Afghan public opinion also noted a gradual decline in positive attitudes towards 
the United States and ISAF, as noted by the BBC. Despite lowering attitudes, the views 
still remained relatively positive. In Table 18, majority support for the U.S. and ISAF fell 
from strongly support to somewhat support from 2006 to 2009. Despite the slide from 
strong support, opposition to international forces only received a slight bump during the 
same period. In Table 19, justification for attacks against international forces remained 
relatively low. Only 25% of Afghans believed attacks against the U.S. and ISAF were 
justified, lower than the 30% recorded in 2005, whereas those who replied “not justified” 
remained in the 60-70% range.  
Opinions on whether international forces should withdraw remained relatively 
promising for the U.S. and ISAF as well. Despite a steady decline, many Afghans felt 
that forces should remain for 1-2 years or stay until security is restored, around 56%, 
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compared to 37% who felt they should leave sooner.599 Also, many Afghans continued to 
see the Taliban and al-Qaeda as the main threat to Afghanistan. A combined 49% of 
Afghans placed blame the Taliban and al-Qaeda for the continuing violence.600 
 
Table 18. Percentage of Afghans Polled who Strongly Support, Somewhat Support, 
Somewhat Oppose, or Strongly Oppose U.S. and ISAF Military Forces601 
U.S. Military 
Forces 
2006 2007 2009 ISAF Military 
Forces 
2006 2007 2009 
Strongly 
Support 
30% 20% 12% Strongly Support 30% 25% 13% 
Somewhat 
Support 
48% 51% 51% Somewhat 
Support 
48% 42% 46% 
Somewhat 
Oppose 
6% 15% 21% Somewhat 
Oppose 
15% 17% 24% 
Strongly 
Oppose 
6% 12% 15% Strongly Oppose 6% 13% 16% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
599 McGivering, “Afghan People,” 13. 
600 McGivering, 11. 
601 McGivering, 10. 
 
 
133 
 
Table 19. Percentage of Afghans Polled who Believe Attacks against U.S. and ISAF 
Forces Can or Cannot be Justified602 
 2005 2006 2007 2009 
Justified 30% 13% 17% 25% 
Not Justified 60% 78% 74% 64% 
No Opinion 10% 9% 8% 11% 
 
However, some polling data should have concerned U.S. and ISAF officials. 
When asked if the use of air strikes by international forces are acceptable, 77% of those 
polled in 2009 responded that strikes are unacceptable.603 41% of Afghans also responded 
that they blamed U.S. and ISAF for mistakenly targeting civilians on the ground.604 
Civilian casualties were a concern of the public, and it might have benefitted foreign 
forces to take better care when planning aerial strikes to diminish Afghan opposition. 
Despite polling oversamples and a lack of Afghan public opinion throughout the 
entire 2001-2008 period, the public opinion polling by the Asia Foundation and the BBC 
highlight the relationship between public opinion and other factors such as troop levels 
and civilian casualties. As both troop levels and casualties increased, Afghan public 
opinion slowly decreased. While the surveys showed that Afghan public still largely 
supported the U.S. and ISAF presence, there is room for concern. As noted, oversampling 
favored the views of Afghans in Kabul and other areas with high international presence. 
Likely, there are more Afghans that have negative views that were not included in polling 
due to poll worker safety. Additionally, those polled in the surveys provided opposition 
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to bombing campaigns and excess civilian casualties by international forces. The data 
provided by Afghan public opinion polls show that there is a possible correlation between 
increasing troops and casualties and the declining Afghan public sentiment, despite some 
evidence of polling discrepancies. Do these factors show an increase in terrorism during 
2001-2008? 
Afghanistan Terrorist Attacks 2001-2008 
Similar to increases in troop numbers and civilian casualties, terrorist attacks in 
Afghanistan increased dramatically in the 2001-2008 period (Figure 11). Once again, 
however, the increase in terrorist attacks can also be linked to increasing levels of Taliban 
violence, and not just rises in troops and casualties. The increase became even more 
defined at the beginning of 2006. By 2006, a year which Ansary calls the tipping point, 
“chaos began to inch ahead” in Afghanistan.605 2006 also marked the beginning of the 
Taliban attacks against schools, which helped to stoke an increase in other insurgent 
attacks, in turn reducing the security situation, and forcing international troops to increase 
both troop levels and military operations.606 Additionally, the increase in terrorist attacks 
also coincide with a steady decrease in Afghan public opinion about the direction of the 
country and views about the presence of U.S. and ISAF troops. However, like Ansary 
states, the renewed Taliban insurgency “began to drain away that aroma of hope,” and the 
bright Afghan dreams for the future began to dim. The growing Taliban movement offers 
an alternative explanation for a decline in public opinion rather than the tactics and troop 
levels of the U.S. and ISAF alone.607 
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Figure 13. Number of Terrorist Attacks in Afghanistan from 2001-2008608 
 
 With clear trends of increasing troops, civilian casualties, and a steadily declining 
Afghan public opinion, it is possible that these trends helped lead to an increase in 
terrorist attacks, and the failure of counterterrorism efforts. Like the pre-surge era of the 
Iraq War, the period from 2001-2008 in Afghanistan also featured aggressive 
counterterrorism tactics. Specifically, the war in Afghanistan featured aggressive war 
tactics, such as intense aerial strikes and numerous special operations raids to hone in on 
the United States’ al-Qaeda and Taliban targets. With both the data trends and the 
predominant aggressive counterterrorism tactics and strategy, it is possible to argue that 
the counterterrorism strategies pursued lead to increased terrorism and ultimately failed. 
Of course, there also alternative explanations to increased terrorism. For example, it is 
possible that the increased terrorism was caused by growing dissent from Afghans 
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towards the increased corruption of the Karzai government. In the following section, the 
Surge era of the war in Afghanistan will be analyzed. If Obama’s replication of the Iraq 
Surge in Afghanistan utilized less aggressive counterterrorism strategies, than it should 
have resulted in a successful counterterrorism campaign. 
Afghanistan History and Politics 2009-2016: The Surge and Withdrawal 
 As the conflict in Afghanistan entered its eighth year, the resurgent Taliban had 
begun to make the situation for U.S. and ISAF troops look bleak. By January 2009, there 
were approximately 64,000 U.S. and ISAF forces in Afghanistan, and both terrorist 
attacks and civilian casualties began to mount.609 As newly elected President Barack 
Obama took office, he saw fit to utilize the success of the Surge in Iraq to forge a new 
path in Afghanistan. Under Obama’s watch, the Surge in Afghanistan was enacted. 
However, the Surge entailed much of the same counterterrorism strategies as the pre-
Surge period. Despite troop increases and a supposed emphasis on COIN, the Surge 
failed to produce meaningful results in Afghanistan, as U.S. troops are still involved in 
the country to this day. In this section, the political and historical contexts of the 
Afghanistan Surge and withdrawal are investigated. By looking at Obama’s Surge 
planning, the military command of the war by Generals Stanley McChrystal and David 
Petraeus, how the Surge went wrong, and the resulting stalemate between international 
forces and the Taliban, it is possible to examine whether the continued hard offensive 
counterterrorism strategy during the Surge in Afghanistan was successful or not. 
 Before being elected, President Obama had made it clear that the war in 
Afghanistan would be one of his top priorities. In comparison to Bush’s “bad” war in 
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Iraq, Obama would devote more resources to the “good” war in Afghanistan.610 Obama 
had criticized the Iraq War as a distraction, and blamed the Bush Administration for not 
focusing on Afghanistan. On the campaign trail, Obama lambasted the lack of effort in 
Afghanistan, stating that it “was unacceptable that seven years after 3,000 Americans 
were killed on our soil, the terrorists who attacked us on 9/11 are still at large.”611 After 
visiting Afghanistan in 2008, Obama assured the commander of ISAF that he would 
provide the troops the Afghanistan campaign needed.612 
 In office, Obama largely kept his promises. After assuring the drawdown of the 
Iraq War, the Obama administration set to work on providing more resources to 
Afghanistan. After an initial review of the war, the President committed to sending an 
additional 17,000 troops to the country by February, 2009.613 Before considering sending 
even more troops, Obama began an additional review process that would coincide with 
the fall 2009 Afghan election.614 
Despite some level of support from the American public in increasing U.S. 
involvement in Afghanistan, Obama had to overcome political opposition to his plan by 
both the Democratic and Republican parties. The Democrats in Congress voiced their 
strong opposition to any escalation in the war in Afghanistan.615 Citing their skepticism 
of the Karzai government, politicians like Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and David 
Obey began to warn the Obama Administration that they were unwilling to allow for 
many more Afghanistan funding requests to pass through Congress.616 Pelosi stated that 
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she “didn’t think … a great deal of support for sending more troops to Afghanistan” 
existed “in the country of in Congress.”617 Similarly, Congressman John Murtha 
threatened that any more war funding measures would be rejected by the majority of 
Democrats, and that the passage of funding would have to depend on hostile Republican 
votes.618 Additionally, Obama was concerned that the Democrats wouldn’t support new 
war plans if he didn’t include a strict withdrawal timeline from Iraq in the near future.619 
As for the Republicans, the party largely supported the continuance of the war in 
Afghanistan, but pushed Obama to commit to a blank check policy to the military.620 
Republicans warned that if a withdrawal timetable was included, it “would be met with 
disapproval from the party.”621 Ultimately, if Obama couldn’t counterbalance both parties 
and promote his own plan, his campaign promise to focus on Afghanistan would 
flounder. 
The divisions over the war in Afghanistan were also present in the Obama 
Administration. Two camps existed on how to proceed in the country. On “Team 
Pentagon,” comprised of Defense secretary Robert Gates, Secretary of State Hilary 
Clinton, General Stanley McCrystal and others, they believed that Afghanistan needed a 
“comprehensive, countrywide counterinsurgency” campaign, and a large influx of new 
troops.622 They felt that the U.S. not only had to defeat al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but also 
to ensure stability of Afghanistan.623 And like Republicans, the Pentagon group resisted 
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plans for a withdrawal deadline, instead asking for a withdrawal once “conditions on the 
ground” warranted it.624 
In opposition, many of Obama’s cabinet members and advisors, such as Vice 
President Joe Biden and the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry, were dead 
set against a COIN strategy and felt that the mission in Afghanistan should be a limited 
counterterror operation featuring a strictly timed withdrawal.625 Heavily skeptical of both 
the Karzai government and the “possibility of political progress,” the “Biden Group” 
reasoned that the U.S. goal should be to kill members of al-Qaeda instead of escalating 
efforts to combat the Taliban.626 In addition, they felt that Obama had limited political 
capital to pursue a policy in Afghanistan unpopular with the Democrats in Congress.627 
In order to rein in the competing political camps in Congress and within his own 
administration, President Obama was forced to pursue a politically expedient way 
forward in Afghanistan. Instead of choosing one side over the other, Obama engineered a 
political compromise between them, while also tamping down each side’s dissent. For 
team Pentagon, President Obama quickly and effectively ended attempts by McChrystal 
and others to go public with the debate inside the administration in order to force support 
for a COIN mission.628 If Team Pentagon had been successful, they might have likely 
formed an alliance with Republicans in Congress, scuttling Obama’s efforts to placate the 
Democrats. Obama also “sought to ensure that there would be no defections” from 
military and Department of Defense leaders once he had made his final decision on 
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Afghanistan strategy.629 Team Pentagon members were asked to endorse a “terms sheet” 
where it was noted that the new strategy would not be “fully resourced nation building, 
but a narrower approach.”630 In return for their support, Obama pledged to limit any 
withdrawal with the appropriate “conditions on the ground.”631 
With Team Biden, Obama took careful measures to win over their support. By 
including a withdrawal date for July 2011, Obama was able to convince both Biden and 
Democrats in Congress that the new plan would not be an open ended campaign in 
Afghanistan.632 Before taking his plan public, Obama met with Biden and Congress to 
explain his decision.633 Democrats weren’t pleased with a deepened commitment in 
Afghanistan, but support from Biden kept the plan from being openly opposed. As Biden 
told the Congressional Democrats, “Just so everyone knows, I’m not for drawing down 
the troops.”634 
After wrangling support for his plan in both the administration and Congress, 
Obama pitched his plan in a speech to the American public. At West Point on December 
10, 2009, Obama outlined his plan to send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan to 
focus on counterinsurgency.635 Additionally, a “civilian surge” would help to fund 
Afghan government efforts to stem corruption.636 Similar to President Bush in Iraq, 
Obama justified the move as an attempt to prevent new threats from terrorism in the 
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region.637 He warned that “the danger would only grow if the region slides backwards, 
and al-Qaeda can operate with impunity.”638 
With his speech, Obama was able to reframe the debate over the way forward in 
Afghanistan. Having co-opted critics within his administration, the speech helped 
improve public opinion of the war, and further convince Democrats of his willingness to 
keep the war in Afghanistan limited in scope. By December 2009, 51% of Americans 
supported the new plan, while 40% opposed.639 Most importantly, 58% of Democrats 
supported the plan, up from 27% in November.640 Likewise, 55% of Republicans 
supported the Obama plan, and those that opposed disapproved of the addition of a 
withdrawal date.641 Democratic leaders like Pelosi seemed placated as well. Pelosi stated 
after the speech that she believed that Obama effectively “articulated a way out of this 
war.”642 Instead of challenging the plan, the Democratic leadership helped to curb any 
strong challenges from the Democratic “doves’ in demanding a shorter withdrawal 
timeline. 643 
The result of the political process was that Obama’s new strategy in Afghanistan 
was now neither a true COIN campaign nor a military counterterrorism campaign. The 
mission in Afghanistan had been narrowed, and the bar for success lowered.644 Now, the 
U.S. and ISAF would focus on “disrupting and dismantling al-Qaeda” rather than 
pursuing a total victory over the Taliban and instead choosing to gradually transfer 
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responsibility to the Afghan army. In actuality, the plan was a broad blend of both COIN 
and counterterrorism strategies. More attention would be paid to securing the safety of 
the population and nation building, but the aggressive military strategies of aerial 
bombings and special operations missions would continue. Ultimately, a true COIN 
mission was never authorized in Afghanistan. Instead, the campaign was the “worst of 
both worlds- a troop increase that was inadequate for requirements … and a deadline that 
would hearten enemies.”645 
General McChrystal had first go with the new plan. A disciple of General 
Petraeus, McChrystal had served as head of Petraeus’s Special Operations Forces 
counterterrorism operations in Iraq, and was therefore a proponent of COIN warfare.646 
After taking command of ISAF in June 2009, McChrystal set about establishing the 
COIN strategy in Afghanistan that been previously used in Iraq. In his assessment in the 
preliminary discussions of creating the Afghan Surge, McChrystal spoke in depth of how 
he felt that the campaign strategy needed to be “focused on protecting the population 
rather than seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces” and how changing the 
operational culture would be necessary.647 On his watch, troops in Afghanistan would 
now follow strict rules of engagement and utilize a clear, hold, and build strategy to limit 
the growth of the Taliban.648 
However, McChrystal’s COIN strategy worked in parallel with the 
counterterrorism strategy being utilized on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to hunt down 
Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda members who were still on the loose. With Obama 
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reaffirming the U.S. aim of disrupting and dismantling al-Qaeda, “kill and capture” 
counterterrorism was intensified.649 NATO Special operations continued to operate 
throughout the country, utilizing night raids, where special ops forces would swoop in 
under cover of night and bag suspected Taliban members.650 Of course, some suspects 
arrested were innocent, and the noisy attacks startled the families and friends of those 
taken- guilty or innocent.651 As one Afghan who worked as an interpreter for the U.S. 
military put it, the strikes left women yelling, “children screaming, and babies crying,” 
and the man remembered thinking as he stared at a certain child, “Whoa. We’ll be back 
for him one day.”652 
Drone strikes began to replace aerial strikes in the 2009-2016 period as well. By 
utilizing drone strikes, the U.S. and ISAF could now target the remote areas that the 
Taliban terrorists were hiding in without risking military lives in the process. In 2008, 
drone strikes conducted by the U.S. military were carried out about 35 times.653 Under 
Obama’s first year in office, the number of drone strikes jumped to 140.654 Despite saving 
U.S. and international forces’ lives, the new method of choice for aerial targeting was 
increasingly controversial amongst Afghans and even neighboring Pakistanis who also 
were targeted from time to time.655 Disputes between NATO, who claimed the strikes 
targeted terrorists, and the Afghans, who believed innocent people were being targeted, 
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became common place.656 Likely it was a combination of both claims- the drone strikes 
hit terrorists, but also resulted in high levels of collateral damage.657 
In the midst of the counterterrorism campaign in southern Afghanistan, 
McChrystal’s clear, hold, and build strategy would be tested. In Helmand Province, 
McChrystal’s forces engaged the Taliban in one of the biggest battles of the war.658 The 
city of Marjah, which was described as the “headquarters of the insurgency,” became the 
center point of the battle to retake Afghanistan.659 NATO quickly defeated the Taliban in 
Marjah in about a week, and proceeded to set up a “government in a box” to administer 
the city, opening schools and medical facilities, patrolling the streets, and enacting 
reconstruction efforts.660  
However, violence continued to plague Marjah. Despite a lack of military battles 
to retake the city, isolated instances of violence continued to pop up.661 McChrystal 
described Marjah as a “bleeding ulcer,” as the U.S. and ISAF presence failed to keep the 
city stable.662 Marjah wasn’t the only issue, as areas held by international forces and the 
ANA around the country had similar problems. Like Marjah, clear, hold, and build 
wasn’t working like it was supposed to across the country, perhaps in part to the different 
conditions in Afghanistan than what existed in Iraq.663 
McChrystal’s rein as commander of ISAF ultimately didn’t come to an end on 
account of the failures on the battlefield, but rather because of his strained relations with 
                                                     
656 Ansary, Games without Rules, 327. 
657 Ibid. 
658 Ansary, 329. 
659 Ibid. 
660 Ansary, 328. 
661 Ibid. 
662 Ibid. 
663 Bailey, Understanding the U.S. Wars, 144. 
 
 
145 
 
the Obama administration. Tensions had already been high during the initial planning of 
the Surge, as McChrystal had clashed with Team Biden on what strategy should be 
pursued in Afghanistan. On several occasions, the General publicly rallied for a true 
COIN mission, until confronted by the President.664 Once the Surge had been established, 
McChrystal continued his political maneuvering, and the relationship with Team Biden 
continued to sour. In particular, the bad relationship with Ambassador Eikenberry made 
the war effort incredibly difficult, likely severely limiting any close cooperation between 
the military and the Department of State.665 Ultimately, McChrystal went too far in his 
public activism. After being featured in a Rolling Stone article where he heavily criticized 
President Obama, McChrystal was fired and replaced by General Petraeus.666 
Petraeus was of course the obvious choice to replace McChrystal, as he was seen 
as the architect for the successful Surge in Iraq.667 After the drawdown in Iraq, Petraeus 
had served as the commander of CENTCOM, so after resigning his post he was able to 
focus on Afghanistan.668 Much like he did in Iraq, the General exercised his adept 
expertise in COIN. Petraeus reformed several aspects of the COIN strategy in 
Afghanistan. First, he loosened restrictions on the rules of engagement that troops had to 
follow, mirroring his approach to engagement in Iraq.669 Second, Petraeus stepped up the 
number counterterror raids, while also demonstrating his ability to handle the nation 
building side of COIN strategy.670 By opening a corruption task force, and working to 
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build constructive dialogue with the Taliban, and improving relations with Ambassador 
Eikenberry, Petraeus looked to be making progress.671  
By 2011, the military situation in Afghanistan seemed to stabilize, targeted 
violent areas in the country were more secure, and had provided “time and space to train” 
Afghan police and military forces. And on May 2, 2011, after 10 years on the run, U.S. 
Special Forces had finally located and killed Osama bin Laden. At this point, Petraeus 
became a victim of his own apparent success. As the deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. 
troops was quickly approaching, Obama saw the death of bin Laden as a sign that the 
withdrawal could be undertaken as planned. However, Petraeus argued that the loss of the 
Surge troops would adversely affect the gains that had been made the past seven months 
under his leadership. A compromise agreement between Obama and Petraeus sponsored 
by Secretary Gates ensured that the Surge troops would remain at least until September 
2012, giving Petraeus a little more time. 
Underneath the surface of Obama’s decision to withdraw the Surge troops and the 
progress of General Petraeus, problems were still lingering. Gains in the South against 
the Taliban were deteriorating. Both Marjah and Petraeus’ later invasion of Kandahar 
were quickly dissolving. In April 2011, eight hundred prisoners had escaped from a 
Kandahar prison in a tunnel that had been dug without anyone noticing.672 The focus on 
the South also allowed for Taliban instability to gain steam in the north and east of 
Afghanistan, prompting the CIA to report that the war in Afghanistan “was headed for 
stalemate.”673 As the troop withdrawals began to gain steam, the U.S. and ISAF wouldn’t 
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be able to decisively defeat the Taliban, contributing to the fact that U.S. troops are still 
stationed in Afghanistan to this day. 
Why didn’t the Surge in Afghanistan work very well? Much of the reasoning for 
its failures can be centered on the lack of a new and specific Surge policy unique to 
Afghanistan, the continued interference of Pakistan, and the continued instability of the 
Karzai government. Despite the strategic facelift to the campaign in Afghanistan, much 
of the U.S. and ISAF strategy in the country stayed very much the same.  
For the United States, the idea of a Surge in Afghanistan closely resembled the 
plan for Iraq. Like Iraq, the COIN strategy in Afghanistan was based largely around Field 
Manual 3-24. Though 3-24 tried to make counterinsurgency applicable to any situation, 
the reality was that it was written in a relatively quick span of 9 months. In order to have 
a coherent plan early enough to begin the Iraq Surge, 3-24 was a very Iraq specific clear, 
hold, and build plan. In Iraq, the COIN approach was able to rely on a strong central 
government with large armed forces and big oil revenues, which Afghanistan severely 
lacked.674 Additionally, the deadline for U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan sent 
clear messages to both the Afghan government and the Taliban- the U.S. did not plan to 
stay long. Likely, this helped to dissipate the impact of the Surge in Afghanistan.675 
Another issue with relying on 3-24 is the Surge in Iraq was a largely urban 
strategy. Unlike Iraq, where a sizeable portion of the population resides in urban areas, 
Afghanistan was a largely rural nation. By the numbers, Iraqi population density in 2009 
was close to 66 people per square mile compared to Afghanistan’s 43.5 people per square 
mile. Iraq also had an urban population of over 19 million (70% of the population), 
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compared to Afghanistan’s 6 million (24% of the population). Securing Afghanistan á la 
Iraq would not make a lot of sense if the main goal of Iraq had been to secure Baghdad 
and its surroundings. To compound this issue, Iraq had been the beneficiary of a Sunni 
Awakening, a local uprising against al-Qaeda, in less populated areas. Without a similar 
movement in Afghanistan, the situation would likely not improve if more rural areas were 
not co-opted or better protected against gains from the Taliban. 
What the U.S. war effort also overlooked was the source of violence and 
resistance to occupation felt by many Afghans. The conflict in Afghanistan was more 
than just the simplified government versus Taliban narrative that the U.S. and NATO had 
relied upon. The continuing violence “had far less to do” with “insurgency and 
counterinsurgency than they did with complex local political dynamics” that more often 
than not revolved around the “narco-economy” and “rival social groups,” which had been 
the basis of conflict in Afghanistan for centuries when foreign powers meddled in the 
country.676 In the 2001-2016 war period, local actors often aligned themselves in relation 
to insurgent or COIN forces based on what suited them the best at any given time.677 
Ultimately, misunderstanding the source of violence resulted in unintentional 
exacerbation of the issues, such as the British led opium eradication program.678 
An increasing resistance to foreign occupation, especially in Pushtoon tribal areas, 
also hindered any progress for the Surge in Afghanistan. As time went on, U.S. and ISAF 
forces had to deal with the fallout of having reintroduced warlords to rural areas, as well 
drone bombings and special operations military missions.679 As one provincial 
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government put it, “people are slowly but surely coming to the conclusion that they are 
an occupied country … and as a result of the bombings, house searches, being bitten by 
dogs, people are thinking the U.S. is worse than the Soviets.”680 The problem these 
actions caused were well noted, but “attempts to address [the issue] remained half-
hearted.”681 Despite COIN being a priority of the Surge era, aggressive counterterror 
continued during the Surge in Afghanistan.682 
Besides the U.S. war effort, Pakistan continued to play a problematic role in 
Afghanistan from 2009-2016. Despite President Obama’s “muted” acknowledgement of 
the role of Pakistan in Afghanistan’s instability, the porous border between the two 
countries continued to make it hard for ISAF to succeed militarily.683 Obama knew the 
importance of stabilizing the border region, emphasizing the area as one combined “Af-
Pak” war zone.684 But in practice, the prescribed remedy of a troop Surge did little to 
alleviate the problem. U.S. and ISAF troops couldn’t just cross the border to go after 
Taliban forces, and the Taliban took advantage of this by establishing a “base from which 
to plan and launch attacks in Afghanistan.”685  
After having been chased out of Afghanistan, the Taliban leadership under Mullah 
Omar regrouped in Pakistan. Mullah Omar and others settled in the Pakistani city of 
Quetta, just a few miles from Afghanistan, and established a shura, or council, to guide 
the Taliban war effort.686 Despite dubious claims regarding the council’s actual 
administrative control over the insurgency, the Quetta Shura was free to operate in the 
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unstable border region, where they were safe from ISAF as well as the Pakistani 
government.687 Highlighting the relative safety in Pakistan for the Taliban and other 
groups, U.S. Special Forces had found Osama hiding in the Pakistani village of 
Abbottabad, nine years after the U.S. had set out to hunt him down. The U.S. could 
initiate raids or use drone strikes in Pakistan, but these often had a political cost for U.S. 
and Pakistan relations, severely limiting military operability over the border. 
With the issues in the Af-Pak region continuing unabated, instability also affected 
the Afghan government, which the U.S. was counting on to assume greater responsibility 
for the war effort after the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Corruption and the autocratic 
leanings of the Karzai government continually endangered the military and stability gains 
of the Surge era. Like the previous era from 2001-2008, the Afghan government was 
successful in angering Afghan civilians who now had to deal with frustrating levels of 
bureaucratic bribes and other modes of corruption to fill out even the most simple of 
forms and applications.  
The increasing levels of corruption soon leaked over into elections as well. In the 
2009 presidential election, serious accusations of voter fraud were raised. A UN official 
at the time recognized that the “election had been marred by ‘widespread fraud,’” even 
after he himself was accused of “covering up fraud to benefit Hamid Karzai.”688 In the 
2010 parliamentary elections, voter fraud concerns were once again raised.689 Combined 
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with Taliban violence targeting the two elections that severely limited voter turnout, 
corruption was severely undermining the new democratic system in Afghanistan.690 
Negative images of the Afghan government did little to help the Surge COIN 
strategy. As mentioned in field manual 3-24, counterinsurgency operations require a 
strong and dependable government to work with. In Afghanistan, U.S. and ISAF forces 
took for granted that the Karzai government could garner political legitimacy.691 
Unfortunately, as time passed, Karzai and his government were “widely and increasingly 
seen by many as weak, corrupt, and abusive.”692 Surge projects implemented by the ISAF 
PRTs, such as the so-called Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), which helped to create local 
“quick wins” by funding infrastructure building and improvements, ultimately worked 
within corrupt local and national frameworks.693 QIPs made some progress, but they 
ultimately helped to “alienate those outside the patronage networks of corrupt and violent 
strongmen” who many Afghans commonly detested. The corruption was so pervasive 
that is was believed that almost every Afghan in the country had been affected by 
corruption in one form or another, severely crippling the already weak legitimacy claims 
of the Karzai government.694. For example, a 2010 UN survey found that “one out two 
Afghans had paid bribes to Afghan officials to obtain basic public services” and that the 
bribe payments had reached about 2.5 billion dollars total that year.695 
The highly autocratic system of government created by Karzai was also partly to 
blame. Karzai’s executive branch had widely powerful influence over the whole of 
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government. For instance, Karzai was responsible for appointing all thirty two provincial 
governors, “creating loyalty to the state” but not necessarily to the Afghan voting 
public.696 To compound the issue of government legitimacy, government services rarely 
covered areas outside of “provincial and district government centers,” and the best 
candidates for government jobs were often reluctant to apply.697 Combined, corruption, 
inept governance, and the political disenfranchisement of the Afghan people made 
relying on the Karzai government difficult at best for the United States and its 
international partners. 
With the U.S. suspicious of the Karzai government, a level of distrust began to 
emerge between both sides. Upon announcement of the Surge, leaders of the Democratic 
Party like President Obama and Nancy Pelosi warned that Karzai would no longer have a 
“blank check of support” from the United States.698 After two elections marred by 
corruption and voter fraud, this sentiment only hardened. For Karzai, he took the rhetoric 
as a sign that the U.S. was planning to abandon him.699 Karzai’s belief was in his mind 
confirmed when he found out that Ambassadors Richard Holbrooke and Eikenberry were 
helping other Afghan candidates to run against him.700 At a time when the U.S. needed to 
rely on Karzai, the foreign interference in the presidential election greatly deteriorated the 
working relationship between them. 
By 2012, the United States began its Surge drawdown, continuing ahead in their 
training and eventual hand off of control to ANSF. With the chances of a military draw 
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between ISAF and the Taliban inching higher, NATO troops also began to transfer power 
to Afghans, with a target date of withdrawal by the end of 2014.701 Despite promises that 
the ISAF withdrawal would be “conditions based,” domestic pressure from NATO 
countries ensured that the “process never stood much chance of being truly 
conditional.”702 The end result of the specific withdrawal timelines is that international 
forces had strict time limits to train Afghan troops who were suffering from high 
desertion rates and corruption. Despite “over fifty-nine billion dollars in U.S. funding,” 
the ANSF continued to “suffer from inadequate logistical, sustainment, and other support 
capabilities” while also being “deeply pervaded by corruption, nepotism, and ethnic and 
patronage fissures.”703 Leaving Afghanistan to the ANSF on a short timeline was looked 
to by many that the U.S. and Obama had adopted a “surge, bribe, and run” war strategy. 
Ultimately the Surge portion of the war in Afghanistan was deemed “at best a 
wildly inefficient partial success and at worst a failure”. Despite increasing troops and 
professing a COIN strategy mantra, President Obama oversaw a mission in Afghanistan 
that failed to ensure a U.S. victory. In reality, the United States hadn’t fully committed to 
a COIN campaign, as clear from the outset when Obama agreed to a compromise strategy 
somewhere between COIN and a strictly counterterror mission. Competing with 
increasingly aggressive drone strikes and special operations mission, the lazily 
implemented COIN portion of the mission in Afghanistan failed to produce anything but 
a draw between the U.S. and the Taliban. As of 2015 post-withdrawal, 10,000 
international troops remained to train the ANSF and conduct special operations mission. 
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With no promise of a U.S. and Taliban ceasefire, the war in Afghanistan has continued 
indefinitely, far from what was promised at the beginning of the war.  
With the failures of the 2009-2016 Surge withdrawal eras in Afghanistan, it is 
possible to examine whether the continuance of a hard offensive counterterrorism 
strategy during the Surge contributed to its failure. In the next section, trends such as U.S. 
and ISAF troop levels, Afghan civilian casualties, Afghan public opinion, and the rate of 
terrorism will be evaluated to evaluate the hypothesis that hard offensive 
counterterrorism results in a failed counterterrorism campaign. 
Afghanistan Surge and Withdrawal Data Trends 2009-2016 
 From 2009-2016, the war in Afghanistan entered its Surge phase, and ultimately a 
withdrawal phase. Though the new era of the war was framed as a COIN mission, the 
reality is that the strategy was a hybrid between COIN and the narrower aggressive 
counterterrorism campaign that predated the Surge. Therefore, because of the hard 
offensive counterterrorism focus, data trends during the Surge should indicate a 
continued rise in terrorism from the pre-Surge era, and also result in a failed 
counterterrorism effort. First, troop level trends for both the U.S. and ISAF during the 
Surge are examined. Second, casualty rates of Afghan civilians are compared to troop 
level trends. Third, Afghan public opinion is examined to see if there is any correlation 
between low public opinion and trends in troop levels and civilian casualties. Lastly, 
trends in troop levels, civilian casualties, and Afghan public opinion are scrutinized to see 
if the Afghanistan Surge resulted in a high rate of terrorism and a failed counterterrorism 
campaign. 
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Afghanistan Troop Levels 2009-2016 
 From 2009-2016, troop levels for both the U.S. and ISAF increased for most of 
the Surge era, then declined as troops were gradually withdrawn from the country (as 
shown in Figure 12). In January 2009, the U.S. and ISAF each had about 32,000 troops 
stationed in Afghanistan. By 2011, U.S. forces had increased from 32,000 to 99,500, and 
ISAF had increased to 42,400 at the peak of the Surge. By January 2015, both militaries 
had drastically reduced their presence to about 10,000 troops apiece to continue training 
the ANSF and continue counterterrorism operations.  
These troop level trends closely mirror political developments in both the U.S. 
and Europe. When President Obama announced the U.S. Surge of 30,000 combat troops, 
NATO agreed to up their troop levels by 7,000 soldiers.704 Just like it had been planned, 
the Surge introduced temporary increases in the number of boots on the ground, 
accompanied with strict withdrawal timetables for the U.S and ISAF. The Surge 
withdrawal timelines were a direct result of both the American and European public 
political pressure on governments involved in Afghanistan. For example, the pressure 
from both Congressional Democrats and by the President’s political advisors inside the 
White House made it clear that Obama’s political tenure would depend on withdrawing 
the troops.705 Ultimately, the troop levels had less to do with conditions on the ground 
and more to do with the political objectives of the United States and its allies.  
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Figure 14. Total Number of U.S. and ISAF Troops Stationed in Afghanistan from 2009-
2016706 
 
Afghan Civilian Casualties 2009-2016 
 Afghan civilian casualties during the 2009-2016 Surge increased to levels higher 
than even the initial U.S. invasion of Afghanistan produced (seen in Figure 13). Despite a 
dip in casualties from 2011-2013, a record number of 3,701 casualties were recorded by 
the United Nations. Possibly the increasing numbers of civilian casualties are a result of 
the Obama administration’s increasing use of drone strikes and special operations 
missions that was occurring parallel to the Surge COIN mission. Despite concerns of 
“over-reliance on firepower and force protection” tarnishing ISAF’s legitimacy “in the 
eyes of the Afghan people,” hard offensive counterterrorism missions continued unabated 
during the Surge period.707  
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In relation to Surge troop levels, increased levels of troops appear to have 
contributed to the increase in casualties. Before the troop Surge, civilian casualties were 
much lower. During the Surge, casualties increased and then continued to increase well 
after the Surge forces began to withdraw. With the use of rampant hard counterterrorism 
strategies from 2009-2016, no remarkable reduction in civilian casualties occurred as 
troops increased. 
 
Figure 15. Yearly Estimated Number of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan 2009-2016708 
 
Afghan Public Opinion 2009-2016 
 Afghan public opinion on the direction of the country and the presence of the 
United States actually slowly increased after implementation of the Surge from 2009 to 
2014, and then dropped as the U.S. and ISAF presence waned into 2006. Unlike the 
2001-2008 period, public opinion in Afghanistan became regularly measured phenomena 
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with the help of the Asia Foundation. However, the same polling challenges apply. 
Polling was much easier in areas secured by higher military presence, such as Kabul, but 
much more dangerous in rural areas under Taliban control. Therefore, despite efforts to 
control for oversampling of urban regions, it is likely that public opinion may skew 
towards urban areas where the U.S. presence was much more tolerated by Afghans living 
there. Despite its limitations, Afghan public opinion polling can provide insight into how 
they perceived the war, and in effect counterterrorism operations. 
In 2009, 42% of Afghans polled believed Afghanistan was headed in the right 
direction (shown in Figure 16). By 2013, public opinion had peaked at 58% responding 
that the country was going in a good direction. Conversely, negative public opinion was 
also gaining ground. In 2009, those that responded that Afghanistan was headed in the 
wrong direction was polling at 29%, and by 2014 had rose to 40%. And by 2016, the 
wrong direction respondents became the majority, at 66%. While the majority of Afghans 
polled had a positive outlook, the rising discontent was likely disconcerting for the U.S., 
ISAF, and ANSF. With two divergent trends present, it is important to understand trends 
in other public opinion polling in the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
159 
 
Figure 16. Percentage of Afghans Who Felt Afghanistan was Heading in the Right or 
Wrong Direction709 
 
  
Reasons for responses to which direction Afghanistan was headed were very 
similar to the 2001 to 2008 period (shown in Table 20). Like the pre-surge era, Afghans 
who responded positively cited good security and reconstruction efforts as two of the 
highest percentage responses. 44% responded that good security influenced their 
response in 2009, and about that many responded the same from 2010-2012, before 
Afghan public opinion in general began trending downward during the Surge withdrawal. 
Respondents who answered reconstruction as their explanation made up another 30-40% 
of those polled from 2009 to 2014. 
 
 
 
                                                     
709 Tabasum et al, “Afghanistan in 2018,” 17. 
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Table 20. Reasons by Percent Why Afghan Respondents Feel Afghanistan is Headed in 
Right Direction 2009-2015710 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Good Security 44% 38% 39% 41% 24% 33% 29% 
Reconstruction 36% 35% 40% 35% 33% 36% 32% 
Schools for Girls Have Opened 21% 15% 10% 13% 12% 8% 9% 
Peace/ End of War 9% 12% 7% 7% 7% 6% 11% 
Having Active ANA and ANP 7% 6% 11% 13% 12% 10% 10% 
Improvements in Education 0% 10% 16% 13% 13% 15% 10% 
Good Government 12% 9% 9% 5% 5% 6% 10% 
Economic Revival 6% 10% 8% 8% 6% 9% 8% 
Democracy/ Elections 10% 7% 3% 3% 6% 9% 7% 
 
 For negative responses, the reasons were also similar to the 2001-2008 period. 
Insecurity, corruption, and economic issues were all prevalent responses for why 
Afghanistan was headed in the wrong direction (as seen in Table 21). Insecurity trended 
in the upper-30% to mid-40% from 2009-2015. Corruption, through a combination of two 
separate response categories regularly made up 20-30% of responses, while a bad 
economy and unemployment made up another 30-40% of responses during the surge 
period. Ultimately, the results on concerns of pessimistic Afghans reflect many of the 
same issues leveled at the U.S. and Afghan government in the first eight years of conflict 
                                                     
710 Zachary Warren et al, "Afghanistan in 2015: A Survey of the Afghan People," The Asia Foundation, 
Accessed 7/15/19, https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Afghanistanin2015.pdf, 19. 
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continued from 2009-2016. For example, over 70% of Afghans polled stated that they felt 
that corruption was a major problem in Afghanistan as a whole from 2006 to 2016.711 
 
Table 21. Reasons by Percent of Why Afghan Respondents Feel Afghanistan is Headed 
in Wrong Direction 2009-2015712 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Insecurity 42% 44% 45% 38% 24% 38% 45% 
Unemployment 15% 16% 13% 18% 20% 23% 25% 
Corruption 17% 12% 16% 14% 23% 15% 13% 
Bad Government 25% 18% 15% 11% 7% 5% 11% 
Bad Economy 11% 8% 10% 10% 8% 10% 12% 
Administrative Corruption 10% 15% 4% 10% 6% 10% 5% 
Suicide Attacks 6% 8% 11% 11% 11% 7% 7% 
Presence of Taliban 7% 6% 7% 6% 8% 6% 6% 
 
 From the public opinion polling data, there is also reason to believe that the 
Afghan people were tiring of the Taliban insurgency. From 2009-2016, sympathy 
(ranging from a little sympathy to a lot of sympathy) for armed opposition groups such as 
the Taliban fell from about 56% to 16%, whereas those who had no sympathy at all for 
the groups increased from 36% to 77% (see Figure 17). Afghans were very concerned 
that as international forces withdrew the Taliban would make a resurgence in the country. 
                                                     
711 Zachary Warren et al, "Afghanistan in 2016: a Survey of the Afghan People," The Asia Foundation, 
Accessed 7/15/19, https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2016_Survey-of-the-Afghan-
People_full-survey.Dec2016.pdf, 108. 
712 Warren et al, “Afghanistan in 2015,” 21. 
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In 2013 and 2014, a Gallup poll revealed that a large percentage of Afghans expected the 
Taliban presence to increase as U.S. and NATO forces left the country, at 59% and 46% 
respectively in those years.713 
 
Figure 17. Percentage of Afghans Polled on Their Sympathy Towards Armed Opposition 
Groups 2009-2016714 
 
 With rising concerns of the Taliban re-emerging after the end of the Surge, public 
opinion showed a general anxiety about international forces leaving, but also positive 
perceptions and confidence in the transition to ANSF control. When asked how 
Afghanistan would be after the U.S. and NATO withdrawal in 2014, around 40% of 
Afghans polled in 2013 and 2014 responded that the country would be worse off after the 
withdrawal, compared to 17-18% who thought Afghanistan would be better off.715  
                                                     
713 Julie Ray, "Many Afghans Expect Life to Be Worse After Troops Leave," Gallup, (January 14, 2015), 
Accessed 7/15/19, https://news.gallup.com/poll/180965/afghans-expect-life-worse-troops-
leave.aspx?g_source=link_NEWSV9&g_medium=TOPIC&g_campaign=item_&g_content=Many%2520A
fghans%2520Expect%2520Life%2520to%2520Be%2520Worse%2520After%2520Troops%2520Leave. 
714 Warren et al, “Afghanistan in 2016,” 51. 
715 Ray, Gallup. 
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Positive perceptions of the ANSF were also prevalent. For the ANA, around 50% 
of Afghans from 2009-2016 believed that the army was honest and fair, helps improve 
security, and protects civilians.716 For the ANP, the percentage was about 40% for those 
that felt the police were honest and fair, and help improve security, but given that police 
corruption was an endemic issue, this is not surprising.717 Confidence in the ANSF also 
increased from 2009-2013, as 51% of Afghans confident in the military in 2009 jumped 
to 80% in 2013.718 Afghans who didn’t express confidence in the military dropped from 
42% in 2009 to 19% in 2013.719 
After 2014, an aura of unfinished business permeated Afghan public opinion. 
Many of the polls that recorded public opinion from 2009 to 2016 recorded a significant 
drop in positive public opinion in the years following the Surge withdrawal. For example, 
those who said Afghanistan was headed in the right direction declined significantly, from 
55% in 2014 to 29% in 2016.720 The most obvious conclusion that can be drawn from the 
decline is that Afghans had serious anxiety about the security that the U.S. and ISAF had 
provided, especially in urban areas like Kabul, being withdrawn. This finding is very 
similar to observations drawn about the Iraq Surge, where Iraqis supported increased 
security that international forces brought, but were less supportive of the foreign troops 
themselves. Though many Afghans were likely ambivalent to continued foreign presence 
in Afghanistan, they also supported and enjoyed the progress in security. 
                                                     
716 Warren et al., “Afghanistan in 2016,” 48. 
717 Warren et al.,, 47. 
718 Mohamed Younis, "Most Afghans Lack Confidence in Elections," Gallup, (April 2, 2014), Accessed 
7/16/19,  https://news.gallup.com/poll/168200/afghans-lack-confidence-
elections.aspx?g_source=link_NEWSV9&g_medium=TOPIC&g_campaign=item_&g_content=Most%252
0Afghans%2520Lack%2520Confidence%2520in%2520Elections.  
719 Younis, “Most Afghans Lack Confidence in Elections,” Gallup. 
720 Akseer, Tabasum et al. “Afghanistan in 2018”, 17. 
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So, as U.S. and ISAF troop numbers dwindled, it seems that many Afghans were 
guarded about just how low the gains of the Surge would last in the coming years. With 
the reduced troop numbers, the U.S. had failed to broker peace and reconciliation with 
their Taliban adversaries. It is then noticeable that in 2015, that 62.9% of Afghans 
believed that the peace process could help stabilize the country.721 Despite regional 
variations (less people in Kabul supported the process than in the Taliban heavy 
southwest regions), a sizeable majority of Afghans most likely felt that a U.S. withdrawal 
without reconciliation with the Taliban was a mistake.722 
In the 2009 to 2016 period, Afghan public opinion had a reverse relationship with 
troop levels. The higher troop levels were, the more optimistic and positive polling 
responses were recorded. As the withdrawal entered critical phases, more negative public 
opinion was prevalent. For civilian casualties however, casualties mounted as foreign 
troops left in droves. Therefore, it is possible to correlate lowered positive public opinion 
with increasing civilian casualties but no direct link between troop levels and public 
opinion, unlike the 2001-2008 period.  Likely, the public opinion findings of the 2009-
2016 Surge era in Afghanistan point to some gains in public opinion from introducing a 
renewed focus on COIN instead of relying on hard offensive terrorism. How does this 
play into the rate of terrorism during the Afghanistan Surge and withdrawal phases of the 
war? 
The Rate of Afghan Terrorism from 2009-2016 
 From 2009-2016, the rate of terrorism in Afghanistan linearly increased (shown in 
Figure 18). Most dramatically, 503 terrorist attacks were recorded in 2009, which 
                                                     
721 Warren et al., “Afghanistan in 2016,” 50. 
722 Ibid. 
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increased to 1,619 terrorist attacks in 2016. In the first few years of the Surge, terrorism 
increased, with the exception being 2011. With the Surge at full strength, U.S. and ISAF 
were able to dampen the number of terrorist attacks. However, terrorist attacks that year 
were still fairly high when compared to terrorist attack rates from 2001-2008. 
 In comparison with troop levels, like previously mentioned, terrorist attacks were 
lower when more troops were present. With U.S. forces capped at 100,000 troops, 
terrorist rates were much lower than when troop levels were lower starting in 2012. As 
the withdrawal was put in place, terrorist attacks skyrocketed. Like in Iraq, the Surge 
strategy helped to reduce terrorist attacks, but it is possible that the Surge wasn’t in place 
long enough to do any long term help. Also, as some critics as the Obama administration 
in Afghanistan point out, a set withdrawal date might have helped to embolden Taliban 
elements as troops left the country. 
 The same can be said for civilian casualties. With full implementation of Surge 
forces, a slight dip in casualty rates occurred, but was then followed by yet another 
increase. It can be argued that the mild dip in casualties wasn’t that noticeable because of 
the hard offensive counterterrorism drone strikes and special operations raids that 
occurred in tandem with the Surge COIN operation. Without widespread use remote 
bombings and sometimes extralegal special ops raids, the rate of casualties might have 
decreased further.  
 In Afghan public opinion, more troops actually resulted in higher positive public 
opinion towards the direction of Afghanistan and the presence of international forces. 
This is very similar to findings from the Iraq Surge, where the COIN mission there also 
increased public opinion. Security was of high importance for both Iraqis and Afghans, as 
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both countries benefitted from increased security during the Surge eras. As public support 
and interest from the United States waned towards both wars, so did Afghan public 
opinion. 
 While comparing the data of troop levels, civilian casualties, afghan public 
opinion, and the rate of terrorism in Afghanistan, a more sustained COIN mission in 
Afghanistan might have been more successful. In part due to the briefness of the full 
strength Surge and lingering use of hard offensive counterterrorism, the Surge in 
Afghanistan didn’t achieve lasting peace. With these findings, it is plausible that hard 
offensive counterterrorism does indeed result in failure, whereas a softer strategy (with 
appropriate troop levels) reduces terrorism and is more successful. However, for the 
withdrawal, a softer strategy combined with fewer troops actually led to counterterrorism 
failure. For both conclusions, other factors are also at play. For instance, the lack of 
political commitment to the Surge sent a message to the Taliban that the U.S wasn’t 
likely to stay in Afghanistan long. After initial Surge success, the Taliban could have 
become more emboldened as the full withdrawal deadline approached. Therefore, the 
hypothesis is possible, but not entirely conclusive. 
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Figure 18. Rate of Terrorism in Afghanistan 2009-2016723 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
723 Global Terrorism Database [gtd_96to13_0718dist], National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START), (2019), Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. 
0
50
100
150
200
250
2
0
0
9
 J
an
u
ar
y
A
p
ri
l
Ju
ly
O
ct
o
b
e
r
2
0
1
0
 J
an
u
ar
y
A
p
ri
l
Ju
ly
O
ct
o
b
e
r
2
0
1
1
 J
an
u
ar
y
A
p
ri
l
Ju
ly
O
ct
o
b
e
r
2
0
1
2
 J
an
u
ar
y
A
p
ri
l
Ju
ly
O
ct
o
b
e
r
2
0
1
3
 J
an
u
ar
y
A
p
ri
l
Ju
ly
O
ct
o
b
e
r
2
0
1
4
 J
an
u
ar
y
A
p
ri
l
Ju
ly
O
ct
o
b
e
r
2
0
1
5
 J
an
u
ar
y
A
p
ri
l
Ju
ly
O
ct
o
b
e
r
2
0
1
6
 J
an
u
ar
y
A
p
ri
l
Ju
ly
O
ct
o
b
e
r
Number of Recorded Terrorist Attacks
 
 
168 
 
CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion 
 In this examination of hard offensive counterterrorism, I first lay out a 
methodology for research based on the existing counterterrorism literature. Four 
categories of counterterrorism can be distinguished, though hybrids like 
counterinsurgency exist. Hard offensive counterterrorism utilizes force to pre-empt 
terrorist activity and include strategies like leadership decapitation and deterrence. I then 
explain the hypothesis that hard offensive counterterrorism results in the failure of a 
counterterrorism strategy. Additionally, I lay out variables such as troop levels, civilian 
casualties, public opinion, and the rate of terrorism, as well as their respective sources of 
data. 
 In the following chapter, counterterrorism in Iraq is discussed. In the first section, 
the history and politics of Iraq from 2003-2006 reveals that the hard offensive 
counterterrorism strategy of “traditional war” was used, and resulted in increased 
terrorism, violence, and instability. In the following section, data shows that when hard 
offensive counterterrorism was paired with increased troops, civilian casualties, lowered 
public opinion, and terrorism increased. The history and politics of Iraq from 2007-2011 
is also examined. The 2007-2011 period included a Surge and a withdrawal, where a 
counterinsurgency approach to counterterrorism was used. In the Surge era, 
counterinsurgency and increased troops resulted in lower civilian casualties, higher 
public opinion, and a lowered rate of terrorism, which resulted in the Surge being a 
success. In the withdrawal era, troop levels were lowered and indicators from the Surge 
were reversed, resulting in a counterterrorism failure. 
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 The next chapter looks at the war in Afghanistan. In the first section, the history 
and politics of the pre-Surge era from 2001-208 is introduced. In the pre-Surge period, 
hard offensive counterterrorism resulted increased terrorism from a Taliban insurgency. 
The data from 2001-2008 shows that terrorism increased as troop levels were raised, as 
well as high civilian casualties and lowered public opinion. Next, the Surge and 
withdrawal period in Afghanistan from 2009-2016 is examined. The Surge helped to 
produce a slight decrease in terrorism and instability when it was at full strength. The 
data reveals that troop levels were high, the rate of terrorism as well as civilian casualties 
were reduced, positive public opinion increased, and the Surge was a relative success. It 
is possible that the brief reduction in terrorism was the result of increasing hard offensive 
counterterrorism in tandem with a limited counterinsurgency strategy dulled the 
effectiveness of the Surge in reducing terrorism. In the withdrawal, the indicators once 
again reversed and resulted in counterterrorism failure. 
 Therefore, based on findings from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, hard 
offensive counterterrorism can plausibly lead to a failed counterterrorism campaign. 
When a softer counterterrorism method is utilized, such as counterinsurgency, reductions 
in the rate of terrorism can be observed. In addition, the effectiveness of troop levels is 
changed depending on what category of counterterrorism strategy is used. When hard 
offensive counterterrorism tactics are combined with higher troop levels, high civilian 
casualties and lowered public opinion increase, and therefore, terrorism increases as well. 
In contrast, when counterinsurgency tactics are used with higher troop levels, rates of 
terrorism are reduced, in addition lower civilian casualties and higher public opinion.  
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However, as illustrated by the history and politics of both wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the result of the counterterrorism strategies are also influenced by a myriad 
of other variables, so the results of this study are still rather inconclusive. What should be 
gleaned from both wars is that counterterrorism results are influenced by unique 
developments in each country. The result in Iraq didn’t necessarily line up with the result 
in Afghanistan, for reasons such as the rural geography of Afghanistan, the lack of an 
indigenous Afghan “Awakening” against the Taliban, and the lack of political 
commitment to counterinsurgency by the Obama administration.  
Another finding is that lower troop levels also affected the outcome of a given 
counterterrorism strategy in the level of civilian casualties and rate of terrorism. As 
illustrated in Figure 19, Hard offensive counterterrorism was more successful when there 
were less troops in lowering civilian casualties and terrorism. Conversely, 
counterinsurgency was less effective when there were fewer troops and led to higher 
civilian casualties and a high rate of terrorism. It is possible that counterterrorism 
strategies and troop levels have a converse relationship.  
Therefore, the occupation theory presented by Pape that links high levels of 
troops to higher levels of local resistance, is too simple. The issue of occupation is a lot 
more complex, and a more nuanced stance should be that the particular counterterrorism 
strategy utilized also influences the outcome on an occupation. When hard offensive 
counterterrorism is used, less troops results in less violence and terrorism. Conversely, 
counterinsurgency with too few troops results in higher violence and terrorism. More 
research needs to be done in order to further evaluate the different results from hard 
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offensive counterterrorism and softer means of counterterrorism, such as 
counterinsurgency. 
 
Figure 19. Relationship Between Counterterrorism Strategies and Troop Levels 
Low Troop Levels High Troop Levels 
 
 
Low Civilian Casualties 
and Low Rate of Terrorism 
High Civilian Casualties 
and High Rate of 
Terrorism 
Hard Counterterrorism 
High Civilian Casualties 
and High Rate of Terrorism 
Low Civilian Casualties 
and Low Rate of 
Terrorism 
Soft Counterterrorism 
 
 It is important to also note that conclusions drawn from this study into 
counterterrorism strategies applies mostly to hard offensive counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency undertaken by a foreign counterterrorism entity against foreign 
terrorism. Findings from this study are not sufficiently generalizable without significant 
testing of domestic counterterrorism strategy and policy. Domestic counterterrorism 
would benefit from an analysis of its own strategies in future research. 
For additional future research, other types of counterinsurgency strategies should 
be evaluated against hard offensive counterterrorism. This means exploring new case 
studies in counterterrorism as well as strategies such as hard and soft defensive 
counterterrorism. By finding new case studies, insights into other areas and different 
governments can help expand knowledge of counterterrorism. The biggest take away 
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from research in counterterrorism is that every case study is slightly different. For 
instance, counterterrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan had varied results that changed 
depending on the situation inside the country. For Iraq, much of the focus of 
counterterrorism was on urban areas, especially inside the capital city of Baghdad. For 
Afghanistan, counterterrorism activities were undertaken in more remote, rural areas. 
Introducing more case studies to the study of counterterrorism would elucidate more 
information to infer what commonalities exist between counterterrorism strategies used in 
different regions. 
 Future research should also look to undergo public opinion polling specifically 
tailored to populations that are affected by terrorism. Polling used in this evaluation of 
hard offensive counterterrorism relies upon public opinion polling more closely related to 
the U.S. war effort, political reconciliation between groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 
questions of rebuilding and reconstruction. More polling should be done that helps to 
better understand the underlying mechanisms of alienation and collateral damage in 
populations that are susceptible to participating in terrorism, and their reasons for doing 
so. 
 Ultimately, the research on counterterrorism presented should serve as caution for 
governments deciding on which counterterrorism strategy to pursue. All options should 
be thoroughly discussed in order for counterterrorism and policy officials to understand 
the side effects of a given hard offensive counterterrorism strategy. Governments may not 
be prepared for a backlash of increased rates of terrorism when they pursue their 
counterterrorism goals. Within the “War on Terror,” the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had 
unintended consequences. After withdrawal from Iraq, world governments faced a new 
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threat from ISIS which continued to carry out terrorist attacks after al-Qaeda had been 
severely weakened. It is possible that the War on Terror was thought of as a quick entry 
and exit war, whereas solving the issue of terrorism in the Middle East might require 
much more patience than typically thought. 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
ANA   Afghan National Army 
ANP   Afghan National Police 
ANSF   Afghan National Security Forces 
BBC   British Broadcasting Corporation 
CERP   Commander’s Emergency Response Program 
CIA   Central Intelligence Agency 
CJTF-7  Combined Joint Task Force 7 
COIN   Counterinsurgency 
CPA   Coalition Provisional Authority 
FOB   Forward operating base 
GOP   Grand Old Party (Republican Party) 
GTD   Global Terrorism Database 
IED   Improvised explosive device 
IGC   Iraqi Governing Council 
ISAF   International Security Assistance Force 
ISI   Inter-Services Intelligence Agency 
ISIS   Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
JCS   Joint Chiefs of Staff 
MNF-I   Multi-National Force-Iraq 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO   Nongovernmental Organization 
OEF   Operation Enduring Freedom 
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ORHA   Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 
OSD   Office of the Secretary of Defense 
PRT   Province Reconstruction Team 
SCIRI   Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq 
UN   United Nations 
UNAMA  United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
USAID  United States Agency for International Development 
USCENTCOM United States Central Command 
USSR   Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WMD   Weapon of mass destruction 
LIST OF NON-ENGLISH TERMS 
Al-qaeda  The base 
Fardh al-qanoon Enforcing the law 
Ibnaa al-Iraq  Sons of Iraq 
Ibn al-balad  Son of the soil 
Loya jirga  Traditional Afghan tribal assembly 
Mujahideen  Islamic freedom fighters 
 
